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Abstract 
International analysts tend to view China as a major beneficiary of the TRIPS 
Agreement, particularly concerning the effects of the stronger patents of TRIPS on local 
innovation. Chinese policymakers were also motivated to adopt TRIPS IP reforms by 
the expectation that stronger patents would stimulate China’s development and improve 
its ability to match the performance of developed countries more rapidly. Yet, due to the 
lack of empirical studies, these assumptions remain theoretical. This research 
investigates empirical evidence to test these assumptions and determine actual impacts 
on China’s pharmaceutical innovation. It seeks to answer two main questions: (1) how 
has the TRIPS legal framework affected China’s ability to formulate a pro-development 
patent policy for pharmaceuticals? (2) how has China’s patent policy affected domestic 
pharmaceutical innovation? The investigation adopts a public health perspective, 
through comparative legal analysis and statistical study. The empirical assessment was 
built on country-level data collection.  
 
The legal evaluation has revealed that China has adopted a pro-patent policy for 
pharmaceuticals, in implementing TRIPS, Chinese policy-makers did not balance 
intrinsic industry interests in strong patent protection against wider socio-economic 
interests and issues under Chinese law and legal practices. This research has found that 
China’s pro-patent policy has had multifaceted economic effects on innovation. 
Whereas, positive effects of patent strengthening were indentified empirically through 
innovation indicators, including patent applications and grants, R&D expenditure and 
ITT inflow, the study also revealed various problems and challenges. Local innovation 
remains imitation-oriented, little R&D is devoted to researching cures for major 
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diseases, more MNC patents control leading and upstream technologies, and patent 
litigation has greatly increased. These developments do not augur well for China’s 
ability to approach developed countries in pharmaceutical innovation. The Chinese 
experience revealed in this thesis contrasts with conventional expectations of the effects 
of TRIPS, at least in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research themes  
 
‘Developing country members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) no longer have 
the policy options and flexibilities developed countries had in using IPRs to support 
their national development.’4 This lamentation represents a core concern about the 
limitations imposed by a WTO agreement, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS or the TRIPS Agreement), on the developing members’ 
legislative autonomy in framing national intellectual property rights (IPRs) systems. 
Economic history has proven that such legislative adaptability was instrumental in 
promoting indigenous technological and economic progress. It is argued that today’s 
developed countries enjoyed and benefited from such legislative autonomy in their 
economic developmental stages.5  
 
Some scholars contend that a harmonised IPRs system can bring in efficiency gains 
from an economic standpoint.6 The United States has been active in convincing other 
nations to adopt a stronger IPRs regime since strengthening its own patent system in the 
1980s. Over the course of a long campaign, the US has not only succeeded in the 
                                                 
4
 UNCTAD-ICTSD (2003), 'Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for Development', (Geneva: 
UNCTAD-ICTSD), pIV. 
5
 For the review of the argument, see Chang, HJ (2002), Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy 
in Historical Perspective (London: Anthem Press), Dutfield, G (2005), 'Is the World Ready for 
Substantive Patent Law Harmonisation? A Lesson from History', in Peter Drahos (ed.), Death of Patents 
(Witney: Lawtext).  
6
 E.g., Abbot, F and Gurry, F (1999), The International Intellectual Property System: Commentary and 
Materials (1; The Hague: Kluwer Law International), p603; Maskus, K (2000), Intellectual Property 
Rights in the Global Economy (Washington DC: Institute of International Economics), p89 (‘The strength 
of IPR is a significant and positive determinant of international business activity. Stronger global IPRs 
could enhance dynamic efficiency with which resources are allocated internationally, which should help 
mitigate any adverse distributional consequence.’).  
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incorporation of the TRIPS Agreement into the charter of the WTO but also in 
pressuring more and more nations into bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with so-
called ‘TRIPS –plus’ IPRs provisions.7 The US arguments include that stronger patent 
protection would stimulate a higher level of local innovation, attract greater investments 
and market entry by innovative companies, and promote larger disclosure and 
circulation of technical information.8 Concerning the health impacts of the Agreement, 
some economists express optimism about the dynamic benefits of strong patents in 
directing additional R&D research devoted to diseases prevalent in developing 
countries,9 and they suggest such a dynamic benefit together with the others can provide 
long-term benefits offsetting the higher drug prices imposed by patents.10 
 
Both of the above arguments are narrowly framed and do not reflect the multifaceted 
and diverse impacts the patent norms in the TRIPS Agreement have on development. 
They do, however, highlight two salient points often debated in the global IPRs 
discourse: the policy and economic effects of TRIPS implementation. The former 
concerns how the TRIPS’ universal approach affects IPRs policy-making and legislative 
adaptability in developing countries; the latter stresses economic consequences resulting 
from IPRs laws and policies adopted under the TRIPS framework. The existing research 
on these subjects is either theoretical or based on countries’ pre-TRIPS experience. 
                                                 
7
 These US arguments are well-documented in the academic literature. E.g., Ryan, M (1998), Knowledge 
Diplomacy: global competition and the politics of intellectual property (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution); Drahos, P (2001), 'Bits and Bips: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property ', The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property, 4 (6), pp791-808; Matthews, D (2002), Globalising the 
Intellectual Property Rights (London: Routledge). Sell, S (2003), Private Power, Public Law: The 
Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
8
 Abbot, F (2001), 'The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial 
Conference', (Quaker UN Office Occasional Paper No. 7), p5.  
9
 Diwan, I and Dani, R (1991), 'Patents, Appropriate Technology, and North-South Trade', Policy 
Research Working Paper (Washington D.C.: The World Bank). Maskus, K (2000), Intellectual Property 
Rights in the Global Economy (Washington DC: Institute of International Economics) 
10
 Maskus, K (2000), p164. 
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Consequently, there is a pressing need for a scholarly examination of the actual TRIPS 
implementation experience in developing countries. This empirical study aims to test 
the above arguments by examining China’s early experience in implementing TRIPS 
patents rules in the pharmaceutical field. It is submitted that if the actual policy and 
economic effects of TRIPS implementation in China can be indentified empirically, 
imperfect as it may be, they can provide a valuable aid for developing governments to 
execute the Agreement on a better informed basis. 
1.2 Research scope and background  
 
The investigation of this empirical study focuses on the impacts of the implementation 
of the TRIPS Agreement in the pharmaceutical industry. This is an area in which 
scholars have perceived the TRIPS rules to have the most profound effects both on IPRs 
policy-making and on economic development involving the pharmaceutical industry in 
developing countries.  
 
The TRIPS Agreement obliges members to provide patent protection to all fields of 
technology for twenty years’ duration. This mandate has deprived member countries of 
their traditional legislative autonomy in the pharmaceutical field. Prior to the TRIPS 
Agreement, international treaties had recognized the members’ freedom to tailor their 
national patent systems to their national interests and development level. Therefore, 
different legal standards for pharmaceutical patents had existed to greater or lesser 
extent among various jurisdictions, regarding areas of non-patentability, the rights 
conferred to patentees, the durations and terms of these rights, etc.11 Countries with a 
stronger pharmaceutical industry like the US tend to grant strong patent protection as an 
                                                 
11Gad, M (2006), Representational Fairness in WTO Rule-Making (London: British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law), p52. 
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institutional advantage to support its ‘national champion’. Some other developed 
countries allowed pharmaceuticals to be patented only when their technology achieved 
sophistication and competitiveness. France did so in 1960, Ireland in 1964, Germany in 
1968, Japan in 1976, Switzerland in 1977, Italy and Sweden both in 1978, and Spain in 
1992.12 For developing countries, it has always been in their interests to exclude product 
patents for pharmaceuticals to meet their needs to improve public health in particular 
and to advance indigenous technical development in general. Prior to TRIPS, drugs 
were not patentable in about fifty developing countries.13 
 
The TRIPS Agreement precludes such different legislative treatment on medicines and 
makes protection of product patents to new medicines mandatory. Article 27.1 stipulates 
that ‘patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all 
fields of technology….. Patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
discrimination as to the field of technology and whether products are imported or 
locally produced’. This provision rules out the common practice of excluding 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals in developing countries’ patent law.14 Article 33 unifies 
the patent term as twenty-years at least from the filing date of application. As a result, 
the legal framework governing manufacturing, commercialisation of and access to 
medicines has been altered dramatically in developing countries.15  
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 Lanjouw, J (1997), 'The Introduction of Pharmaceutical product patents in India: 'Heartless 
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The process of implementing the TRIPS Agreement has caused great concerns about the 
impact of patents on health welfare in developing countries. These concerns provoke 
intense political and legislative backlash against pharmaceutical patents, particularly in 
the context of the HIV/AIDs pandemic in developing countries.16 To respond to the 
international concerns about access to medicine in developing countries, the WHO 
Ministerial Conference of 2001 adopted the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health (Doha Declaration 2001). Doha Declaration 2001 recognizes the 
concerns about patents’ effects on medicine prices17 and reaffirms the legitimacy of the 
use of mechanisms under the Agreement, commonly called TRIPS flexibilities, in 
circumscribing patent monopoly for better access to essential medicines. Other reforms 
have addressed legal barriers to the utilisation of one of the key TRIPS flexibilities, 
compulsory licences. Initially, the Agreement only permitted the products manufactured 
under compulsory licensing to be used within the domestic market; this precluded many 
developing countries without manufacturing capability from participating in the 
compulsory license system. The WTO General Council passed a decision on August 30, 
2003, which created a temporary mechanism to allow WTO member states to issue 
compulsory licenses to export generic substitutes to countries without sufficient or with 
no health manufacturing capability.18  On December 6, 2005, WTO member states 
                                                 
16For example, South Africa adopted provisions allowing for parallel importation of medicine as well as 
the use of compulsory licences in certain circumstance. In 1998, 39 multinational pharmaceutical 
companies brought a legal suit against the South African government. After intense global NGO 
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 Matthews, D (2004), 'WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
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of International Economic Law, 7 (1).  
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reached an agreement to modify Article31 (f) of the TRIPS, thus legitimising such a 
mechanism.19 
 
Conversely, a counter movement has emerged from beyond the TRIPS forum. New 
measures, either introducing a higher level of patent standards on medicines than those 
under the TRIPS Agreement or reducing the scope and effectiveness of TRIPS 
flexibilities, are increasingly negotiated under the free trade agreements (FTAs) 
between developed countries, especially the US, and developing countries.20 These 
measures include a broadening of patent scope, patent term extension, compulsory 
license restrictions, parallel exportation prohibition, extensive data protection, patent 
registration linkage and so on.21 These provisions are infamously termed as ‘TRIPS-
plus’ provisions.22  
 
This new movement under FTAs opens up new frontiers about the nature, state and 
effects of TRIPS implementation in developing countries. To sign up the IPRs 
provisions under the FTAs implies either abandoning the TRIPS flexibilities or agreeing 
to the higher level of patent standards on medicines and other technical products. The 
development of a mutually exclusive two-tiered global IPRs system raises more 
questions. It is broadly recognized by development agencies that it is in developing 
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countries’ interests to interpret TRIPS as a ceiling and to utilize its built-in flexibility 
mechanisms in full.23 So, why have some developing members of the WTO opted out of 
the TRIPS minimum regime and adopted a TRIPS-plus approach in the process of 
TRIPS implementation? Do they really believe the higher level of patent protection is 
more conducive to their development, or have they agreed due to a misunderstanding of 
the likely effects or to political pressure and compromise? To answer these questions, it 
is necessary to examine the impacts of TRIPS and TRIPS-plus patent regimes on local 
innovation to determine whether the new patent regimes have induced a higher level of 
innovation and technology diffusion or raised roadblocks for local firms for acquiring 
and developing new technologies in developing countries. The next section discusses 
how these impacts may be explored through a case study on the Peoples’ Republic of 
China (China).  
1.3 The significance of a case study on China   
 
A study on China’s experience of TRIPS and TRIPS-plus implementation in the 
pharmaceutical area may provide the information and insights needed to answer the 
above questions.  
 
First, China’s early experience with the TRIPS’ pharmaceutical patent regime makes an 
apt example for exploring the impacts of TRIPS on development. China appeared to 
show fewer qualms about the possible repercussions of TRIPS than many other 
developing countries. While developing countries, led by India and Brazil, opposed the 
wholesale imposition of western IPR standards by the US and EU countries during the 
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 Such as UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005), 'Resource book on TRIPS and Development', available at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/ResourceBookIndex.htm, CIPR (2002), ‘Integrating Intellectual 
Property Rights and Development Policy', in (London: UK International Development).  
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TRIPS negotiations, China introduced TRIPS-style patent rules for pharmaceuticals as 
early as 1992.24 Now that more than fifteen years have passed, some early impacts of 
TRIPS on development perhaps can be observed and understood through this empirical 
study on China.  
 
Secondly, China has also taken a different course from many other developing countries 
in response to the TRIPS-plus agenda. During the TRIPS implementation process, 
developing countries at China’s comparable development position, such as India and 
Brazil, strongly resisted the IPRs overly protectionist tendencies and actively exploited 
the TRIPS flexibilities to promote public health and other development interests. In 
contrast, China introduced TRIPS-plus provisions for pharmaceutical patents under the 
first two Chinese patent reforms in 1992 and 2000, and these remain largely unaltered 
and unchallenged to date despite the recent adoption of key TRIPS flexibilities under 
the 2008 amendment of Chinese patent law.  
 
Finally, China is one of the world’s main suppliers of generic drugs, including anti-
retroviral. Yet, in 2006, the per capita drug expenditure in China was less than US$20, 
among the lowest in the world, and the annual drug expenditure for the majority of rural 
people, who account for 80% of the population, was even lower, below US$5 per 
capita.25 Thus, despite its recent success in economic growth and poverty reduction, 
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 According to Liu, XH, an Chinese law maker, the 1992 amendment of the Chinese patent law made a 
direct reference to the drafted TRIPS Agreement, see Liu, XH (2008), 'A Study on Patent Compulsory 
License System in China – With Particular Reference to the Drafted 3rd Amendment to the Patent Law of 
the P.R. of China ', in W Pyrmont, et al. (eds.), Patents and Technological Progress in a Globalized 
World (Springer Berlin Heidelberg), p116.   In addition, chapter 4 will give a detailed account on the key 
patent provision relevant to pharmaceutical under the Chinese patent law 1992.   
25
  OECD health data, cited in 'Chinese biogenerics and protection of IP', Genetic Engineering & 
Biotechnology News, Vol. 26 (15) (1 September 2006). 
<http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem_print.aspx?aid=1875&chid=0> 
 30 
there were still some 135 million people living below the poverty line in 2009.26  This 
clearly indicates that domestic medicine consumption greatly depends on the supply of 
low cost generic medicines.27 Internationally, China is currently the largest producer of 
vaccines in the world.28 Active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) produced by Chinese 
firms are dominant in the API import markets in the EU, the US, India and Japan.29 
Importantly, Chinese firms are increasingly important suppliers of certain products that 
target the diseases prevailing in poor countries. Many Indian and other developing 
countries purchase and are outsourcing ingredients for anti-retroviral from China. 
 
Given China’s unique policy towards pharmaceutical patents and its significant role in 
access to medicine at home and abroad, it is important to understand the rationales 
behind Chinese patent policy-making and the policy impacts on the local generic 
industry and its innovative capabilities. The lessons drawn from China’s experience 
may provide useful information and insights for further policy experimentation in IPRs 
and other innovation strategies domestically and internationally. 
1.4 The existing research and knowledge gap 
The scope of current literature on China’s experience in implementing the TRIPS 
Agreement mainly examines Chinese IPR legislation, its compliance and non-
compliance with TRIPS obligations, or enforcement procedures and problems. A large 
volume of studies has also contributed knowledge of the strength or weakness of the 
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Chinese pharmaceutical industry in terms of production and innovation. Yet, there is a 
shortage of empirical studies on the interplay between China’s approach to TRIPS 
implementation and the potential for innovation in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. 
There is also a need for empirical studies that are initiated from a public health policy 
perspective and based on data collected at the country-level. This research aims to add 
such new information and insights to academic knowledge.  
 
Yet, the existing relevant literature does provide insightful observations and valuable 
empirical data for this research. Peter Yu has contributed a large volume of studies on 
the history and politics of the Chinese intellectual property system.30 Maskus, 
Dougherty, and Mertha have examined how the inadequate enforcement of IPRs limits 
incentives to develop products and brand names, especially for small and medium-size 
enterprises.31 Lixuan has offered a theoretical overview on the static and dynamic 
effects of the introduction of TRIPS product patent regimes to pharmaceutical patents in 
China.32 Cheri Grace has contributed an early empirical report on the state of the 
Chinese pharmaceutical industry, its response to changes of the patent system, and its 
implications for access to medicine domestically and internationally.33 In addition, a 
large amount of scholarship has shed light on the enforcement of IPRs in China.34 A 
recent study assigned by the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation 
and Public Health (CIPIH) has studied the state of health-related innovation in China. 
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However, the main focus of the analysis was to provide an overview of the input 
indicators of innovation whereas the output indicator ‘patent’ and the interplay of patent 
policy and innovation were not included in the scope of that project. This gap has been 
greatly filled by new published research from Li Yahong. However, her research 
perspective is more from an economic viewpoint and the research mainly relies on 
second hand data.35  
1.5 Research objectives, questions and method 
The existing theoretical and empirical studies widely view China as a major beneficiary 
of the TRIPS Agreement, particularly concerning the effects of the TRIPS stronger 
patent protection provisions on local innovation.36 Nonetheless, there are also concerns 
that the TRIPS patent regime may hamper local innovation and disadvantage the 
development of the local generic industry.37 Yet, there is little evidence one way or the 
other to confirm these views. This research is thus motivated to investigate information 
and evidence that may verify or disprove those theoretical assumptions. 
 
The central concerns of this study are twofold: 1) how does the TRIPS’ universalism 
affect China’s legislative capability in utilizing IPRs for development? and 2) how have 
the perceived economic benefits and costs of the TRIPS’ patent regime materialized in 
China? These questions fall between quantitative and qualitative assessments. The 
following are the designed research questions for this study:  
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1. Has China been able to formulate a pro-development patent policy for 
pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS legal framework? To this end, it examines the 
following sub-questions in turn:  
1.1 What are the current state and nature of pharmaceutical patent protections and 
enforcement in China? Have the relevant standards applied in China met its 
international obligation?   
1.2 What is China’s policy approach to TRIPS implementation in the 
pharmaceutical field? Has China made effective use of the TRIPS flexibilities to 
protect and promote public health interests?  
1.3 What are the rationales behind Chinese particular pharmaceutical patent policy? 
 
2.  What effects has China’s particular patent policy had on local innovation? This 
investigation is guided by the following two sub-questions:  
2.1 What is the state of local pharmaceutical innovation using both quantitative and 
qualitative standards?  
2.2 Have patent incentives contributed to more R&D activities allocated to the cure 
of diseases essentially important to Chinese patients? 
 
3. How can the research findings be explained and what implications can be drawn from 
China’s experience? 
 
Comparative legal analysis is employed as the major approach in the legal evaluation. 
The comparison includes two orientations. The first type of comparative study analyses 
four versions of Chinese patent law. Chinese patent law has been revised three times 
since its initial promulgation in 1984. Each revision has embedded within it significant 
differences in some important substantive or procedural patent standards. This type of 
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comparison is used to investigate the changes to substantive patent standards applied for 
pharmaceuticals, the state of the accommodation of TRIPS flexibilities or TRIPS-plus 
standards under the Chinese patent system, the changes of threshold of enforcement 
measures etc. The second type of comparative study involves the international 
comparison between Chinese pharmaceutical legislation and foreign law or international 
IPRs treaties. The legal analysis applies the law of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (the Paris Convention), the TRIPS Agreement, and 
some relevant legal provisions under US patent law.  
 
In addition, statistical analyses are employed to establish the correlation between 
stronger patents and the growth of local innovation. The major indicators include the 
number and type of pharmaceutical patent, pharmaceutical R&D expenditures, the 
number of patents granted to Chinese nationals by the USTR in the past twenty years, 
the composition of FDI from the leading multinational pharmaceutical companies 
(MNCs,) operating in China, comparative patent ratio quotient between the inventions 
for the cure of major diseases and the aggregate pharmaceutical patent filings. All the 
patent related data covers a span of two decades. The data is directly drawn from the 
official statistics. 
 
IPRs-related political economy and development perspectives are employed in order to 
explain the rationales, nature and effects of each relevant reform of Chinese patent law, 
to describe policy related recommendations, and to draw useful lessons from the 
Chinese experience in TRIPS implementation. 
1.6 Limitations of the research  
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This research project is limited by the complexity of the research project itself, the short 
history of TRIPS implementation in China, and various methodological and other 
practical constraints. Firstly, this research centres on the role of patents in innovation, 
but other factors, such as government policies and complex economic dynamics, also 
influence innovation together with the IPRs regime. It is difficult to distinguish the roles 
of patents from the effects of these other policies and factors on innovation so that 
appropriate attribution cannot always be given in the analysis. Secondly, China 
introduced product patent protection on pharmaceuticals in 1992 while TRIPS-
compliant enforcement measures were not accommodated into law until 2000. It can be 
argued that TRIPS implementation in China is still in its preliminary stage. The research 
findings may be inconclusive and should be interpreted only as an indication of current 
trends in this field. Thirdly, the author’s limited pharmaceutical knowledge could have 
restricted the methodology design and the interpretation of the research findings.  
1.7 Structure of the thesis  
 
This study is divided into nine chapters containing the content summarised as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 presents the main research premises and the core research questions of the 
thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the genesis and the history of the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
Chapter 3 reviews the current knowledge existing and the gaps occurring in the two 
premised research themes. It first examines how the TRIPS Agreement affects national 
legislative capability in designing and enforcing national patent rules, then, studies the 
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diverse roles patents can play in the evolution of local innovation. The knowledge gaps 
in these two areas are also identified. 
 
Following the opening chapters, the thesis commences the investigation on the policy 
effect of TRIPS implementation in China from chapter 4 to chapter 6.  
 
Chapter 4 reviews the legal history of introducing the TRIPS standards into Chinese 
patent laws. The analysis places its emphasis on both the threshold for the 
pharmaceutical patent protection applied, and the rationales behind each law reform.  
 
Chapter 5 evaluates whether public health interests have been incorporated into the 
current Chinese pharmaceutical patent system. The evaluation covers four areas: the 
patentability standard, TRIPS-flexibilities, TRIPS-plus provision, and the application of 
Utility Model protection for pharmaceuticals.  
 
Chapter 6 explores the nature and state of pharmaceutical patent enforcement in China. 
The examination involves two questions: 1) Has the Chinese enforcement procedure 
provided a TRIPS-consistent patent enforcement for pharmaceutical patents? 2) Has the 
Chinese enforcement procedure been carried out in ‘a balanced and pro-competitive 
way’?38 
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Chapter 7 explores the second research question concerning what effect of Chinese 
particular patent policy has had on the development of local pharmaceutical innovation.   
A statistical approach is used to in assessment. 
 
Chapter 8 offers explanations for the research findings.  
 
Chapter 9 concludes the investigations and draws implications from China’s given 
experience.  
.  
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Chapter 2 Advent of the TRIPS Agreement 
 
To appreciate the relationship between patents and pharmaceutical innovations requires 
an understanding of the North-South conflict on this issue and the history of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Therefore, I shall start with a historical review of these subjects. 
 
Patents have been the subject of controversy for at least two centuries.39 The debate on 
pharmaceutical patents was central in at least two salient events in the recent history of 
the international IPRs system: the attempt to revise the Paris Convention in the earlier 
1980s and the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995 under the auspices of the 
WIPO and WTO, respectively. While rights holders and their supporters upheld the 
merit of patent protection for promoting pharmaceutical innovations, scholar and 
activists challenged the professed fairness and justice concerning poor access to 
essential medicines for the poor. Developing countries’ governments have increasingly 
challenged pharmaceutical patents through national legislation reforms or campaigns 
advocating public health reform and international patent rules favourable to 
development. Nevertheless, the past two decades have witnessed not only the aggressive 
reinforcement of a pro-patent international patent governance regime, but also a 
‘ratchet-up’ of patent standards across countries regardless of their level of economic, 
social and technological development. What were the drivers behind this development? 
If such development was against the interests of developing countries, why did they 
accept the rules of the current international patent governance? This chapter aims to 
examine these questions through the history of IPRs from the 1960s towards the 1995. 
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2.1 The north-south conflict in pharmaceutical patents in the 
era of the Paris Convention 
2.1.1 The influence of Dependence Theory  
When former European colonies started to gain their independence and acceptance as 
sovereign states after 1945, the predominant policy to enable their development was to 
nurture domestic technological capabilities.40 This objective was particularly reinforced 
by the dominant development thinking known as ‘Dependence Theory’ from the mid-
1960s to the 1970s. Despite variations, the dependency theorists generally viewed the 
underdevelopment of developing countries largely to be a result of their dependent 
relationship with developed countries. They were concerned that the development path 
of both economy and culture of the poor countries was largely conditioned by 
developed countries through trade, migration, and capital and technology flow. 
Consequently, they believed, developing countries were deprived of autonomy to adopt 
alternative policies to achieve desirable economic growth.41  
Among the generally dependent relationships with rich countries, technology 
dependence is regarded as particularly detrimental and influential for the development 
prospects of developing countries. Stewart suggests that the dependence on advanced 
countries for technology could be the cause as well as a consequence of general 
dependence on them.42 As the history of industrialisation demonstrates, technology 
played a crucial role in narrowing the economic gaps between the late- developing 
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countries and the leading countries. Thus, Stewart argues that technology dependence is 
possibly the most critical feature to the break up of the dependent economic relationship 
with advanced industrialised countries.43  
The dependence theory dominated development policy, particularly after the increasing 
dissatisfaction with the earlier import substitution industrialization (ISI) development 
strategy in the developing countries from the late 1960s to 1970s.  Reducing technology 
dependence became a critical goal of the development agenda. Two opposing 
approaches were prescribed to accomplish this task prescribed by different schools of 
economic theory. The ‘structuralists’ emphasized the importance of building up local 
technological capabilities through ‘learning- by-doing’ while ‘neo-liberal’ theorists 
proposed the advantage of integration into international technology trade.44 The former 
approach advocates domestic research and development efforts, such as imitation, 
reverse engineering, studying information available from patent applications, 
international exchange of technical personnel and the use of non-proprietary technology 
etc. The latter prefers trade in capital or technological goods, foreign direct investment, 
and purchase of technological licenses.45 
Although it is debatable which approach works best, both approaches involved 
implementation of international technology transfer (ITT), i.e. the international flow of 
industrial technology from developed world to developing countries. At the time there 
was a huge gap in technological capability between developing and developed countries. 
According to studies by the United Nations, only 6 percent of the estimated 3.5 million 
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patents granted in 1972 were to developing countries, of which less than one-sixth were 
owned by nationals of developing countries. The majority of advanced industrial 
technology was produced in developed countries.46 It is generally considered to be less 
costly and faster to acquire technological capability through technology transfer than to 
develop it from the scratch with domestic resources. 47 Nonetheless, developing 
countries highly valued the ability to build indigenous scientific and innovative 
capabilities because it directly serves their aspirations to improve their autonomy in 
technology. Consequently, developing countries tended to apply a combination of these 
two approaches in their industrialization practice.  
Governments of all countries, regardless of national wealth, focus particular attention 
and scrutiny on the pharmaceutical industry as it is a powerful, strategic industrial sector. 
Moreover, pharmaceutical products have greater relevance to general social welfare 
than any other industry. Thus, the economic and political implications of 
pharmaceuticals can influence government policy decision-making.48 The relative 
strengths of the two interest groups shifted towards industry with the emergence of the 
modern pharmaceutical industry after the Second World War. Transforming into 
intensive research and advertising businesses, drug companies grew rapidly and 
concentrated on legal monopolies of specific products protected by patents and branded 
names in developed countries.49 By the 1970s, this industry had become highly 
concentrated and a few multinational companies had established their dominance over 
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production, marketing, and research and development (R&D) in the world 
pharmaceutical market.50 This trend was demonstrated in Lall’s studies:  
The developing and southern European countries accounted, around 1971, for 
only 14 per cent of world pharmaceutical output… The three leading countries 
(United States, Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany), accounted for 
nearly 70 per cent of pharmaceutical output in the developed market-economy 
countries….51   
The imbalance of the world pharmaceutical market meant that developing countries 
were heavily dependent on foreign pharmaceutical products and technology whose 
value was often protected by patents or branded names.52 This dependence had 
detrimental economic and social consequences in developing countries, such as high 
drug prices, inappropriate products or technology, structural constraints to developing 
their indigenous pharmaceutical industry and innovative capability and so on.53 This 
unfavorable position prompted governments of developing countries to search for 
measures to gain greater autonomy over their pharmaceutical industries at economic 
institutions as both the national and international levels. Among other international legal 
arrangements existing prior to their independence and participation in the international 
legal system, developing countries found they were locked into the international patent 
system under the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 
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2.1.2 Developed countries: motives for the internationalisation of 
patent protection 
Competing with developing countries’ needs to acquire indigenous technology 
capability, the interest of developed countries to re-regulate the trade in technological 
goods worldwide has ascended as a result of four recent developments. 
Firstly, technology-intensive goods had become the most dynamic segment of 
production and trade in developed countries around the mid-1960s, and the economic 
structure of developed countries started to go through a change towards de-
industrialisation. The key features of this trajectory were the decline of manufactured 
goods and the growth of knowledge-intensive goods.54 Investment in research and 
development (R&D) had steadily increased in developed countries in the 1970s, 
particularly with private large firms playing an increasingly major role.55 As a result, 
during this period, the number of high R&D manufactured products produced for 
international trade by the major developed countries, such as the United States, Japan, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, expanded rapidly.56  
Secondly, since 1950, multinational companies (MNCs) had found developing countries 
to be increasingly desirable and popular locations for foreign direct investment (FDI). 
When developing countries adopted import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policies 
in the 1950s, which discouraged the import of competing manufactured goods from 
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developed countries through tariff barriers57 MNCs responded to such tariff measures 
by establishing manufacturing operations in the developing countries themselves. 
Meanwhile, free trade zones (FTZs) or export processing zones (EPZs) established by 
developing governments also attracted increasing numbers of MNCs to relocate their 
manufacturing operations in those countries.58 In addition, other favourable economic 
conditions, including cheap labour and services, low costs of manufacturing operations, 
preferential treatment for foreign investment and abundant resources nearby also 
attracted FDI to developing countries.  However, MNCs soon became dissatisfied by the 
legal systems of developing countries in which they could not enjoy the same 
institutional advantages as those in their home countries. The reasons will be discussed 
in the fourth factor below. 
Thirdly, US competitiveness in manufacturing and technology had been challenged in 
certain high-tech areas. Japan first and later the Asian newly industrialising countries 
like Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan had emerged as aggressive competitors 
of the US firms’ in consumer electronics, microelectronics, robotics, computers and 
various services such as in engineering and construction. US industries viewed this 
erosion of technology leadership as a consequence of lax IPR protection for US 
technology in those countries and regions.59  
Fourthly, IPRs protection in their target foreign markets was not sufficient to protect 
MNCs technology assets and the associated profits. Historically, IPR laws have been 
‘introduced by nation states in response to economic demands and ideas of moral value 
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which have focused particularly on their own territories and nationals’.60 Although there 
are a number of international treaties mandating standards, IPRs protection was 
fundamentally a national, territorial principle prior to the introduction of the TRIPS 
agreement.61 Regarding patent rights, the Paris Convention of 1883 has been the major 
international arrangement governing the patent rights among member states. However, 
the Paris Convention did not try to level national laws or establish the reciprocity 
principle for national treatment. On the contrary, it stipulated vast legislative freedom 
for each country and only required the equal treatment of nationals and foreigners 
(national treatment principle).62 This allowed member states the freedom to tailor 
national patent regulations to specific national interests. Even patent standards among 
developed countries were different from each other, such as the treatment of 
pharmaceutical patents,63 the scope of the coverage of the patent allowed, the types of 
patent and quasi-patents; the inventions excluded from patenting, or some procedural 
variation as ‘first –to –file’ versus ‘first to invent’ system, and examination versus 
registration.64  
IPR policy is traditionally a matter of national discretion. In accordance with their own 
technology levels and industrial development objectives, developing countries 
emphasize the social welfare function of exclusive rights. Their IPR legislation tends to 
be designed to facilitate production and access to innovation. As a consequence, the 
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level of protection on patents is generally weaker than the standard that MNCs can 
typically expect to enjoy in their home countries. This difference in patent protection 
level tends to result in the unintended rent transfer from MNCs to their local 
competitors through their ‘free-riding’ activities. 
2.1.3 Conflicting interests on international patent governance  
Divergence in IPR law and practice has always existed between technologically 
advanced countries and those in the process of industrialisation. The former countries 
emphasize the protection of IP rights while the latter focus on facilitating the diffusion 
of industrial technology. Historically, countries in catch-up positions preferred to adopt 
a patent policy which limited the scope of protection on foreign technological goods as 
part of their developmental strategies. For example, ‘….when the United States was still 
a relatively young and developing country,…. it refused to respect international 
property rights on the grounds that it was freely entitled to foreign works to further its 
social and economic development.’65 
 
Developing countries logically choose to provide weaker and more flexible standards to 
protect foreign-patented technology in their domestic markets. They put emphasis on 
the provisions of local working requirements, parallel imports, and great scope for 
compulsory licensing in the absence of local working.66  This kind of patent policy 
reflects a utilitarian approach toward patent laws, i.e. a patent system should be 
designed according to socio-economic conditions and primary development purposes in 
given countries.  
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Due to either colonial heritage or perceived interests, many developing countries 
obtained membership of the Paris Convention in 1960s and 1970s. The Paris 
Convention could bring benefits to developing countries if it facilitated the inflow of 
foreign industrial technology into their economy. Article 5 of the Convention may fulfil 
this expectation through its compulsory working provision and non-working sanctions. 
It implies that member states have the right to demand that foreign patentees explore 
their invention locally. These provisions were introduced based on the experience of the 
developed countries during in their industrialisation. However, the effectiveness of 
compulsory working provisions depends on substantive conditions. As Penrose 
indicates: ‘Compulsory working provisions cannot compel foreigners to work their 
patents. ….if domestic producers cannot use his invention, he will not fear his 
competitors very much and certainly won’t go to the trouble of producing under what 
are, to him, unprofitable conditions in order to maintain his patent.’67 It is very likely 
that many developing countries do not have sufficient technological capacities to absorb 
and use foreign inventions. In addition, their markets are generally small and 
unprofitable, and thus unattractive to MNCs. These economic disadvantages have 
undermined the effectiveness of the local working requirement, in other words, it was 
most unlikely any developing members of the Paris Convention would benefit from the 
compulsory working provision. The economic reciprocities expected from complying 
with the obligations under the Paris Convention were not returned to developing 
member countries. On the contrary, developing states bore a significant socio-economic 
burden due to their compliance with the international patent rules. 68  
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Since the early 1960s, there was growing awareness of the adverse effects of the 
international patent system on the socio-economic development of developing countries. 
Nationals from developed countries held the majority of patents filed in developing 
countries. The monopoly power and patent abuse exercised by foreign right holders 
worked against national interests of developing countries. For example, in the area of 
pharmaceuticals patents, in an empirical study Agarwal has indicated that leading 
transnational pharmaceuticals dominated 85-90% of patent ownership in developing 
countries; however, only 5-10% of these patents were actually exploited in the 
developing countries. The majority of the remaining ownerships exacted profits through 
their import monopoly power.69 Lall in his report to the UNCTAD claimed that foreign 
pharmaceutical patents could be detrimental to health welfare of people in developing 
countries.  
The legal character of patents needs to be reformed in a manner that 
would permit local firms in developing countries to copy or adapt 
foreign technology for national interest. Furthermore, the restrictions on 
cheaper imports which are provided for by the existing system should be 
abolished.70 
 
The Andean group, united through the Treaty of Cartegena, started to challenge the 
traditional principles of the Paris Convention. They argued that development should be 
prioritised as the objective of patent system.71 In Brazil, its patent law of 1969 abolished 
all patent protection for pharmaceuticals. India passed its Patent Law Act No.39 in 1970 
that treated medicine, food and agro-chemicals as specific subjects, and granted them 
only seven years of patent protection. Compulsory licensing could be granted after three 
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years of selling a pharmaceutical patent, and the maximum royalty was set at 4%72. This 
new law laid down a pivotal foundation, allowing India to build a successful generic 
industry.73 Following these initiatives, India formally called for a revision of the Paris 
Conversion in a 1974 WIPO meeting.74  
 
On the other side of the world, developed countries were coming to the opposite 
conclusion: that there should be even stronger international rules protecting patent rights. 
The economic structure of developed countries had been transformed by globalisation 
of production, technology progress in communication, transport and production, and 
declining costs of international trade and investment. The US, along with the EU and 
Japan, had developed into the net producers and the major suppliers of technology-
intensive goods in the world market since1980s.75 Industrial property had become 
developed countries’ major source of assets, and they were increasingly dependent on 
patents, copyrights and trademarks to maintain their competitiveness in the world 
market. As a result, industrialised countries began to argue that the weak state of patent 
protection in developing countries threatened their economic interests, and they began 
to advocate strengthening intellectual property rights protections on a global basis.  
2.1.4 Attempts to revise the Paris Convention 
From 1980 to 1984, there were negotiations between the Group of 77 and the OECD 
countries for the Revision of the Paris Convention, launched under the Diplomatic 
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Conference for Protection of Industry property under the auspices of WIPO.76 
UNCTAD joined developing countries’ campaign for the reform of the Paris 
Convention. It conducted two studies entitled ‘The Role of the Patent System in the 
Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries’ and ‘International Patent System as 
an Instrument for National Development’ in 1974 and 1975, respectively. These studies 
not only raised awareness among developing countries of the adverse impacts of patents 
on development, but also contributed to building a consensus among a group of 
developing countries on the terms and merits of demanded reforms of the Paris 
Convention.77 
 
Two issues were ardently discussed in the negotiations. First, developing countries 
attempted to request the preferential treatment under Article 5 regarding the importation 
and process patents. The second major issue they sought was to gain more effective 
measures to Article 5 (A), such as the grant of an exclusive compulsory licence to 
address or relax the conditions to use the sanctions, etc. to address the non-working and 
insufficient working of patents.78  
 
Non-discrimination and national treatment are longstanding traditional principles of 
Paris Convention, and OECD countries rejected developing countries’ request for the 
adoption of preferential measures to Article 5.79 Moreover, as the Paris Convention was 
devised to overcome hidden domestic barriers through reciprocal legislative 
arrangements in international industrial trade, OECD states argued that the adherence to 
this principle was essential to maintaining the balance between rights and obligations.  
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The OECD countries also resisted the local working arguments, although they 
acknowledged the importance of technology transfer in assisting economic growth in 
developing countries80 However, they argued that patent protection was the legal basis 
for the diffusion of technology and that attempts to weaken or abolish patent protection 
in developing countries would actually discourage foreign investment in production and 
technology transfer locally.81 The OECD countries also produced empirical studies in 
the defence of those propositions. Sell and Mundkowski suggested in their empirical 
analysis that patent protection has played a positive role to some extent in the 
pharmaceutical industry in Latin America.82 Hallstain’s survey pointed out the 
significant negative effects of the Indian Patent Act 1970: ‘Whereas 4,158 foreign 
patents were filed in India in 1969, only 3, 864 were filed in 1970, and no more than 
2372 in 1973 – a decline of more than 40% in four years’.83 These studies attempted to 
suggest that the movement in patent reform in developing countries was to their 
disadvantage. However, they cannot deny the link between the India 1970 Patent Act 
and the fact of the rapid growth of indigenous production and technical capability of the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry since the 1970s.  
 
The clash of interests between the two groups was so significant that no agreement was 
reached at the end of negotiations in 1986. Still, the attempts to introduce a 
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development-focused instrument into the patent system succeeded in the national 
legislation of developing countries even though it halted in the international system.  
 53 
2.2 The advent of the TRIPS Agreement  
Since the failure of the attempts to revise the Paris Convention, the disputes between the 
developing and developed countries on pharmaceutical patent rules have persisted and 
evolved. In 1994, a compromise was reached under an international legal framework, i.e. 
the TRIPS Agreement under the auspices of the WTO. The Agreement has been 
controversial since its beginning, because it is widely conceived as an outcome of an 
undemocratic negotiation process, in which developing countries were not only short of 
representation, knowledge, and full information of the IP issues, but also were subject to 
economic coercion from the US. This section reviews the political and economic factors 
that contributed to the establishment of TRIPS.  
2.2.1 MNCs’ defining role in the making of the TRIPS agreement 
A. Pharmaceutical MNCs’ interests in the internationalisation of IP 
protection  
Conventionally, nation-states play the predominant role in international political 
relations, and only states create the law governing their relations, including international 
rules on intellectual property rights. Nonetheless, since the 1960s and particularly since 
the 1990s, the transnational forces of economic globalization have enabled non-state 
actors, including MNCs, to increase their influence in the international realm, and this 
has at times, undermined states’ sovereign authority.84 Much of the world’s production, 
capital, and technology and market access are under the control of MNCs.85 They play a 
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major role in determining the location of industries, the direction of trade flow and other 
economic activities. As a consequence, MNCs have become increasingly successful in 
their attempts to incorporate their self-interests in the economic and legislative 
regulation of many nations. 
 
Worldwide international IP protection has been centred in such interests since the 1980s. 
MNCs economic supremacy has been building on their specialisation and 
competitiveness in the international trade and investment of high technology goods. For 
example, the ratio that high technology-intensive goods account for in the US exports 
rose from 25.8 percent in 1970 to 31.1 percent in 1982.86 This implies the significance 
of the world market for MNCs’ profitability and revenues. However, as discussed 
earlier, the IPR rules and practice in protection standards, limitation and enforcement 
vary between jurisdictions. MNCs can’t enjoy the same level of protection generally in 
developing countries as in their home countries. Since the mid-1960s, developing 
countries have pursued the strategy of facilitating the production of and access to 
innovation. This policy has benefited indigenous technology capability building and 
enhanced the availability of affordable technological goods for consumers, but has 
lessened MNCs’ profitability and returns from the investment in R&D.87 Moreover, 
they have also perceived local generic drug companies as a competitive threat. These 
dual challenges have led MNCs to seek institutional means to safeguard their economic 
interests both nationally and internationally.  
 
Pharmaceutical MNCs have been among the most active parties of this movement. Two 
main claims have been employed to justify their demands for internationalised IPRs 
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protection. The first refers to the high expenditure on research and development of new 
drugs. It is cited that that it costs about US$350 million to develop a new drug on 
average and ten or twelve years to bring it to the market. 93 percent of new drug 
therapies are brought in by private R&D.88 In addition, the pharmaceutical compounds 
are relatively easier to be duplicated. Therefore, the pharmaceutical industry has 
particularly viewed patent protection as the crucial means to recoup their investment 
and maintain their ability to develop new drugs. This argument finds its resonance in 
Arrow’s proposition on the necessity of a rewarding mechanism for the R&D activities. 
Arrow suggests that innovative activities would diminish if the research results and its 
financial rewards are reaped by others. Patents have been credited with this incentive 
function to ensure the willingness of private companies to invest in innovation.89 
Secondly, pharmaceutical MNCs also contend that patent protection is the engine for 
pharmaceutical innovations, which in turn encourages pharmaceutical R& D to bring 
flourishing new products.90 Therefore, developing countries would actually benefit from 
introducing the product patents to their legislation, since this would encourage more 
private R & D investment into the research on drugs for tropical diseases.91  
B. Mobilising the reform of IP laws domestically and internationally  
The above line of argument has been resorted by the pharmaceutical industry to push for 
the establishment of a universal IPRs standard globally since the late 1970s. An anti-
counterfeiting coalition was established among 100 MNCs cross industries from 
automobiles, software, clothing, pharmaceuticals and food to luxuries and 
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entertainment.92 The campaigns of this coalition have whetted the appetites of 
protectionism in the trade negotiations under the auspices of General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariff (GATT). Although the initial negotiation on an anti-counterfeiting 
Code under the Tokyo Round between 1973 and 1979 bore no fruition, this experience 
enlightened more sophisticated preparation from the US industries to further their 
advocacy on intellectual property issues in the next GATT negotiations, the Uruguay 
Round.93  
 
In Europe, the Publishers’ Association from the United Kingdom started to exercise the 
strategy of coordinating IPRs protection internationally by lobbying the Deputy US 
Trade Representative to take action against copyright infringement in 1978.94 In the US, 
the MNCs mobilized their influence even more directly and effectively, in their attempts 
to make intellectual property protection a trade issue at both bilateral and multilateral 
levels. The US President Advisory Committee on Trade and Policy and Negotiation 
(ACTPN) was one of the major forums for them to influence US trade policy. High-
level executives from MNCs, such as Ed Pratt, Chief Executive Officer of the Pfizer, 
often worked as the advisors for ACTPN.95 MNCs also took action to press the 
government to respond to the infringement of IPRs abroad by submitting reports of their 
annual revenue losses to the congressional hearings.96These actions persuaded the US 
government to address the demands from businesses for higher standards of IPR 
protection and enforcement through legislative action at both the domestic and 
international levels.  
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In the 1980s, strong lobbies from US multinational corporations successfully pressurise 
the government to tackle the comparatively lax IPRs standards in developing countries 
through unilateral trade sanctions. The amended Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 
was employed to enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights domestically in 
order to protect US rights holders from unfair import competition, although the 
legitimacy of Section 337 had been challenged by the EC and Canada through NAFTA 
and GATT, and consequently this provision had to be amended in compliance with 
GATT.97 Regarding the protection of US IPRs overseas, the Special 301 provision of 
the Trade Act of 1974 amended by Ominbus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
(the Special 301 provision) was devised to strengthen the US leverage to improve IPRs 
enforcement in the world market. The Special 301 provision has provided effective 
measures for assessment, negotiation and sanctions to achieve the elimination of so-
called ‘unjustified and unreasonable’ trading practices of US trading partners.98  
 
The Special 301 provision quickly and effectively pressed the legislative changes 
desired by the US government on various rival markets. Korea, the first country targeted 
by the US, responded the threat of sanctions under the Special 301 provision by 
changing its national intellectual property laws in 1985.99 In another example, in 1992, 
faced with the combined threat (‘stick’) of US trade sanctions and the promise (‘carrot’) 
of access to US markets, China amended its first Patent Law of 1984 to incorporate US-
demanded IPRs standards on pharmaceuticals and chemicals.100  
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The success of such US bilateral negotiations encouraged MNCs to extend their strategy 
of linking trade to intellectual property into the global trade regime, the GATT. In 1988, 
three leading MNCs groups, the Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of 
Europe (UNICE), the Japanese Federation of Economic Organization and the 
Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), submitted a joint report entitled Basic 
Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property to all participants in the 
Uruguay Round. The Basic Framework included features such as minimum standards in 
the major areas of IP, mechanisms to maintain the agreed IPRs standards, and incentive 
provisions such as preferential treatment and technical assistance etc. All these features 
were included in the final version of the TRIPS Agreement.101 
 
As a result of their powerful, organized campaign beginning in the 1980s, MNCs 
succeeded in capturing the formulation of national and international rules governing 
IPRs through their intervention in the political process of making the international 
TRIPS Agreement. They devised a strategy for defining IPRs as a trade-related issue at 
both national and international levels. By projecting IP interests as a matter of national 
competitiveness,102 they mobilized their national governments to take legislative actions 
at both national and international levels. It is rather clear that intellectual property 
business interests greatly influenced the creation of the TRIPS Agreement in its 
initiation, drafting and negotiation processes. Among the most prominent of the active 
lobbyists were major multinational pharmaceutical companies, including Pfizer, Merck, 
Bristol-Meyers and Johnson and Johnson.103 
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2.2.2 Structural vulnerability of developing countries 
A. Low participation and low representation  
 
It was observed above that developing countries had historically low levels of 
participation and engagement in the international IPRs system of the WIPO. When IP 
issues arose during the TRIPS negotiation process, many developing countries were 
unable to participate in an informed way in the WTO-TRIPS negotiation process. The 
Agreement was widely criticised by its perceived adverse impacts on undeveloped 
economies before and during its negotiation. Yet, it was clear that it is an agreement that 
would have far-reaching implication in their prospects for social and economic 
development. Only ten countries, India, Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Egypt, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Yugoslavia, had the capabilities to enable them to be 
actively involved in opposing the US GATT agenda.104 As the negotiations progressed, 
most of these countries eventually accepted the US position.105 India was the only 
country to oppose the December 1991 text proposed by Chairman Anell and the GATT 
Secretariat. The outcome of the negotiation of this text was similar to the final, formal 
TRIPS text.106  
 
Developing country inactivity has persisted in their domestic implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement. For example, many have failed to take advantage of TRIPS 
flexibilities to promote public interests. Under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement the 
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governments of member states may authorise the use of compulsory licensing (CL) 
under certain conditions and procedures when faced with a public health emergency. 
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration), 
adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference of 2001, affirmed this allowance; however, 
according to the recent survey by the Consumer Project on Technology, there is still 
little CL activity taking place in developing countries.107 
 
Developing countries have traditionally been reluctant to participate in the multilateral 
trade system at all due to the sense of unequal bargaining power. In fact, many 
developing countries had viewed the GATT, which governed international trade before 
the WTO was established, as a club for developed countries. Under this forum, they 
believed that the initial proposals and the following rule-making processes were all 
dictated by wealthy countries, and issues of importance to developing countries were 
always left out of the negotiating rounds.108 
 
Another factor that may have discouraged developing countries from engaging with the 
international trade regime was the trade policy most developing countries had adopted 
between the 1950s and the 1970s. Most developing countries had development policies 
that aimed to maximize GNP growth through capital accumulation and industrialisation. 
Their government leaders thought that liberal free trade would stifle the development of 
infant industries rather than promote industrialisation.109 In 1964, a new multinational 
institution, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), was 
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established to deal specifically with the concerns of developing countries in respect to 
their problems relating to trade and development.110During the 1960s and 1970s, the 
developing countries mainly pursued their international trade agenda through this new 
institution. Through UNCTAD, developing countries attempted to establish a system of 
preference facilitating their manufactured exports to industrialized markets and 
stabilizing commodity prices.111 
 
Since the 1980s, developing countries’ participation in the GATT, and subsequently in 
the WTO, has increased significantly. During the Uruguay Round, the number of 
developing country memberships in the GATT increased to 96.112 Notwithstanding 
membership growth, the number of votes attributable to developing countries was not 
sufficient alone to overturn their weak bargaining power in the WTO negotiations.113 
Besides lacking experience in previous GATT negotiations rounds, they also had the 
other disadvantages of lacking human resources, information, and negotiating strategies 
in contrast to their counterparts in the Uruguay Round. 
 
B. Divergent interests among developing countries 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, developing countries generally achieved overall economic 
growth.114 What followed was a period of contrasts in economic performance in the 
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developing world, with economic stagnation in Latin America and Africa on the one 
hand, and rapid economic growth achieved by the newly industrialised countries in East 
Asia.115 Some of them, including the ‘Four tigers’, enjoyed some of the highest growth 
rates in the world in the thirty-year period between 1960 and 1990 and managed to 
catch up with the developed nations in per capita terms. 116   
 
The diverse developmental trajectories among developing countries have caused their 
economic interests under the GATT to move apart. At the earlier stages, developing 
countries engaged under the auspices of two distinctive groups, labelled G10 and G20. 
The former, led by Brazil and India, was concerned about the issues related to 
safeguarding textile manufacturing and agriculture, and to contesting the potentially 
undesirable linking of services and intellectual properties with the new Round of 
negotiations. The G20 group, which was mainly made up of East Asian, South Asian 
and several Latin American countries, increasingly valued the advantages of working 
within the framework of the international trade system. They were already prepared to 
accept an extension of GATT rules into areas such as service, IPRs and other deep 
integration agendas.117 The increasing departure of the interests among developing 
countries led to the splintering of trade policy unity among developing countries. With 
added bilateral pressures from more powerful countries, more and more developing 
countries began, to accept the western concepts of IPRs and trade policy promoted 
through the multilateral or bilateral forums. 118  
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C. The collapse of the coalition between Brazil and India   
 
The 1960s and early 1970s were viewed as the ideal moment for developing countries to 
press their demand for a new international economic order. One of the important 
conditions was the political unity under the leadership of Brazil and India among 
developing countries. However, this favourable condition started to dissipate in the run-
up to the 1980s. The coalition between Brazil and India began to waver. One major 
internal reason leading to this change was the departure in developmental policies 
between these two countries.119 From the 1960s up to1985, India had consistently 
implemented a heavily import-substitution oriented policy. Brazil had pursued a 
similarly protectionist industrial policy following the end of the Second World War. 
However, since the mid-1960s, Brazil had adapted to the export –oriented growth 
industrialisation policy120 after confronting difficulties and dissatisfaction with the 
import substitution industrialisation policy.121 The departure of economic policies 
between these two countries made their political alliance fragile in facing the external 
pressures and threats. 
 
On the other side, the US started to pursue bilateral or unilateral approaches more 
strongly to further its IP objectives, following the failure of negotiations in the Paris 
Convention of 1986. Since this point the coalition between Brazil and India had played 
the leading role in the opposition to the US’s IPR agenda under the framework of the 
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GATT.122 Thus, for the US to succeed with its agenda, ‘the Brazil- India axis was one 
that had to be broken’.123 This was to be achieved without much difficulty by the 
pressure of trade sanctions exercised by the US. The US acted in July 1987, when the 
USTR launched an investigation into the Brazilian patent provisions for pharmaceutical 
products under Section 301of Trade Act of 1974 124 The investigation led to the 
imposition of a100 percent tariff ad valorem on exports of more than 20 pharmaceutical 
products from Brazil to the US, affecting trade worth US$39 million.125 Thereafter, 
further tariff penalties were continually imposed on other Brazilian goods. In June 1990, 
the Brazilian President announced a legislative action in response to the US’s demand. 
Soon after, in Geneva, India found little support from Brazil in the negotiations.126 
Through similar approaches, the US broke down the resistance of other developing 
countries and effectively isolated India by deploying the same tool of trade sanctions.127 
D. Market dependence 
 
Another cause of developing countries’ vulnerabilities in international economic 
relations derives from their asymmetric dependence upon US markets for international 
trade. The ability to access US markets is highly attractive for international exports due 
to its huge size and affluence; however, historical policy influences could affect 
developing countries trade orientation and dependence on the US quite differently. For 
example, Brazil and other Latin American countries that had espoused protectionist 
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import-substitution industrialization policies. This became problematic when Brazil 
needed new markets. It found opportunities with its Latin America trade partners from 
the 1950s and the early 1960s to be limited because the strong influence of the doctrine 
of the import-substitution industrialisation in Latin America led to inward-orientated 
economies. Consequently, the open economies in North America and Europe became 
the most important markets for Brazilian exports. Another factor that separated Brazil 
from other developing countries was that until 1970 it produced primary and semi-
processed products, and demand by developed countries provided important markets for 
Brazilian exports. So, it had already long relied on the US and Europe as its major 
export markets for coffee, sugar, soybeans and iron ore.128  
 
Korea provides another example of dependency on US markets. The foundations of 
economic ties between Korea and the United States were laid in the Korean War. The 
US had provided about US$6 billion between 1945 and 1978 in aid of Korea’s 
economic reconstruction and development.129 Because of its internal constraints (narrow 
domestic market, rare resources) and favorable external conditions (the historical link 
with Japan and political and economic support from the US), the Korean government 
adopted an export-oriented development policy, and the US and Japan naturally became 
its major trading partners.130 Korea exported 75.6 percent of all trading goods to the US 
and Japan in 1970. Following this, there was a governmental effort to reduce the 
dependence on the US and Japan’s market through diversifying export markets, but the 
level of Korean export going to these two countries was still as high as at 55.6 percent 
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in 1986.131 
 
In the world economy, all countries are unavoidably dependent on each other; however, 
the dependence among countries varies in kind and in degree.132 Interdependence of 
certain forms and degrees could integrate countries in a competitive and coordinated 
way. It tends to produce mutual benefits and positive development for all the partners. 
However, this dependence, either in an unfavorable form or of an asymmetric degree, 
would bring about vulnerability and undesirable consequences for the partners who are 
more greatly reliant on the others in the international economic relations. The latter 
circumstance was the case with Brazil and Korea when they confronted US demands to 
reform their national intellectual property laws in the mid and the later 1980s. Given 
wealth and technological asymmetries, the majority of developing countries are subject 
to the whims of the countries they rely on; with their economic prowess, rich capital 
source and technological advancement, the US and Western European countries have 
enjoyed powerful bargaining positions in international economic relations.  
E. Domestic ‘regulatory capture’  
At the domestic level, the relative backwardness of economies and rigid political 
systems add another level of vulnerability to developing countries in the international 
system.133 For instance, India has traditionally demonstrated great determination and 
abilities in its utilization of IPRs for development. Its pioneering reform of its patent 
law in 1970 not only promoted its indigenous pharmaceutical industry, but also 
showcased an efficient technology-learning path for technologically undeveloped 
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countries. Also, internationally, India has always stood at the forefront of defending 
developing countries’ interests. For example, during the TRIPS negotiations, it fought 
for various dilutions of restrictive conditions proposed by the US on Article 31 of 
TRIPS and argued for provisions that maintained some useful policy space for 
developing countries to utilise the CL provision.134  
 
Nevertheless, since the 1990s, the industry groups, the Confederation of India Industry 
(CII) and the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM), together 
with the newly emerged technology-based industries, have risen as the most influential 
economic powers in India. They started to favour strengthening intellectual property 
protection in India, in order to safeguard their growing trade interests in the US 
market.135 India undertook a dramatic IP policy shift from one of opposition to one of 
favouring stronger IP protection, especially after the political party Bhartiya Janata 
Party (BJP) came to power. This policy change by the Indian government did not mean 
that they had been persuaded of the value of a strong IP regime,136 but is rather more 
likely to have been a policy strategy to reduce the uncertainty and risk associated with 
being confronted with powerful domestic and international forces.   
 
2.3 Concluding remarks  
The TRIPS rules can be shown to be the result of a long period of North-South conflicts 
over IPRs since the 1970s. During their early industrialization period, developing 
countries began to find that the international convention governing patents, the Paris 
Convention, contained standards contrary to their interests in industrialisation and 
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technology acquisition. As a consequence, many restructured their national legislation 
in the 1970s to fit their particular levels of development and in the early1980s, some 
launched initiatives to reform the Convention. Their efforts failed, however, due to the 
irreconcilable conflict of interests and insurmountable power imbalances between 
developing and developed states. 
  
Contrary to the original intentions of the developing countries, a new international IPRs 
legal framework with higher standards was initiated and negotiated under the GATT 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in the late 1980s and concluded as a result of the 
TRIPS Agreement in 1994. Some scholars have suggested that the TRIPS Agreement 
was a bad deal for the developing member countries because it was a product of 
developed countries’ superior and coercive bargaining power and developing countries’ 
economic dependence and their ignorance of IP matters. On the other hand, it is also 
argued that the TRIPS Agreement was the result of a trade-off between developed 
countries’ interests in safeguarding their IP assets in developing countries’ markets and 
developing countries’ interests in accessing developed countries’ markets, FDI and 
technology. The history of the TRIPS negotiation has provided well-document evidence 
for the former argument. Within the latter argument, certainly developed countries’ 
IPRs agenda was largely satisfied by the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Nevertheless, the economic benefits that developing countries expected through their 
concessions on IP have largely not materialized. This raises the question whether those 
promises were simply theoretical assumptions or purely rhetoric used by those 
promoting stronger IP protection rules to persuade recalcitrant developing countries not 
to oppose the TRIPS Agreement. The next chapter provides a critical review of these 
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theoretical assumptions and discusses the impacts of the TRIPS Agreement on 
development in developing countries. 
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Chapter 3 TRIPS and pharmaceutical innovations in 
developing countries: existing knowledge and gaps 
 
This chapter reviews the possible impact of the stronger patents of TRIPS on indigenous 
innovation in developing countries. The focus of examination concerns both the policy-
effect and economic-effect of such provisions. Therefore, it examines the following two 
questions in turn:  
1) Whether or not TRIPS implementation affects a member country’s adaptability in 
designing and executing its own IPR law and policy;  
2) Whether TRIPS implementation can promote indigenous innovation, international 
technology transfer (ITT), and additional global R&D responding to the local major 
health needs of developing countries. 
 
3.1 Policy effects of TRIPS implementation  
 
Does TRIPS implementation impede the legislative adaptability of developing countries 
in making a pro-health patent system? A good understanding of this question may be 
found through a comparative study of the patent rules prior to and after the TRIPS 
Agreement as well as a study of the complementary institutional factors. Thus, this 
section first reviews patent standard setting under the Paris Convention, followed by a 
study of the new pharmaceutical patent regime under the TRIPS framework, involving 
TRIPS compulsory standards, TRIPS-plus standards and TRIPS flexibilities. Then, it 
also analyses the relationship between institutional capabilities and the use of TRIPS 
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flexibility. It concludes by reviewing answers and knowledge gaps with respect to the 
two thematic questions posed.  
 
3.1.1 Pharmaceutical patent policy making prior to TRIPS  
 
Prior to TRIPS, patent policies in pharmaceuticals have traditionally varied greatly over 
space and time. Fundamentally, patent rights, like other forms of intellectual property 
rights, are national and territorial in nature.137 It is a matter that should be left within a 
state’s decision-making process. Any sovereign state is entitled to its autonomy in 
formulating and enforcing its patent laws in respect to national interests. Nevertheless, 
as a contracting party for any international agreements, the country is obliged to comply 
with the commitments it has undertaken. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the main international convention governing patents before the 
entry of the TRIPS Agreement was the Paris Convention. Although contracting 
countries of the Convention are allowed the autonomy to develop and enforce their own 
patent legislation, they must abide by the standards and obligations established under 
the Convention, and the scope of their national patent policies and the flexibilities in 
their administrative practice have to conform to the standards of the Convention. 
Nonetheless, the Paris Convention did not have a broad membership until the 1970s. 
The number of original signatory contracting countries was 14, increased to 47 by 1958 
and to 80 by 1973. Many major developing countries including India, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Sudan and Thailand were yet to become members of 
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the Paris Convention by that time. In the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, a 
system of honourable reward for inventions applied. Not bound by international rules, 
these countries formulated and enforced a national patent system according to their 
respective interests. In addition, the patent standards for pharmaceuticals among 
developed countries also varied according to their industrial strength and 
competitiveness. Hence, the following review will discuss not only the major provisions 
of the Paris Conventions but also the patent standard-setting for pharmaceuticals in 
various groups of countries, namely developing countries, socialist countries and 
developed countries, in the pre-TRIPS period..  
A. Major provisions of the Paris Convention in relation to 
pharmaceutical patents 
The Paris Convention is constituted by a straightforward mission that is to protect 
industrial property and to safeguard the interests of rights holders.138 Consequently, the 
privileges for rights holders are stated in considerable detail in the Convention. On the 
other hand, there is little recognition or consideration of the public interest that the 
system is expected to serve, nor do the rights afforded to countries granting these 
privileges and the remedial measures to deal with possible abuses of the system receive 
the same level of safeguard.139 Thus, its developing country members have long 
criticised the patent protection maximalist approach adopted by the Convention.    
 
Nevertheless, the Paris Convention, unlike its later rival the TRIPS Agreement, does not 
mandate a universal minimum standard. Instead, it adopts ‘a mechanism of international 
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protection without harmonisation’140 It does not attempt to level national laws and, 
despite six modifications since its inception, it leaves significant legislative freedom in 
substantive matters such as patentability criteria, exclusion of patentability and duration 
of patents, for example.141  
 
 National treatment   
 
Article 2.1 of the Convention requires that whatever rights and obligations are provided 
for a country’s nationals under national patent law should also be applicable to 
foreigners. This provision appears to permit formal differences in rules provided that the 
level of protection granted to local and foreign nationals is equivalent. Commentators 
credit this principle as being a rule of non-discrimination between nationals and 
foreigners in protection while allowing legislative freedom for members to develop and 
enforce their own laws in certain important areas: non-patentability, the rights conferred 
to patentees and the duration and terms of these rights. 142 
  
 Independence of patent 
 
Unlike Article 27.1 under TRIPS, the Convention does not establish any patentability 
criteria and allows exclusions from patentability.143 Under Article 4 bis, the Convention 
stipulates the rule about the ‘independence of patents obtained for the same invention in 
different countries’. It does not intend to lay down unified standards but instead ‘patents 
applied for in the various countries of the Union by nationals of countries of the Union 
shall be independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other countries, 
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whether members of the Union or not’ The independence of such patents is also applied 
as regards the grounds for nullity and forfeit, and as regards their normal duration. 
These provisions can be interpreted to mean that member states remain free to make 
their own decisions on substantive matters such as patentability, exclusion of 
patentability, and duration of patent protection, for example.144  
 
   Compulsory licensing 
 
The term ‘compulsory licensing’ or non-voluntary use ‘refers to the practice by a 
government to authorise itself or third parties to use the subject matter of a patent 
without the authorisation of the right holder for reasons of public policy.’145 As 
mentioned earlier, the Paris Convention recognises the rights of its members to grant 
compulsory licensing to prevent abuses of patent rights, and failure to work the patent is 
explicitly recognised as such an example (Article 5 A.2). This provision has been the 
most controversial in the history of the Paris Convention, 146 for it directly touches on 
the issues that create ‘the conflict between the interest of the national economy as a 
whole and the interest of the individual patentee in obtaining the maximum return from 
his patent’.147 After five revisions since its inception, its final text lost much of its 
flexibility and became more rigid than the original.148 This rendered Article 5 of the 
Convention virtually unable to promote technology transfer or prevent patent abuse in 
developing countries.149  
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Nevertheless, the limitations laid down under the Convention are less restrictive 
compared to the new modalities added to this provision under TRIPS. It only sets a 
minimum period of time before compulsory licensing may be applied for ‘before the 
expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of the patent application or 
three years from the date of the grant of the patent,’ (Article 5 A.4); it does not provide 
a right to compensation for patent holders, but otherwise does not restrict the granting of 
such licenses.150 The term ‘working’ is not defined in the 1883 Convention and 
members are free to make their own determination of the rules under which local 
exploitation can take place.151 Consequently, both developed and developing countries 
have interpreted ‘working’ as local production and not importation in accordance with 
Article 5.A.4 of the Convention.152  
 
The above three provisions of national treatment, independence of patent and 
compulsory licensing lay down the primary principles and procedures for safeguarding 
the rights of patent holders, especially in foreign jurisdictions. However, it also keeps 
open considerable policy options in areas such as patentability criteria, exclusion of 
patentability, duration of patentable criteria and the rules for local exploitation. Such 
legislative leeway allows member countries flexibility in adopting patent rules adapted 
to their national conditions.  
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B. Developed countries 
The patent system was a legislative creation by medieval European countries. The first 
patent law was probably established by the Republic of Venice in 1747 aimed at 
regulating inventors’ protection through statutory law. This system evolved and was 
established widely in other European countries and the rest of the world over the next 
four hundred years.153 However, various standards were established under different 
national patent systems to fit with national interests. With respect to the patent rules on 
pharmaceuticals, the design of legislation, such as the scope of patentability, the types 
of patents and quasi-patents, the inventions excluded from patentability, and the 
duration of rights, all become deeply defined by the strengths of the respective 
pharmaceutical industries.154 
 
In the US, chemical products have always been patentable and pharmaceutical products 
followed.155 As the US pharmaceutical industry has grown to become the leader in the 
world market, it has successfully lobbied for longer and more frequent extensions for 
drug patents. However, in most European countries, only the processes by which drugs 
are produced have been patentable until recently. In France, pharmaceutical inventions 
were not subject matter under 1844 patent law. Patents for processes were allowed with 
the evolution of legislation, but the inclusion of product patents was forbidden until the 
1966 law, in which limited product patent protection was allowed. The ban on drug 
patenting was only completely removed in 1978.156 In Germany, patents for both 
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chemical and pharmaceutical processes were adopted under the 1877 law. Product 
patenting was prohibited until the extension of patent protection to products obtained 
through a patented process under the 1891 law. General patentability for chemical and 
pharmaceutical products was finally established in 1967.157 In Switzerland, patents for 
chemical processes were only introduced in 1907 as a result of constant political and 
legal pressure from Germany; nevertheless the rules were applied restrictively.158 
Patents for products were only introduced into Swiss patent law in 1977. In addition, 
Ireland allowed pharmaceuticals to be patented in 1964, Japan in 1976, Switzerland in 
1977 and Italy and Sweden both in 1978, and Spain in 1992.159 
C. Developing countries  
Given the weak industrial base and resource constraints, developing countries have 
naturally emphasised the social welfare function of exclusive rights. Their IPR 
legislation tends to be designed to facilitate local production and access to innovation. 
Pharmaceutical products have greater relevance to social welfare than any other 
industrial products. It is in the interest of developing countries to adopt a patent system 
which encourages the transfer of technology and the entry of generic competition. Thus, 
the strength of patent protection for pharmaceuticals in developing countries has been 
weaker than that adopted by developed countries in terms of patentability, the duration 
of patents, the working requirements and the compulsory licensing system.  In addition, 
some of major developing countries, including China, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the 
Republic of Korea, Sudan and Thailand, have only relatively recently acceded to the 
Paris Convention. Their adherence to the Convention began in the 1980s. China, for 
                                                 
157
 Boldrin, M  and Levine, D (2008), Against Intellectual Monopoly , p216. 
158
 Ibid, p216. 
159
 Dutfield, G and Suthersanen, U (2005), 'Harmonisation or Differentiation in Intellectual Property 
Protection? The Lessons of History', p135. 
 78 
example, became a member in July 1992, India in December 1998 and Pakistan as 
recently as 2004.160 It seems only natural that there was great distance between the 
pharmaceutical patent standard settings of developed and developing countries. 161 
India’s Patent Law of 1970 laid down a pivotal foundation allowing India to build a 
successful generic industry.162  
D. Socialist countries:  
Many socialist countries provided another model of legal protection for inventions. This 
was termed as Author’s or Inventor’s Certificate. This system was first introduced in the 
Soviet Union under its first legislation ‘Decree on Inventions’ on June 30, 1919; it was 
then taken up by many other socialist countries, with certain changes.163 The Inventor’s 
Certificate granted the right of exploitation of inventions to the state and the inventors 
were rewarded with remuneration or a prize from the state. The inventors had no rights 
to transfer or license their inventions to third parties.164 Medical substances obtained by 
non-chemical processes and inventions relating to methods of treating disease were 
subject matters rewarded by the Certificate. The general nature of this model was to 
encourage invention through non-monetary and honourable rewards.165 The incentive 
mechanism under the Inventor’s Certificate is obviously in contrast to the exclusivity 
rights provided by the patent system. 
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The above account of the historical and complex international patent regimes is 
inevitably simplified. It is important to note that many alternatives may exist 
simultaneously, such as patent protection being, in theory, an option for inventors in 
some socialist countries;166 the harmonisation movement around the world, and the 
inception and operation of the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1970 under the World 
Intellectual Property Office (WIPO). 
 
In brief, prior to the TRIPS Agreement, the patent standard setting for pharmaceuticals 
was a matter for sovereign decisions. The Paris Convention, the primary international 
patent governing treaty before the TRIPS Agreement, has operated under ‘a mechanism 
of international protection without harmonisation’, allowing the autonomy of member 
countries to design their respective patent systems according to the level of economic 
development and to product concerns. Therefore, differences in pharmaceutical patent 
laws had existed to a greater or lesser degree between various jurisdictions regarding 
areas of non-patentability, the rights conferred to patentees and the duration and terms 
of these rights, for example.167 The historical records demonstrate that the development 
of branded pharmaceutical industries and generic industries both benefitted from the 
existence of this variation in the patent policies adopted in each jurisdiction. 
3.1.2 New legal framework for pharmaceutical patents after TRIPS  
The TRIPS Agreement has provoked dramatic changes in the legal framework of 
pharmaceutical patents both nationally and internationally. It closes significant policy 
options provided under the Paris Convention through a universal IPRs mandate. It 
significantly increases the level of patent protection beyond the standard previously 
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established under the Paris Convention and other international treaties.168 The following 
section reviews a number of key TRIPS provisions to illustrate the changes TRIPS has 
brought to the legal framework of pharmaceutical patents.   
A. Key TRIPS obligations to pharmaceuticals  
National treatment and most favoured nation (MFN) are two fundamental principles of 
the TRIPS Agreement. The national treatment principle basically requires that each 
member of the WTO treats nationals of other member states at least as well as it treats 
its own nationals in the matter of IP protection. This is incorporated by reference to the 
national principle provisions under the WIPO conventions. 169 
 
The MFN principle is one of the additional principles set up under TRIPS which are 
absent from the Paris Convention. It provides that the members of the WTO shall 
immediately and unconditionally extend to all other members ‘any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity’ granted with respect to the protection of intellectual property to 
nationals of any country including a non-member of the WTO.170  
 
The impact of TRIPS principles on pharmaceutical patent protection is profound in 
developing countries. Under the MFN principle, any strengthening of patent protection 
through FTAs in one WTO member is unconditionally and automatically accorded to 
the benefit of all other members.171 On the other hand, the formal equality required by 
the national treatment and MFN may not be an ‘unalloyed benefit’ to developing 
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countries. Given the tremendous gap in technical capabilities between developed and 
developing countries, these two principles which require developing countries to treat 
local and foreign economic parties on the same basis may in effect place developing 
countries at a disadvantage in their international trade with developed countries172 
  
Non-discrimination  
 
TRIPS Article 27 requires WTO members to provide patent protection without 
discrimination in terms of the place, the field of technology, whether products are 
imported or locally produced, while permitting certain exceptions.173 Discrimination is 
neither allowed between different fields of technology in national patent laws nor is it 
permitted between the places of inventions whether they are imported or locally 
produced. 174 This provision has evoked intense protest for it is perceived as the most 
rigorous limitation on national autonomy over IP matters among TRIPS rules.175 
 
The non-discrimination principle of TRIPS rules out the policy option of allowing the 
exclusion of inventions in fields such as food, medicines and agricultural goods under 
the previous international treaties.176 Secondly, it creates an inconsistency between 
Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention and Article 27.1 of TRIPS. Article 5(A) states that 
importation does not equate to local working, whereas TRIPS Article 27.1 provides that 
patents should be enjoyed without discrimination as to whether products are imported or 
locally produced. 177 This discrepancy has led to controversy about which provision 
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prevails, and whether Article 27.1 of TRIPS was intended to supersede the rule under 
Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, thereby prohibiting a member from issuing 
compulsory licenses for lack of local working. Some scholars have argued that this 
provision does not incorporate a direct ban on the working requirement. Others have 
contended that Article 27.1 requires equal treatment for both imported and locally 
produced goods, and the imposition of the local working requirement is therefore not 
allowed. They then consider that the working of a patent can be satisfied by importation 
for the purposes of compulsory licences.178 Such conflicting interpretations were 
manifested in the WTO US-Brazil case in which the US challenged the local working 
requirement provided under Brazilian 1996 IP law. Although the case was not decided 
on the merits as the US withdrew its complaint, this case demonstrated that states 
interpret Article 27.1 rather differently for the purpose of compulsory licensing. Such 
differences in interpretation may reduce the scope of the application of compulsory 
licensing. 
 
Patent term:  
 
Article 33 of TRIPS provides that patent protection has to last at least a period of 20 
years from the filing date. This provision attempts to harmonise the patent term by 
providing a minimum standard. The term of protection under TRIPS is longer than in 
many countries,179  including China, which provided a 15-year term from the filing 
date.180 Moreover, TRIPS non-discrimination clause also rules out the practice of 
varying the length of patent terms according to the type of invention.181 For example, 
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the 1970 Indian patent law provided a 5-year term for patent processes for 
pharmaceuticals and longer terms for other inventions. 
 
Pharmaceutical test data protection  
 
Pharmaceutical registration data refers to data results from preclinical and clinical 
studies on the efficacy and non-toxicity of pharmaceutical products. Such data is 
required as the justification for national health authorities in their decisions on the 
granting of manufacturing or marketing licences for pharmaceutical products containing 
new chemical entities.182 
 
Prior to TRIPS, countries had full discretion to determine whether or not to confer 
protection on such data. The TRIPS Agreement established the first international 
standard on this subject under Article 39.3.183 It requires members to protect 
‘undisclosed’ pharmaceutical registration data from ‘unfair commercial use’. However, 
the rule provides broad parameters for members to interpret the rule in their national 
laws, thereby allowing different models for such protection to be applied in various 
jurisdictions under the WTO.184 
 
Enforcement mechanism:  
 
The enforcement mechanism is another major innovation of the TRIPS Agreement in 
relation to other existing IP treaties. Part III  lays down the minimum substantive 
standards for the enforcement of IPRs. The scope of the enforcement procedure is broad, 
including measures to prevent IPR infringement domestically and at borders, civil and 
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administrative procedures, remedies, provisional measures, and other special 
requirements related to border measures and criminal procedures.185 These enforcement 
rules are in place at both national and international levels.186 Nationally, many members, 
in particular developing countries, are required to adopt higher enforcement procedures 
despite a lack of infrastructure and resources. Internationally, TRIPS Article 64 
establishes a punitive dispute settlement procedure to resolve IP disputes. This rule 
provides a mechanism by which members can threaten to invoke this WTO remedy of 
withdrawing trade concession when the accused party fails to comply with a WTO 
ruling.187  
B. TRIPS flexibility 
Although the TRIPS Agreement’s universal approach significantly reduces the policy 
leeway of member countries, in its defence the Agreement incorporates a number of 
flexible provisions designed to facilitate development and to protect the public interest. 
To mitigate the problematic TRIPS constraints, it is crucial for developing countries to 
utilise TRIPS safeguarding mechanisms effectively in the process of TRIPS 
implementation. This objective calls for a good understanding of the scope of 
flexibilities and active initiatives in the process of TRIPS interpretation and 
implementation. For a reference for future proposals, this section reviews the key 
operative flexibilities and some useful implementation precedents. 
Key operative flexibilities:   
 
The guiding rules for TRIPS interpretation and implementation  
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Articles 1.1, 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement are considered to be the ‘guiding 
principles’ for its interpretation and implementation.188 Thus, the clarification of these 
guiding principles may be considered the first and principal task for member countries 
to undertake. These provisions clearly state that WTO member states should balance the 
private  interests in IPRs against a variety of wider socio-economic interests in the 
course of their implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.  
  
It is a well-established in international law, that states are bound by the agreements they 
make with other states, known as pacta sunt servanda and enshrined in Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).189 Thus, clearly WTO 
members must abide by their TRIPS obligations; however, this obligation does not 
dictate how TRIPS should be observed domestically.190 The guiding principles are 
provided as guidance. Under the first, Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement endorses 
freedom in its implementation method. While obliging conformity, it states that 
‘…..[m]embers shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the 
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice’. This implies 
that TRIPS obligations may have no ‘direct effect’ in member countries and that each 
member may determine the relationship between TRIPS and domestic legal systems 
constitutionally for itself; it also provides authorisation for members to implement 
TRIPS-compatible rules in a manner most appropriate for their national conditions.191  
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In the second guiding principle, Article 7 delineates five objectives that TRIPS 
implementation aims to achieve in developing countries. It provides:  
 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute 
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
 
 
This article clearly indicates that the Agreement is intended to promote not only the 
interests of individual rights holders but also the socio-economic welfare interests of the 
wider society. Thus, a reasonable interpretation of this provision is that the Agreement 
requires member states to strike a balance between these interests in the process of 
implementing TRIPS under national IPRs laws. 
 
In the third set of guiding principles, Article 8.1 recognises that member countries are 
reasonably expected to adopt TRIPS-consistent internal measures to protect public 
health and promote certain sectors important to their socio-economic objectives, while 
Article 8.2 endorses the TRIPS-compliant domestic measures against patent abuse and 
anti-competition acts. 192  
 
Despite the existence of limitations in Articles 7 and 8 of ‘various procedural and 
compensatory encumbrances’,193 these Articles may enable developing countries to 
explore TRIPS flexibilities more effectively. For example, a broad interpretation of 
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these Articles was referred to favourably in the WTO dispute, Canada – Patent 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada – Generics disputes).194 In its final 
report, the WTO panel declared that: ‘[b]oth the goals and the limitations stated in Articles 
7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in mind when [examining the words of the limiting 
conditions in Article 30] as well as those of other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 
which indicate its object and purposes’.195Moreover, Articles 7 and 8 were considered to 
be important guidelines in the Doha negotiations.196 The Ministerial Declaration, in 
Paragraph 19, explicitly requires that Council in its work ‘shall be guided by the 
objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take 
fully into account the development dimension.’197 Building on this, Professor Yu has 
recommended five ways in which Articles 7 and 8 could facilitate a more flexible 
TRIPS interpretation and implementation: 
(1) as a guiding light for interpretation and implementation; (2) as a shield 
against aggressive demands for increased intellectual property protection; (3) as 
a sword to challenge provisions that overprotect intellectual property rights or 
tolerate their abuse; (4) as a bridge to connect the TRIPS regime with other 
intellectual property or related international regimes; and (5) as a seed for the 
development of future international intellectual property norms.198 
 
It is worth noting that the inherent ambiguities in Articles 7 and 8 are a result of the 
compromises reached among the disparate state views during the negotiation of the 
Agreement, leading to the possibility of different interpretations.199 As a consequence, 
exploiting the policy space opened by this ambiguity under Articles 7 and 8 may 
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provide an important starting point for developing countries to advance their interests 
under the TRIPS framework.  
 
Flexibilities relevant to pharmaceutical patents   
There are a number of ‘flexibilities’ available in the TRIPS Agreement that can be 
useful to promote public health and access to medicines in developing countries. The 
main relevant provisions include: compulsory licensing (Article 31), parallel 
importation (Article 6), provisions relating to exceptions to patent rights (Article 30), 
provisions relating to patentable subject matter (Article 27.2 & 27.3), provisions relating 
to data protection (Article 39) and provisions relating to the abuse of rights, competition 
and the control of anti-competitive practices (Articles 40).200  
Compulsory licensing provision could be used as a policy mechanism to address 
problems such as the high price of medicines, anti-competitive practices and the under-
supply of essential medicines.  Parallel importation provision could be used as a 
measure to enable the importation of lower-priced patented pharmaceuticals and thus 
promote access to affordable medicines. This flexibility is reaffirmed by the Doha 
Declaration.  Articles 27.2 and 27.3 permit the refusal to grant patents in some areas 
related to public health. Article 30 allows member countries to provide experimentation 
and early working exceptions. In addition, Article 39 provides the limitation on the 
extent of test data protection while Article 40 allows safeguarding measures against 
patent abuse. Both of these provisions could be very useful to facilitate the early entry 
of generic medicines and the healthy development of the local pharmaceutical industry 
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in developing countries. A detailed discussion of patent-specific flexibilities will be 
provided in the context of China’s experience in TRIPS implementation in Chapter 5.  
Political scope of TRIPS flexibilities 
 
The mere existence of TRIPS flexibilities, although essential, does little to ensure 
protection of public interests and in particular, their interest in access to medicines. 
More essential, perhaps, are the political will and abilities of states in their 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. In past decades, various developing countries 
demonstrated great determination and were proactive in exploring policies to meet their 
national development priorities. In this regard, Brazil and India perhaps stand out.201 
Both countries have played pioneering roles in initiating appropriate IP policies 
beneficial to their domestic economic development for several decades. For example, 
both countries’ pre-TRIPS patent laws contained a similar local working clause which 
requires patent-holding companies to work their inventions locally in order to maintain 
exclusive rights, and this requirement continues after their adoption of TRIPS.202 Also, 
India has traditionally provided a pre-grant opposition system which ensures that 
patents are not granted unnecessarily or to inventions not up to their particular standards 
for patentability. Despite pressures to eliminate this system, this pre-grant mechanism 
has been retained under section 3(d) of the revised Indian Patent Law (2005).203 In 
Brazil, the health authority has used its domestic law provisions on compulsory 
licensing (CL) to negotiate price discounts for HIV/AID medicines from pharmaceutical 
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MNCs. The 2001 President Directive and 2003 reform have made the CL provision 
easier to issue and less vulnerable to appeal.204 In May 2007, a CL for public non-
commercial use of Efavirens was actually issued after the price negotiation with the 
patent owner Merck failed.205  
 
In addition, international civil society pressure has on occasion proved to be an effective 
means of defending developing member countries’ use of TRIPS flexibilities. For 
example, to make medicine more affordable, in 1997 the South African government 
passed the Medicine and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, which allowed 
parallel imports, enforcing generic substitution, and implementing price controls. When 
thirty-nine multinational pharmaceutical companies filed a lawsuit to block the 
legislation under the claims that the law was unconstitutional and that it violated the 
TRIPS rules, there was an intense backlash from international media and civil society 
organizations. In the end, the companies were pressured to withdraw the case.206 .In 
another example, an active and well-organized international campaign by NGOs and 
international media organizations helped developing countries gain the WTO's 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the Doha Declaration). This 
reaffirmed and clarified the existence of flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement.207 
 
In brief, this section has demonstrated that political and judicial processes are 
interactive and complementary in the international IP forums. Just as WTO judicial 
processes shape bilateral negotiations, political processes inform and influence judicial 
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decisions 208If developing countries want to be more effective in advancing their 
national interests in international IP negotiations, they will need to identify common 
interests. Then, through cooperation and political mobilisation, they may have more 
successes.  
C.TRIPS-plus provisions   
 
While the TRIPS mandate created obstacles for access to medicines for developing 
countries, the recent adoption of TRIPS-plus patent regimes in a growing number of 
developing countries has added to this problem.209 This trend could be the result of 
international power pressures, economic dependence and weak institutional capabilities 
within developing countries.210 Having failed to achieve all they demanded in TRIPS 
negotiations and implementation, developed countries and their IP industries have 
sought other means to either limit the use of TRIPS flexibilities or to press for higher IP 
standards than the TRIPS minimum requirements for developing countries. Free trade 
agreements, trade investment deals, WTO DSU and WIPO negotiations are the typical 
means used to push TRIPS-plus standards.211 In addition, the ‘ideational tool’ has also 
been deployed to reinforce an international policy environment advocating TRIPS-plus 
standards. Through technical assistance programmes, published research and WTO 
trade policy review processes, the pro-IP discourses sustain the spread of their argument 
that IP and development are mutually supportive. Currently, TRIPS-plus IP rules have 
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been imposed as the new basis for trade negotiations between developed and developing 
countries.212 Moreover, they are gradually becoming accepted as the new norm even 
among developing countries for various reasons. 
 
There are several reasons developing countries are acquiescing to TRIPS-plus rules. 
Firstly, as explained in Chapter 2, developing country economic dependence on the US 
and EU markets and technologies has always undermined their capacity to resist 
pressures from the more powerful states. This increases the likelihood of their accepting 
the more demanding IP rules. Secondly, their lack of IP expertise and experience in IP 
matters has made developing countries susceptible to the strong influence of pro-IP 
capability-building discourse. Consequently, their policy makers and IP experts may 
have become gradually accustomed to viewing the TRIPS-plus approach toward TRIPS 
implementation as the only reasonable alternative.213 Finally, the growing 
competitiveness of domestic industries in the more rapidly developing countries as their 
interests approach those of developed countries may be inclined to support the TRIPS-
plus policy options.214 
 
The submission of increasing numbers of developing states to TRIPS-plus norms poses 
serious problems for the development, health and well-being of developing countries 
with weaker economies. This is because TRIPS-plus provisions not only impede generic 
competition but also have the potential to impact future global IPR development. It is 
important for policy makers in developing countries to understand the impacts of 
TRIPS-plus provisions on development in general and public health in particular. For 
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this purpose, this section reviews some key TRIPS-plus provisions that are a particular 
threat to the health welfare of people in developing countries.  
 
Patent term extension 
Free trade agreements (FTAs) often oblige signatory countries to extend the terms of 
patents to compensate for unreasonable loss of the effective patent term as a result of a 
lengthy regulatory approval or patent application process.215 Some FTAs even require 
an automatic patent term extension on the basis of the extension granted in other 
countries at the request of the rights holder.216 Since such obligations under FTAs are 
‘independent, cumulative and with no maximum period’, a patent may be extended for 
an indefinite period due to the delays in the granting of patent and drug registration. 
Presumably, this could lead to a drug patent lasting for several months or years beyond 
the 20-year term established under the TRIPS Agreement.217  
 
Allowing such patent term extensions for regulatory procedures could have unfortunate 
unintended consequences.218 For example, the patent regulatory offices in many 
developing countries are generally understaffed, and pending application backlogs are 
not uncommon.219 As a result, imposing the patent term extension obligation may put 
pressure on staff to rush their assessments on the validity of patents or the efficacy and 
safety of drugs. This could result in ineffectual or unsafe products being granted patents 
and unqualified or even dangerous medicines being marketed to customers.220 
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Pharmaceutical test data exclusivity 
 
The US has sought to create another TRIPS-plus obligation beyond the TRIPS 
requirements on the provision concerning the protection of pharmaceutical data. The 
broad scope of TRIPS Article 39.3, on protection of pharmaceutical data has enabled 
WTO members to adopt diverse modes of protecting pharmaceutical test data under 
their national laws while remaining within the regulatory constraints of TRIPS and the 
other relevant international treaties.221 For example, the US and the EU have 
implemented their Article 39.3 obligations in an anti-competitive way that grants a 
period of ‘marketing exclusivity’ on pharmaceutical test data under their current 
legislation.222 On the other hand, it has been argued that TRIPS requires the protection 
of pharmaceutical test data under the established WTO fundamental principle 
prohibiting unfair competition, and therefore, market exclusivity should be viewed as a 
kind of implied TRIPS-plus standard.223 This argument was raised by Argentina in a 
WTO case that remains unresolved because the US withdrew its complaint against 
Argentina for non-recognition of data exclusivity under its national law after the WTO 
consultation.224 The argument, however, remains viable and worthy of further 
consideration. 
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M (2004), Ibid, p5. 
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All the same, the US has actively sought to have this TRIPS-plus standard recognized in 
other jurisdictions through trade negotiations and particularly by including it in its free 
trade agreements.225 The US model of data exclusivity was first incorporated under 
Article 1711 of the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1992 (NAFTA).226 Since 
then, the US has succeeded in including this provision in its FTAs with many other 
countries, including Australia and the developing countries, Bahrain, Jordan, Panama, 
Singapore, Morocco, Chile and the Dominican Republic and Central American 
countries (CAFTA). These FTAs established a sui generis data exclusivity regime in 
which the period of protection is generally five years for pharmaceuticals and ten years 
for agrochemicals. 227  
 
The argument supporting this approach is that since drug development is expensive and 
risky, the data exclusivity approach can provide an economic incentive for originator 
companies to undertake R&D and to ensure their huge investments are protected against 
the ‘free-ride’ of generic companies.228 However, the application of data exclusivity 
creates major barriers to the early entry of generic competition. Generic companies must 
wait to enter into the market until they are allowed to use the data for regulatory 
registration, for it is too expensive and wasteful for generic companies to repeat the tests 
conducted by originator companies. Thus, data exclusivity in effect confers a marketing 
monopoly on the term of exclusivity provided.229  
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Patent linkage  
 
Patent linkage or patent-registration linkage refers to the practise of linking the 
regulatory authorisation of a generic medicine to the patent status of the referred 
originator medicine.230 The concept of ‘patent linkage’ is statutorily provided in the US 
under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the Hatch-
Waxman Act). 231 This Act requires that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
maintain a publication of pharmaceutical products and their uses currently under patent, 
which is commonly known as the Orange Book. The FDA may not authorise the 
marketing approval of a generic copy of a brand name product that is protected by a 
patent listed in the Orange Book.232 
 
The patent linkage scheme under FTAs is not deemed as an obligation under TRIPS by 
most commentators.233 In reality, whether or not to adopt such a practice is subject to 
national jurisdictions. While some countries, such as the US, China, Canada and 
Australia, have incorporated patent linkages into their national laws, many others, 
including the EU, have not accepted it; 234 instead, a Bolar-exception provision was  
recently introduced by Directive 2004/27/EC amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the 
EU code relating to medicinal products for human use.235 The Bolar-exception provision 
is named after the case Roche products Inc vs. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co, in which the 
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied Bolar’s right to use Roche’s patented 
invention in experiments conducted for the purpose of regulatory approval. Right after 
the court’s decision, however, the congress passed a law permitting such use of patented 
products in experiments for the purpose of obtaining FDA approval rights. This 
provision allows the use of patented products to conduct tests and obtain regulatory 
approval from the health authority before the expiry of a patent. This can facilitate the 
commercialisation of the generic alternative right after the patented pharmaceutical 
product expires.236  This Bolar-exception provision proved to be consistent with Article 
30 of TRIPS under a WTO case initiated by the European Communities and their 
members against Canada.237 
 
In comparison, patent linkage creates a higher level of rights protection for 
pharmaceutical patents than the TRIPS provision. This system requires the health 
authority to refuse to register a generic version of medicine if the related patent is still in 
force. Legally, only a court can decide the validity of a patent or whether there is 
infringement or not. Yet, with the imposition of a patent linkage system, such 
responsibilities are shifted to the health authorities which normally do not have the 
sufficient expertise. 238 In addition, it is well-documented that pharmaceutical patents 
with sub-patentability have been used strategically to encumber or block potential 
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competitors.239 Such patents, in many cases subject to the validity challenge, can impose 
legal hazards to delay the entry of generic competition.240 
 
In short, three measures promoted under the FTAs from the US impose higher levels of 
patent protection to pharmaceutical products than those mandated by the TRIPS 
Agreement. They may erect formidable legislative or administrative barriers to the early 
entry of generic competition, particularly needed in developing countries. Moreover, 
these TRIPS-plus standards of the FTAs enacted by a WTO member apply to other 
WTO members under the principle of most favoured nation. One of the major 
consequences of the application of the TRIPS-plus standard is that WTO members are 
then limited in their ability to use the exceptions and flexibilities preserved under the 
Agreement. This can significantly constrain national discretion of WTO members in 
designing their own pharmaceutical patent legislation suitable for their national 
conditions.  
 
3.1.3 Institutional challenges for the use of TRIPS flexibility  
For developing countries to exploit the TRIPS flexibilities and to ward off external 
pressures against their internal policies, they need to develop sufficient institutional 
capabilities to enable policy makers to clarify their domestic public goods priorities, 
coordinate their strategies and formulate effective pro-development IPR policy. 
However, many developing countries are generally not well equipped with these 
capabilities. The following section highlights several institutional weaknesses:  
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A. Institutional factors important for the translation of TRIPS 
flexibilities into national law and practices   
Local technical expertise 
 
It is well-recognised that one of the major obstacles to the effective use of TRIPS 
flexibilities is a lack of technical expertise. 241 In a report commissioned by the UK 
Government,242 the commissioners found that developing countries are generally 
lacking, although to different degrees, legal professionals, IP expertise, and policy 
development capability in the area of IPRs.243 The limited domestic capacity makes the 
majority of developing countries strongly dependent on technical assistance from 
international agencies like WIPO, the European Patent Office (EPO) or the international 
cooperation agencies of developed countries for drafting and modernizing their national 
IP systems.244 These external aids have emphasised the strengthening of IP protection 
and thus largely facilitate the business interests of foreign IP rights holders.245 For 
example, the model laws developed by the WIPO for developing countries were drafted 
‘either at the behest of or closely aligned with the positions of the US and Europe’.246 
Consequently there is a focus on promoting universal IP rights without sufficient regard 
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for their social cost, so that they have generally failed to provide guidance for members 
in utilising the TRIPS flexibilities for their development priorities.247  
 
Moreover, it is apparent that domestic agencies are in better positions to understand 
national needs and concerns, whereas foreign agencies have much lower understanding 
of local norms, cultures and conditions. Given the profound influence of patent policy 
on access to medicines and medical technology, it is too important issue to leave it to 
foreign agencies dictate the orientation of pharmaceutical patent policy. 
 
Coordination between relevant government departments 
 
 Patent policy for pharmaceuticals is more than just a legal issue. The implication of 
patent rights will also affect the interests of industry competitors and customers. Thus, 
policy making for pharmaceuticals can be a complex mixture of economic, social and 
legal standards. Conflicts of interests are often apparent in the law-making process. 
Typically, industry groups and health departments might lobby for different positions. 
To reconcile such differences, the formulation of patent policies related to 
pharmaceuticals should ideally proceed with comprehensive coordination between 
relevant agencies, such as law making agencies, patent offices, drug registration bureaus, 
health authorities, and special courts, for example.  
 
However, the ability of developing countries to co-ordinate policies across governments 
remains low and insufficient. Some countries have established intra-government 
mechanisms to improve the coordination of policies and advice. However, the evidence 
found by the CIPR study suggests that such coordination consultations have not 
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generated effective results, and in many cases they are not able to readily provide 
technical advice and expertise.248 
  
Public participation:  
 
The decision-making process in many developing counties is largely based on a top-
down approach. Intellectual property offices and trade departments often dominate the 
standards setting process for pharmaceutical patents, and there is often limited 
participation of representatives from the industry and consumers in the process of patent 
policy formulation.249 Although some developing countries are exceptional in this 
aspect, for instance India has preserved a broad-based, extensive system for public 
consultation and debates, 250  in most cases the process of IP policy making in 
developing countries lacks any real interactions with domestic stakeholders.251  
B. Institutions facilitating the effective use of TRIPS flexibilities:   
Drug regulation 
 
A competent drug registration authority (DRA) and appropriate drug legislation have to 
be in place in order to realise the benefits of TRIPS flexibilities.  Compulsory licensing 
is one of the vital provisions enabling a WTO developing member to improve access to 
essential medicines. However, a competent DRA is required to carry out the tasks 
involved in the standard regulation of the safety, efficacy and quality of the drugs in 
question in case a compulsory licence is successfully issued and a product 
manufactured.252 In reality, many developing countries do not have sufficient technical 
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and infrastructural capacities for the registration and regulation of medicines.253 One 
WHO project surveyed 36 African countries and found that only three had a limited 
drug regulatory capability and that none had a ‘comprehensive drug regulatory 
capacity.’254  
 
This regulatory incompetence is also found in the aspect of making drug registration 
and regulation rules. The survey from Hill and Johnson revealed that regulatory systems 
in developing countries are yet to be able to respond effectively to the changes imposed 
by TRIPS and FTAs. In particular, there is lack of effective legislation to allow the 
utilisation of TRIPS flexibilities.255 Instead, some TRIPS-plus provisions, particularly 
patent linkage and data exclusivity, are increasingly translated into the regulatory 
regime of developing countries via bilateral trade agreements with developed countries, 
especially the US.256  
 
The role of the court 
 
Certain TRIPS flexibility provisions aim to facilitate the availability of generic 
medicines or the early entry of generic competition. However, these provisions are often 
undermined by rights holders through tactical litigation, in particular, preliminary 
injunctions in court. This highlights the role of courts in facilitating the effective use of 
TRIPS flexibilities.  
 
A preliminary injunction refers to a temporary injunction issued before or during the 
trial to prevent an irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a chance to 
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decide the case. Article 50 of TRIPS empowers the court to issue a preliminary 
injunction against infringements that are taking place or are imminent. It also requires 
the court to exercise its authority to impose a number of conditions on the application of 
a preliminary injunction. To fulfil such a ‘check and balance’ approach requires a 
competent court, which is often absent in developing countries.  
3.1.4 Summary: the known and unknown  
 
The TRIPS Agreement places new and significant restrictions on the legal options 
available to developing countries to create domestic policies and law to promote and 
protect public health, even though some of the built-in flexibility mechanisms may be 
useful to help them to mitigate some of the possible effects of such lost adaptability. In 
addition, many developing countries lack the institutional capabilities to make effective 
use of TRIPS’ flexibilities for their national development purposes. 
 
It is not clear whether the national capabilities of particular developing states, such as 
growing economic power and political independence, can help in mitigating the loss of 
legislative adaptability in IPR matters, or whether they can be helpful in alleviating 
aggressive attempts to limit the use of TRIPS flexibilities through FTAs or other 
protectionist approaches. It is notable that China is one of a small group of developing 
countries whose economic and political competitiveness is growing rapidly. This thesis 
is interested to explore whether China possesses or is developing capabilities to exploit 
the TRIPS flexibilities more effectively, ward off the pressures of more powerful states 
acting through the international IPR regime, and thus, improve its autonomy in 
domestic IP policy making.  
 
 104 
3.2 Economic effects of TRIPS implementation 
This section explores the range of economic benefits TRIPS can be expected to deliver 
to developing countries. It seeks to determine whether it can promote a higher level of 
local innovation, international technology transfer (ITT) and additional global R&D, 
particularly in areas devoted to the prevention and cure of diseases relevant to 
developing countries. To find answers to these questions it examines current scholarship.  
3.2.1 Theory: a trade-off between static loss and dynamic gains 
 
Economists have detected an inherent conflict between public and private interests in 
the context of IPRs. On the one hand, static efficiency requires the satisfaction of public 
interests in having wide access to inventions at an affordable price, which may be quite 
low. On the other hand, dynamic efficiency necessitates meeting private interests in 
profit generation, which may be substantial but necessary for providing an incentive to 
invest in new inventions.257 
A. Static effects 
 
This basic innovation trade off in IPRs is demonstrated below in Figure 1. The Figure 
illustrates the linear demand and marginal revenue for a newly invented product that can 
be supplied to the market at constant marginal costs.258 In the absence of patent 
protection, many firms could compete in the market with imitative substitutes of the 
product. The ‘ex-post optimality’ requires firms to sell their products at a competitive 
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price, which is assumed to be equal to the marginal cost Pc and output Qc.259 Then, the 
area of APcC is the generated customer benefits; the introduction of patent protection 
transforms the competitive market into a monopolistic place. When a firm has a 
monopoly over a product it can sell this product at a much higher level than in a 
competitive market, at Pm, given the high cost of R&D, and the output would fall to 
Qm as a consequence of less demand. The monopoly rents earned by the patentee firm 
are in the area PcPmBD. This area represents a rent transfer from the customers to the 
firm, which constitutes a welfare loss or, as is termed in economics, a deadweight loss 
to consumers, with the introduction of patent protection to a product.260 
 
In the open economy, for a country in the position of importing or producing imitative 
substitutes the decision to reward patent protection facilitates the transfer of monopoly 
rents to foreign rights holders. This implies the static loss of the area PcPm BC, in 
addition to a reduction of output from local firms. Subsequently, a country newly 
introducing patent protection may suffer higher static costs than that it would pay in a 
closed economy.261 A country would suffer a straightforward welfare loss if its market 
were too small for such a transfer to induce more foreign R&D investment in products 
that meet local needs.262  
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Figure 1:  Innovation trade-off in IPRs 
 
 
 
B. Dynamic effects  
Economists also have noted the sources of dynamic gains from such a basic trade-off. 
The granting IP monopoly rights can generate sufficient payoffs to foster dynamic 
innovation, which in turn increases long-term customer welfare by producing more new 
and diverse products. Maskus has argued that free limitations and selling cannot 
generate sufficient profits to cover the financial demand for original R&D projects. 
Such an inadequacy would result in no investment in research and development of a 
product, and the entire customer benefit would disappear.263  
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This model finds its support from other theoretical studies. Diwan and Rodrik have 
suggested that the patent protection provided by developing countries can work as an 
incentive to attract additional R&D activities from developed countries to meet their 
local needs. Tayor’s theoretical study on the linkage between IPRs and R&D shows that 
the insufficient patent protection not only discourages foreign innovators to engage in 
R&D activities in a desirable mode, but also makes them unwillingly to transfer their 
technology in the given jurisdiction.264 
.  
Nevertheless, many economists have also raised doubts about the possible effects of the 
role of patents on innovation. Maskus warns that IPRs should be understood as the 
second best solution.265 Intellectual property rights are expected to foster investment in 
R&D and knowledge creation, but they impose constraints on the current consumption 
of knowledge by enhancing the market power of rights holders, which necessitates 
government policy mediation to strike a balance between the producers of knowledge 
and society.266 Moreover, other theoretical arguments also predicted that the 
strengthening of patent protection may slow down technology progress in the long run. 
Takalo and Kanniainen’s model suggested that enhanced patent protection may 
encourage firms to delay the commercialisation of innovation. Under strong patent 
protection, firms find it more profitable to exploit current technologies. They tend to opt 
to slow down the development or exploitation of new technology or products.267  
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In brief, there seems to be a consensus among the economists studied about the static 
effects of patents, but they maintain more contentious views about the dynamic gains of 
the role of patents in innovation. Still, it is not enough to rely on theoretical arguments 
to understand the relationship between patents and innovation. The following section 
turns to an examination of actual practices to obtain empirical evidence that should 
enable a more reliable determination to be made. 
3.2.2 Empirical analyses  
 
The section reviews empirical studies of actual practice to help determine whether the 
supposed advantages of strong patents have materialised in terms of fostering local 
innovation, strengthening patents and technology transfer and advancing global research 
on diseases relevant to developing countries.  
A. The role of patents in fostering local innovation 
A principle argument advanced by advocates of strong IP protection is that it promotes 
higher levels of innovation by local companies.268 Lanjouw (1997) was optimistic about 
these benefits and indentified supporting evidence from her 1996 and 1997 surveys on 
the impacts of introducing product patents for pharmaceutical industries in India. She 
confirmed that large firms in India are already responding to TRIPS by increasing their 
total R&D expenditure and by moving away from the sole development of new 
processes towards new molecular discoveries.269 In contrast, the literature review by 
Maskus, including experiences from countries such as South Korea ( Kawaura and 
LaCroix,1995), Argentina (Nougues, 1990) and Lebanon (Maskus 1997b), suggested 
that the preponderance of evidence indicates that limited financial capital tends to 
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prevent local pharmaceutical firms in developing countries from undertaking R&D.270 
Lerner used the patent application as a measure to assess the impact of strengthening 
patent standards in local innovation. His results on sixty countries over a 150-year 
period also confirmed that strengthening patent protection did not appear to have 
positive effects on domestic patent application.271 Branstertter et al. looked at R&D 
input and output in Japan following two waves of patent strengthening reforms in 1988 
and the mid-1990s. They found no evidence of increased R&D spending and patenting 
activities. In fact, the 1990s witnessed a wide decline of R&D investment associated 
with the general economic downturn in Japan.272  
 
Conversely, recent empirical studies support Lanjouw’s optimism on the role of strong 
patents in reducing local innovation. Maskus, Dougherty and Metha (2005) indentified 
rapid growth of patenting and R&D expenditure from Chinese enterprises and suggested 
that the strengthening of IPR is one of important factors contributing to such positive 
effects in local technological development.273 Chadha’s (2009) micro-econometric 
studies on 65 Indian pharmaceutical firms revealed a significant increase in patent 
activities for the period 1991 to 2004. He argued that this result proved the positive 
impact of introducing stronger patents in India.274 Meanwhile, Chaudhuri (2009) also 
reported that R&D expenditure dramatically increased whilst the structure of R&D 
activities shifted towards more involvement with the development of new chemical 
entities (NCEs) and new formulations and compositions, but he suggested that the 
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primary motivation for this was not the TRIPS-compliant product patent regime in India 
but the patent regime in developed countries, given their market orientation focusing on 
the larger and more lucrative markets in developed countries.275  
 
The scholarship examined shows the empirical studies conducted after the TRIPS 
regime was established have detected some positive effects of strengthened patents on 
innovation, whereas the studies examining pre-TRIPS experience of stronger patents 
under national legal reforms found little such evidence. This indicates that the legal 
changes produced by TRIPS compliance may have had stronger impacts on the national 
economy than on internal patent reform. But what is of most interest to this thesis is that 
these positive effects seem to be indentified in only a few of the larger developing 
countries, such as India and China. This suggests that local conditions, such as market 
size, local imitative and innovative capabilities, level of development and growth, also 
play a part in fostering the growth of R&D spending and patenting activities in a 
country. This proposition is evident in a recent empirical study. Qian studied 26 sample 
countries which had newly introduced the pharmaceutical patent law during the period 
of 1978 to 2002. He found that the establishment of patent laws does not ‘promptly 
stimulate local innovation’ by itself, but that other additional conditions, such as higher 
levels of economic development, education attainment, and economic freedom, play 
more influential roles in accelerating local innovation.276 
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While this evidence may suggest that TRIPS rules may induce more local innovation at 
least to middle income developing countries, this claim has to be weighed against the 
potential negative impacts of strong patents on innovation. Technological development 
essentially involves learning about existing advanced technology. However, patents 
restrict access to that technology by imposing high costs on copying and imitating them. 
This causes problems for developing countries because imitation by reverse-engineering 
is a common means for their innovation.277 Moreover, the legal framework under TRIPS 
or TRIPS-plus regimes enhances the power of rights holders in technology transactions, 
consequently, the costs of obtaining technology through licensing are likely to increase 
which would exclude imitation via reverse engineering even more. 278A strong patent 
system which limits access to existing technology can make both ‘catch-up’ efforts and 
campaigns against poverty and disease more costly or difficult for developing countries. 
 
The above review has found mixed evidence about the role of patents in fostering local 
innovation. While earlier empirical studies established that patent strengthening had no 
significant effects in inducing local innovation, the post-TRIPS empirical studies have 
indentified some positive impacts of TRIPS implementation but principally in larger 
developing countries such as India and China. 
 
B. Patent strengthening and international technology transfer 
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International technology transfer (ITT), in the form of licensing, capital goods and 
technical assistance, constitutes a crucial source of innovation in developing 
countries.279 During the TRIPS negotiations, developed countries argued that 
strengthening the IPRs protection was a prerequisite for fostering increased technology 
transfer flows to developing countries.280 In theory, the existence of an effective IPR 
protection is assumed to be a logical precondition for the international transfer of certain 
new technologies, especially those such as pharmaceutical inventions which can be 
easily copied. The offer of sufficient IPR protection enables firms to take control of 
their proprietary technology and charge sufficient prices that reflect the cost of 
innovation in the technology transfer deals. This position can encourage firms to 
transfer their technology property either through licensing or direct foreign investment 
(FDI). 281  
 
Does an increased flow of foreign technology into developing countries after they adopt 
a stronger IPR regime really occur? The preponderance of econometric studies confirms 
that market-mediated forms of technology transfer, such as trade flow, FDI and 
licensing, respond positively to patent strengthening in advanced and larger developing 
countries.282 Branstetter et al. examined the response of US multinational companies to 
patent reform in 16 middle income developing countries during the period of 1982 to 
1999 and found that royalty payments for technology licensing to affiliates or third 
parties had significantly increased. The same was true with the deployment of R&D 
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expenditure and patent applications. 283 Smith’s statistical analysis suggested that patent 
strengthening had positive effects on the market expansion of US affiliate sales and 
technology licensing, and that this was particularly effective across countries with 
strong imitative abilities.284 Lerner did not find positive links between patent 
strengthening and increased domestic patenting activities in his survey on 60 countries 
over a 150-year period, but he did indentify a positive correlation between foreign 
patenting and reforming countries.285 This result also suggested a positive link between 
technology transfer and patent strength.  
 
Again, it is also important to note the fact that the main beneficiaries of increased levels 
of ITT induced by patent strengthening are middle income countries, despite the wide 
membership of TRIPS, including economies at all levels. This implies that patents may 
not be the main determining factor for attracting foreign technology transfer; other 
factors, such as infrastructure, market size, and economic level, for example, all matter. 
C. The interface of patent strengthening and additional global research 
on the diseases of poorer nations  
 
The most controversial issue about the impact of patents is that they impose high drug 
prices and decrease the choice of sources of medicines. 286  However, the industry 
emphasises the indispensable role of patent incentives for drug development and 
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justifies the potential impacts of patents on drugs via compensation through new and 
additional research devoted to the cure of particular diseases found in the poorer nations. 
 
The creation of new drugs is highly capital and technology intensive but the number of 
products finally introduced to the market is very low.287 Surveys conducted by Levin 
and Scherer et al. suggested that the pharmaceutical industry is more dependent on the 
patent system than many other sectors for recouping its R&D investment costs and for 
generating profit to fund further R&D activities.288 Research-based pharmaceutical 
MNCs have strong interests in the establishment of a globalised strong patent-protection 
regime.289 They can expect to profit greatly from the global application of TRIPS patent 
standards, which they played an influential role in creating by pressing for the 
incorporation of IPRs into the legal framework of the world’s trading system.290  
 
On the other hand, TRIPS implementation also obligates States to balance these private 
interests against interests that touch wider economic and social issues. In the 
pharmaceutical field this refers to the interests of patients and the users of patented 
technologies, as provided under Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS. The Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration on Health) supports this 
proposition, It stresses that TRIPS should be implemented and interpreted in a way that 
supports public health ‘by promoting both access to existing medicines and the creation 
of new medicines.’ Thus, it reaffirms the governments’ rights to use the TRIPS 
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flexibilities in circumventing patent rights for the improvement of access to essential 
medicines.291  
 
The final empirical analysis in this section 3.2.2 examines the likelihood of TRIPS’ 
commitments promoting better access to medicine. Research by the WHO provides 
some disappointing empirical evidence. In its 1996 study, the WHO surveyed the global 
allocation of R&D funds to research on two of the prevailing diseases in developing 
countries and found that only a few R&D investments and inventions had been devoted 
to the diseases particularly relevant to developing countries. The survey reported that of 
an overall global US$56 billion in R&D investment annually, R&D spending was only 
US$32 million on diarrhoea per year and between US$48 to US$68 million on 
pneumonia per year. Moreover, much of this spending was targeted on inventions that 
mainly benefit people living in developed countries, such as those travelling to 
developing countries.292 According to another report by Pecoul et al., of the 1,233 drugs 
licensed worldwide between 1975 and 1997, only 13 were for tropical diseases. Among 
these, five were from veterinary research and two were versions of existing medicines; 
only four were developed by private investments specialising in tropical human 
diseases.293 Finally, in one of the most recent studies, the Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH) also confirmed the continuation 
of this problem. The CIPIH explained that ‘because the market demand for diagnostics, 
vaccines and medicines needed to address health problems mainly affecting developing 
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countries is small and uncertain, the incentive effect of intellectual property rights may 
be limited or non-existent’294. 
3.2.3 Summary: the known and unknown  
The examination of the economic effects of TRIPS implementation in this section 3.2 
has found that economists suggest that TRIPS may bring a trade-off effect to developing 
countries, resulting in a short-term welfare loss associated with monopoly pricing on the 
one hand but on the other, long-term economic benefits associated with innovation. 
Nevertheless, the existing empirical evidence cannot verify this trade-off effect as yet, 
but it does suggest that TRIPS has delivered some positive innovation benefits to the 
larger developing countries. However, insufficient time has passed to draw a conclusive 
judgement on the role of TRIPS in fostering innovation in developing countries, and 
uncertainties lie even for the larger developing countries if innovation there is still 
incremental and cumulative in nature. This raises another question for further empirical 
studies: how can a strong patent system that limits access to the existing technology 
affect the technological ‘catch-up’ efforts in the large developing countries? It is hoped 
that this new empirical study on Chinese experience will contribute to an answer to this 
question.  
3.3 Concluding remarks   
 
This literature review explored two questions. Firstly, it attempted to understand how 
TRIPS implementation affects national legislative adaptability in making and enforcing 
patent rules in developing countries. The prevailing view is that the universal strong 
patent protection approach of the Agreement may restrict developing countries’ ability 
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to adapt their domestic laws to enable the designing of a patent system that works for its 
public health interests, despite the TRIPS built-in flexible safeguarding mechanisms. 
The challenges are twofold: developing countries face formidable institutional 
challenges in utilising and exploiting TRIPS’ flexibilities for their development interests, 
and they are also confronted with increasing IPRs protectionism beyond TRIPS, such as 
the harmonisation movement under the WIPO and higher IPRs standards under FTAs 
and other international agreements.  
  
The second question examined whether the stronger patent of TRIPS has fostered local 
innovation in developing countries. Economists seem to share a consensus about the 
welfare loss that developing countries will suffer in the short term,295 but they diverge 
concerning the roles of the stronger patents in innovation. Some studies suggested that 
the harmonised patent regime would bring in certain long-term benefits, such as a 
higher level of local innovation and greater inflow of ITT, but others argued that patents 
impose barriers to access the existing technology and hence give rise to the under- 
provision of essential medicines and the delay of technology learning and catch-up. 
Nevertheless, the existing empirical evidence is too mixed and inconclusive to verify 
the theoretical propositions.  
 
What is fascinating in this research is that certain positive effects of TRIPS 
implementation have so far been found only in middle income countries. This finding 
suggests two further empirical topics for this research: (a) Are middle-income countries 
with relatively stronger economies and institutional capabilities likely to do better in 
mitigating the loss of legislative adaptability under the TRIPS framework? and (b) Is a 
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strong patent system more beneficial for middle- income developing countries?296 In the 
following chapters these two topics will be explored in a case study of China’s TRIPS 
implementation experience in the pharmaceutical field.  
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Chapter 4 Evolution of pharmaceutical patent rules  
in China 
 
This chapter is set to provide the political and legal background for the analysis on the 
relationship between TRIPS implementation and the development of local 
pharmaceutical innovation in China. It reviews the legal history that led to the 
incorporation of TRIPS standards into the Chinese patent laws. It focuses on both the 
threshold for pharmaceutical patent protection and the rationales behind each law 
reform. The first section examines the background, adaptive efforts and policy effects of 
the passage of the first patent law in the People’s Republic China (PRC or China). 
Section two then analyses why and how China adopted product patents for medicines as 
early as in 1992. Finally, the third section evaluates the major pharmaceutical patent 
provisions under the 2000 Chinese patent law to determine whether China has fulfilled 
its WTO accession commitments. 
4.1 The establishment of the 1984 Chinese patent law  
As with much of the body of law promulgated during the 1980s, the 1984 Chinese 
patent law297 was the result of the tentative efforts of the PRC government to adapt 
foreign legal and policy ideas to its own political and economic circumstances.298 
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Consequently, its standard setting was experimental,299 and its implementation marked 
with deficiencies when compared with its designated major objectives. 
4.1.1 Background 
 
In the end of the 1980s, when the PRC commenced efforts to be more receptive to the 
world outside its borders, it found itself to have fallen far behind the West in terms of 
productivity and technological competence. To fulfil its catch up ambitions, the 
government introduced a policy known as the ‘four modernisations’ programme as a 
blueprint for development policy.300 This programme was aimed at building the four 
sectors of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology through 
advanced science and technology.301 This meant that accelerating access to foreign 
technology became an essential policy objective.  
The PRC found the United States to a particularly attractive trading partner, given its 
advanced industrial and technological economy and its new, friendly diplomatic policy 
towards China.302 However, the US demanded the protection of the IPR assets of its 
citizens as a condition from the start of negotiations of the bilateral science and 
technology (S&T) agreements, such as the ‘U.S.-China Agreement on Cooperation in 
Science and Technology’ and ‘the Understanding on Cooperation in Space 
Technology’.303 When the ‘Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States of 
America and the People’s Republic of China’ was concluded, the two parties agreed to 
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provide equivalent IPR protection to each other’s citizens.304 Pursuant to this agreement, 
China joined the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) in 1980 and the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1984.305 To implement these 
agreements, in 1984 the PRC government enacted the Patent Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, China’s first patent law. 
 
The PRC found itself in a major dilemma of a clash of legal cultures. The notion of 
private ownership rights was completely new to the PRC and potentially conflicted 
hugely with the existing legal culture based on socialist principles.306 This resulted in 
intense debates concerning the validity of the introduction of a patent system in China. 
Proponents primarily stressed the desirable economic benefits purportedly associated 
with a patent system. They argued that a patent system would introduce not only 
meaningful material incentives to spur domestic innovation but also offer systematic 
way of obtaining new technological information. These benefits could promote growth 
and help make up for developmental losses due to the Cultural Revolution.307 They also 
emphasised that a patent system would yield benefits to China in its international 
economic relations. They believed that the establishment of a modern patent system 
would promote greater foreign investment and international technology transfer to 
China.308 On the other side, the opponents contended that the patent system could lead 
to foreign control of technology given the discrepancy in the levels of economic and 
technological development between China and the West. This then could hinder the 
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healthy development of domestic technology and national industries.309 They also 
argued that the concepts of private ownership and profit-oriented goals associated with a 
patent system were antithetical to the socialist principles of collectivism and service-
minded attitudes toward work.310 Some of the opponents even condemned the 
establishment of a patent system as a treasonous act against national interests because 
they believed this system would only benefit foreign interests.311 
 
The line of the debates was sharply drawn between representatives from the legal and 
economic communities. The legal experts, who favoured adoption of a patent system, 
was initially supported by officials from the National Science and Technology 
Department and were later joined by officials from the national patent office.312 From 
the start they had strong support from the new political and state leader, Deng Xiao Pin, 
and. Deng instructed the formation of committee to draft the text of the first modern 
Chinese patent law following China’s execution of the bilateral trade agreement with 
the US in July 1979.313 The opponents came from the economic bureaus. The economic 
experts submitted written arguments against adopting a patent system to Deng and other 
leaders of the State Council in August 1980. Two subsequent meetings among experts 
were organised to consider both arguments on the issue.314 The views of the proponents 
prevailed, and the drafting work continued. Nonetheless, due to the consistent 
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objections and criticism from economic officials, the draft was amended twenty-five 
times before its final submission to the National People’s Congress (NPC).315 In the end, 
it was Deng’s instruction to the NPC , of ‘the earlier the establishment of a patent 
system, the more advantageous to China’ that finally paved the way for the ultimate 
approval of the Chinese patent law in March 1984.316 
 
4.1.2 Bifurcated adaptive efforts under the 1984 Chinese patent law 
 
Given the political concerns and the economic expectations prevailing in the passing of 
the 1984 patent law, the PRC strive to fulfil two key objectives through the careful 
design of the new rights under its first patent law. These aims were to introduce private 
rights-based incentives to promote innovation and yet restrict such rights to an extent 
that would enable the government to safeguard important state interests. 
 
The 1984 law designed the  new rights were within careful boundaries to aimed to avoid 
compromising the state’s basic interests and socialist legal principles.317 The new patent 
law granted private property rights to individuals or entities for their inventions, but the 
scope of private ownership was limited to prevent the extraction of monopoly rents. 318 
For example, Article 6 provided that only enterprises were entitled to apply for patents 
in ‘service invention-creations’.319 Rule 10 of the implementation regulation defines ‘a 
service invention or creation’ broadly to include anything made during or in relation to 
one’s job, using materials or data from one’s work unit, or within a year of leaving 
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work.320 Given the dependence of Chinese individuals on jobs, capital and equipment 
provided by state-owned work units in the 1980s, this provision posed sufficient 
limitations on private ownership in favour of state interests. 
 
A similar bias was also structured under the provision of compulsory licensing. Article 
14.1 empowered the state council and other competent governmental units to compel 
the licensing of patents held by state entities, subject only to the condition that such 
action is taken ‘in accordance with the state plan’, with a payment decided by the state.  
Article 14.2 authorised competent governmental units to order the licensing of patents 
held by either individuals or entities under collective ownership as long as they could be 
considered of ‘great significance to the interests of the State or to public interest, and is 
in need of dissemination and application.’ 321  
 
Besides these ideological-oriented adaptations, other cautions and limitations were 
adopted to promote national interests in advancement of domestic innovative 
capabilities under the law. For example, Article 25 excludes seven categories from 
patentability. The fifth one was ‘pharmaceutical products and substances obtained by 
means of chemical process’.322 This exclusion included new pharmaceutical compounds 
and compositions or mixtures of pharmaceutical products.323 This provision 
disadvantaged pharmaceutical patents given that inventive steps were easy to discern 
and copy.324 On the other hand, such provision was conducive for the production of low 
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cost generic medicine. This provision also allowed the option to develop domestic 
pharmaceutical technology though imitative innovation or learning.  
 
A similar logic was applied in Article 11, which states that ‘no entity or individual may, 
without the authorization of the patentee, exploit the patent, that is, make, use of  or sell 
the patented product, or use the patented process, for production or business purposes’ 
and does not prevent the importation of the products made by the third country (which 
do not protect process),325 and in Article 45 which limits patent duration to a maximum 
of fifteen year.326  
 4.1.3 Policy effect  
 
In the 1984 Chinese patent law, the political motive of maintaining state control of new 
rights was incompatible with the concept of exclusivity inherent in a patent system. This 
State policy objective implemented in the new patent system was disadvantageous to 
private rights holders. On the other hand, from a public health policy perspective, the 
1984 patent law was effective in enhancing protection of public health because 
prohibiting the patenting of pharmaceutical products in China contributed to the rapid 
growth of domestic production and spread of cheaper generic medications in the 1990s. 
Prior to 1949, the provision of traditional medicines was very limited, and there were 
effectively no Western medicines available in China.327 Table 4.1 illustrates the output 
of raw medicine production in China. In 1980, there were 3964.5 tons, and this soared 
to 330000 tons in 1995, increasing production by a multiple of 83. By 1995, China had 
already exported its medicines to over 100 countries, and China ranked first in the world 
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production and export of penicillin and second for Vitamin C. Since then, the Chinese 
pharmaceutical industry has increasingly developed into the main supplier of low-cost 
medicine to large populations nationally and internationally.328 It must be noted that 
other national policies and economic factors had also contributed to this progress, 
including national funding schemes, fiscal initiatives, market advantages, talent and 
education policies etc. The role of these complementary factors in fostering domestic 
innovation will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
Table 4.1: Output of raw medicine production in China (1980 -1995) 
 
 
Years Output (Ton) Growth Rate 
1980 3964.5  
1985 147832.8 3729% 
1990 209300 142% 
1995 330000 158% 
Source: China pharmaceutical industry overview, available at 
http://www.chinadetail.com/Business/IndustryReviewsPharmaceuticalIndustry.php 
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4.2 The 1992 reform of Chinese patent law  
The development of the IPRs system entered into another phase in the 1990s in China. 
Chinese IPR protection standards were rapidly ratcheted up largely due to requirements 
to conform to the IPRs norms demanded by its major trading partners, particularly the 
US. Another contributing factor was that the PRC’s increasing dependence upon US 
markets and technology made it more vulnerable to US pressure for IPR reforms 
following the US model. Also, China’s economic development-centred policy may have 
rendered it more likely to adopting IPR norms advocated by its other major trading 
partners. In addition, the political aspiration of resuming WTO membership also obliged 
China to harmonise its IPRs regime in line with the legal framework of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
4.2.1 Sino-US bilateral agreement on IPRs  
 
China has emerged as one of the fastest growing economies in the world since the 1980s. 
According the World Bank, China enjoyed average GDP growth rates of around 10% 
during the 1980s to 2000.329 However, a large proportion of Chinese economic growth 
has been driven by international trade and investment.330 Among others, the US and 
China have become most significant trade partners to each other. The bilateral trade 
between the US and China has substantially expanded from $8 billion to $121 billion, 
and China ascended from the US’ 18th to its 4th trading partner in the period of 1986 to 
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2001.331  Sino-US trade relations proved to be the catalyst to shaping China’s IPR 
policy.332  
 
The comparative advantage for the US in trade depends upon IP-intensive goods. 
Sufficient IPR protection is vital for securing US economic interests in the Chinese 
market. China, on the other hand, was at the stage of developing domestic industrial 
capability through imitative innovation and learning. Chinese interests were attained 
through national industry policy including a more lenient patent regime on intellectual 
properties than those of developed countries.  
 
The different levels of IPR protection in the US and China increasingly resulted in 
infringements or piracy of American goods in the Chinese market. The industries 
claimed that losses due to Chinese patent infringement, copyright piracy and trademark 
counterfeiting were estimated at $1billion by 1994 and that they were escalating 
rapidly.333 Several US industries, such as pharmaceuticals, music and software, started 
lobbying the US government intensively to take actions to protect their IPR assets in 
China. The US government responded repeatedly with unilateral trade sanctions to press 
IPR legal reform in China.334 The Special 301 provision of the US Trade Act of 1974, 
amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the Trade Act) was 
devised to strengthen US leverage to improve the enforcement of IPR protection in the 
targeted countries like China.335 Section 301 permits the United State Trade 
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Representative (USTR) to investigate unfair practices concerning IPRs, to initiate plans 
of action, and to impose sanctions against US trading partners for ‘unjustified and 
unreasonable’ trading practices.336 
 
The USTR placed China on the “Priority Watch List” in 1989.  In response, China 
adopted a new copyright law and new implementing regulations in 1990, followed by a 
set of computer software regulations in 1991;337 however, these Chinese legislative 
efforts failed to satisfy US expectations. The USTR soon initiated another Special 301 
investigation of China’s IPR practices in May 1991.338 Meanwhile, market access 
bilateral negotiations were also underway in June and August in Beijing and 
Washington, respectively. The negotiations were not constructive, and the US 
government threatened to impose prohibitive tariffs on 3.9 billion Chinese exports to the 
US market in August 1991.339 China reacted with counter-sanctions of a similar amount 
on US goods.340 The two countries reached a compromise to avert a trade war, by 
signing the Memorandum of Understanding between China (PRC) and the United States 
on the Protection of Intellectual Property (1992 MOU) on January 17 1992.341 
 
The 1992 MOU significantly changed the substantive rules of Chinese patent law. In its 
Article 1(a), the Chinese government commits to provide patent protection to all 
chemical inventions, including pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, whether 
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products or processes.342 Article 1(3) assures the term of protection for a patent of 
invention will be extended to 20 years from the original 15 years. Article 1 (D:i) pledges 
to extend patent rights to the imported products.343 Moreover, the 1992 MOU endorsed 
strict TRIPS criteria on the provisions on Compulsory Licence.344 As a result, 
significant limitations were imposed on the use of compulsory license in the follow-on 
revision of Chinese patent law.    
4.2.2 Major changes to China’ patent law in 1992: a pioneering move 
towards the TRIPS pharmaceutical patent regime   
 
Pursuant to the agreements made in the 1992 MOU, China revised its patent law and 
implementation regulation. The major amendments to the Chinese patent law relevant to 
pharmaceutical patents are listed below: 
1. To expand the patent protection for pharmaceutical and chemical products, by 
omitting the Clause (5) ‘Pharmaceutical products and substances’ from the Article 
25 which stipulates the fields excluded from patentability.  
2. To prolong the duration of the patent protection for the invention from 15 years to 
20 years (Article 45 ) the utility model 5 years to 10 years  
3. To modify the provision on compulsory licences and place more restrictions on its 
use, such as, limitation of  the use of compulsory license for the supply of 
domestic market345 a request for authorisation from the patentee on reasonable 
                                                 
342
 The 1992 MOU, available at 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005362.asp.,Acessed on  March 6, 
2009.  
343
 The 1992 MOU. 
344
 Article 1(D) in the 1992 MOU. 
345
  Rule 68.5, the 1992 Implementation Regulation of Chinese Patent Law. 
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terms (Article 51), non-exclusive and non- assignable (Article 54), and a 
reasonable fee decided by both parties through consultation (Article 57) etc. 
4. To add on the right of import to the exclusive rights granted to the patentee and 
thus treat inventions equally whether they are imported or locally produced 
(Article 11).346 
The 1992 Chinese patent law had already incorporated TRIPS-level patent standards for 
pharmaceuticals, including changes to substantive obligations particularly significant 
for pharmaceuticals. Such standards included expanding patent protection from 
processes to all product substances, non-discrimination on the patent whether or not the 
product was imported or locally produced, and a 20-year patent duration, and restraints 
on the use of compulsory licensing. Thus, China adopted a much stronger form of patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals much earlier than many other developing countries at 
comparable developmental positions. A notable example is India, which only adopted 
product patent protection rules in 2005.  
4.2.3 Chinese administrative protection for pharmaceuticals: TRIPS-
plus standards   
Like China’s early move relative to other developing countries toward adopting strong 
patent protection rules, it also adopted TRIP-plus standards in its legislation governing 
pharmaceuticals earlier. This was first evident when it signed a 1992 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with the United States establishing retroactive patent protection 
to existing foreign pharmaceutical patents. This was initiated by a concession China 
                                                 
346
 The following summary is based on the article by Shen, Jl (1993), 'Some Important Amendments to 
the Chinese Patent Law', World Patent Information, 15 (4). 
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made in the 1992 MOU in which China agreed to offer specific patent administrative 
protection to existing US patents on drugs and agricultural chemical products if they: 
(i) were not subject to protection by exclusive rights prior to the amendment 
of current Chinese laws;  
(ii) are subject to an exclusive right to prohibit others from making, using or 
selling it in the United States which was granted after January 1, 1986 and 
before January 1, 1993;  
(iii) have not been marketed in China; 347   
This advantage was then extended to all foreign pharmaceutical patent holders in the 
new legislation, ‘Regulations on Administrative Protection for Pharmaceuticals’ 
promulgated by the State Pharmaceutical Administration on December 19, 1992.348 Its 
Article 1 states that the purpose of ‘Administrative Protection’ is ‘expanding economic 
and technological cooperation and exchange with foreign countries, providing 
Administrative Protection to the lawful rights and interests of the owners of the 
exclusive right of foreign pharmaceuticals.’   
Table 4.2 below presents the Chinese administrative standards in relation to those under 
the TRIPS Agreement.  Compared to similar measures (widely called ‘the mailbox 
system’) provided by Article 70.8 of the Agreement, the 1992 MOU together with the 
‘Regulations on Administrative Protection for Pharmaceuticals’ provided even greater 
protection for existing foreign pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical patents. First, 
the Chinese rules were retroactive to January 1 1986, providing protection six years 
before both the signing of the 1992 MOU and the patent protection on pharmaceutical 
                                                 
347
 Article 2, The 1992 MOU. 
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  ‘Regulations on Administrative Protection for Pharmaceuticals’, available at 
http://former.sfda.gov.cn/cmsweb/webportal/W45649038/A47484015.html. accessed on April 16, 2009. 
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products permitted under the revised 1992 Chinese patent law.349 Meanwhile, similar 
protection under TRIPS was only made available from January 1 1995, when it entered 
into force.350 Secondly, regarding the terms of duration, the TRIPS mailbox system only 
requires protection ‘for a period of five years after obtaining marketing approval in that 
Member or until a product patent is granted or rejected in that Member….’;351 whereas 
the Chinese ‘Administrative Protection’ grants seven years and six months.352  
It is important to note that Chinese administrative protection is not only a TRIPS-plus 
standard, but it is also another example of the unequal treatment between domestic and 
foreign inventions. Only existing foreign pharmaceutical patents can enjoy such 
protection; domestic pharmaceutical inventions are excluded.353 There are a lot of 
interests at stake with such an arrangement. Foreign companies demonstrate strong 
incentives for using this system to extend their patent monopoly rights in China, even 
though their products are not the subject matter of protection.354 On other hand, it is not 
in Chinese national interest to extend patent monopoly in terms of its needs to access 
low cost medicines and technology.  
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Table 4.2: Comparative administrative protection standards under TRIPS and 
Chinese laws 
 
 
 
TRIPS 
 
China 
 
Duration (yrs) 
 
5 
 
7.5 
 
Retroactive 
protection date 
 
1/1/1995 
 
1/1/1986 
 
Sources:  
1) Article 70.9, the TRIPS Agreement 
2) Article 13, ‘Regulations on Administrative Protection for Pharmaceuticals’. 
 
4.3 The 2000 amendment of Chinese patent law 
 
In 2000 Chinese patent law was amended a second time. The principle aim of the 
second amendment was to ensure that Chinese law conformed with TRIPS requirements 
in order to honour the commitments China made for its accession to the WTO.355 
Fulfilling such commitments is an enormous task for China given the 
comprehensiveness of TRIPS norms, the Chinese experience with IPRs, and the rapid 
time frames for implementation and compliance. Opinions are divided on the extent of 
conformity of the 2000 Chinese patent law with TRIPS. Some scholars have suggested 
that the 2001 patent law principally offers consistent protection in line with the 
requirements of TRIPS.356 While many others have insisted that significant gaps still 
remain, even though the changes to China’s patent law in 2000 represents a step closer 
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 Para 67 & 68,  WTO (1 October 2001), 'Report of the  Working Party on the Accession of China', 
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356
 Guo, SK and Zuo, XG (2007), 'Are Chinese Intellectual Property Laws Consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreements? ' in P Torremans, HL Shan, and J Erauw (eds.), Intellectual Property and TRIPS 
Compliance In China: Chinese and European Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited); Gao, LL (2008), ' China's Patent System and Globalization ', Research Technology 
Management, 56 (6). It is noted that Gao was the Commissioner of the Chinese Patent Office and the 
Founding Commissioner of the State Intellectual Property Office. 
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to TRIPS compliance.357 This examines the degree of conformity of the 2000 
amendment of Chinese patent law with the TRIPS Agreement. It focuses on the 
provisions particularly relevant to pharmaceutical patents. 
4.3.1 WTO entry and the 2000 amendment of Chinese patent law  
Beginning in 1986, China sought to resume its GATT (later updated to the WTO) 
membership.358 It perceived that the WTO’s trade liberalisation agenda offered a 
favourable trade environment and could facilitate its export-led growth strategy. More 
importantly, in seeking WTO membership, China expected to gain leverage to 
counterbalance the pressure from bilateral trade conflicts through WTO equality 
principles. Governing principles of the WTO oblige member states to treat their trading 
partners equally, to give them ‘Most-favoured-nation’ (MFN) Status equally, and to 
grant national treatment to foreign products, services and nationals.359 It is vital for 
China’s exports and its economic growth to access the US market, as the largest and 
most advanced world market; however, China has been entangled in annual battles with 
the US Congress regarding review of its MFN trade status in the US. Securing a 
permanent MFN through the WTO could help China to avoid the political 
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embarrassment over US Congress’s annual scrutiny on its human rights, labour 
standards, and environmental record.360 
One of the key subjects in China’s WTO accession negotiations was the issue of 
intellectual property protection in China. The final Working Party Report on China’s 
WTO accession devoted 55 paragraphs out of a total of 343 to China’s commitments 
under the TRIPS regime.361 Accession to the WTO required China to negotiate bilateral 
trade agreements with its major trading partners.362 The most difficult negotiation 
rounds were with the US and the European Union (EU).363 China finally reached 
agreements with the US in November 15 1999 and with EU on May 19 2000. Among 
other concessions, China agreed to implement the TRIPS Agreement in full from the 
date of its accession.364  
Against the foregoing background, China launched work on a second amendment of its 
patent law. The Chinese State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) began drafting this 
amendment in 1998.365 The amendment was approved by the National People’s 
Congress on August 25, 2000 and entered in to force on July 1, 2001.366 Thirty-six out 
of the sixty-nine Articles of 1992 Patent Law were substantively modified. This 
included changes to twenty-seven Articles and the deletion of four Articles.367 
                                                 
360
 Nolt, J (1999), 'China in the WTO: The Debate', Interhemispheric Resource Centre and Institute for 
Policy Studies   4(38). 
361
 Long, YT (2002), 'Implications of China's Entry into the WTO in the Field of Intellectual Property 
Rights ', in C Magainos, Long YT, and S  Francisco (eds.), China in the WTO : the Birth of a New 
Catching-up Strategy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), p165. 
362
 WTO website, ‘How to become a member of  the WTO’, see 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm, accessed on May 6 2009. 
363
  Nolt, J (1999), 'China in the WTO: The Debate . 
364
 WTO (2001), 'Accession of the People's Republic of China', (WT/L/432, 23 November 2001). Para 1.3. 
365
 Chert, J (2001), 'The amendment PRC Patent Law', China Business Review, 28 (4) p38.  
366
 Patent Law of People’s Republic of China (2001), available at http://www.sipo.cn/sipo_English 
/lawsregulations/200203/t20020327_33872. 
367
 Yu, X (2001), 'The Second Amendment of the Chinese Patent Law and the Comparison between the 
New Patent Law and Trips', The Journal of World Intellectual Property, 4 (1), p137. 
 137 
4.3.2 Comparison of the 2000 Chinese patent law and TRIPS  
As examined in the previous section, the 1992 amendment incorporated the principal 
TRIPS-compliant rules relevant to pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, differences still exist 
between the Chinese patent law and the TRIPS Agreement. Before the 2000 amendment, 
the Chinese patent law contains both provisions having lower thresholds of protection, 
i.e. TRIPS-minus provisions, and those with higher standards when compared to the 
TRIPS minimum standards. But the 2000 amendment only upgraded those provisions 
with TRIPS-minus standards without downward adjustment on those TRIPS-plus 
provisions. This final section of Chapter 4 reviews the former upward changes in 
relation to TRIPS, while the remaining TRIPS-plus provisions are examined in Chapter 
5. 
A.  Exclusivity rights: 
 
Article 11 of the Chinese patent law defines the scope and content of exclusivity 
rights conferred on the patentees. Under the 1992 law, the exclusivity rights granted to 
the patentee only included the rights to make, use and sell the patented products.  
In comparison, Article 28 of TRIPS provides a broader scope; ‘offering for sale’ 
defined under the TRIPS provision was not included in Article 11 of the 1992 Chinese 
patent law. The aim of making ‘offering for sale’ illegal without prior authorisation 
was to enable a patentee to stop infringement prior to the transaction so that any 
associated damage can be prevented. At present, most countries have defined 
unauthorised ‘Offer for sale’ as a violation of a patentee’s rights by law. According to 
the TRIPS provision, the 2001 amendment granted the right to prohibit the 
unauthorised ‘offering for sale’ of patented products to the patentees. Consequently, 
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the content and scope of the exclusivity rights of patentees in the 2000 Chinese patent 
law were updated in compliance with TRIPS. 368   
B. Compulsory licence  
The 2000 Chinese patent law increased the conditions required for the use of 
compulsory licences. The major changes covered the following aspects:  
1) Article 53 of the Law of 1992 only required the dependent invention to be 
‘technically more advanced’ in relation to the earlier invention to be qualified for the 
application of compulsory licence to exploit the earlier invention. Article 50 of 2001 
patent law enhances the standard for such use and transplants in the exact same wording 
‘an important technical advance of considerable economic significance’ from the TRIPS 
Article 31(l)(i). 
 
 2) 1992 Patent Law had no similar rules as defined in Article 31 (g) of TRIPS relating 
to the provisions on the duration, scope and determination of the compulsory licence.369 
Paragraph 2 of Article 52 of 2001 patent law defines these elements and provides that 
the decision of a compulsory-licence shall specify the scope and duration of the licence 
as well as the grounds for the decision. When these reasons cease to exist or are likely to 
expire, the patent holder may appeal to the patent administration department of the State 
Council to terminate the compulsory licence.  
 
3) The limitation in TRIPS on the use of compulsory licences predominantly for the 
supply of the domestic market was not directly written into the 2001 patent law, but it 
was adopted under paragraph 4 of Article 72 in the Implementing Regulations of the 
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Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, which state that: ‘The decision of the 
Patent Administration Department under the State Council  granting a compulsory 
license for exploitation shall limit the exploitation of the compulsory license to be 
dominantly for the supply of the domestic  market.’370 
 
4) Significant gaps and non-compliance still exist between the 2000 Chinese patent law 
and TRIPS. These include: 
(i)  a lack of any provision for the use of compulsory licences as an anti-
competitive remedy and its conditions in line with TRIPS Article 31(K), in which 
it states that when the government uses compulsory licences to remedy anti-
competitive practices, it is not required for prior negotiation or notification of the 
patentee as required under Article 31 (b) & (f); and 
(ii)  in the 2001 patent law there is no specification that the patentee should be 
paid ‘adequate remuneration in the circumstances’, as provided under TRIPS 
Article 31 (h).  
C. Enforcement measures 
1) Preliminary injunction made available. The 1992 patent law did not have any 
injunctive provisions similar to the rule provided under the TRIPS Article 50 that 
permits ordering the staying of infringement pre-litigation proceedings.371 Moreover, 
the 2001 Patent Law added rules on provisional measures concerning this issue in 
Article 61. It provides that the court may adopt provisional measures to order the 
suspension of the reported infringing action or preserve the related property upon the 
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plea of the right holder on the conditions that he or she provides evidence that the 
patent right is being infringed or such infringement is imminent, or any delay is likely 
to lead to irreparable damage to the legitimate interest.372  
 2) The determination of damages codified. The 1992 Patent Law did not set a 
standard for the determination of infringement damages. In practice, courts usually 
use the general tort standard of infringement remedies.373 The 2001 patent law adds a 
provision concerning the determination of damages in Article 60. It provides that the 
calculation of the amount of infringement damages for a patent right shall be based on 
the patentee's loss caused by the infringement or the infringer's profits derived from 
the infringing act. If it is difficult to assess the damages based on the patentee's losses 
or the infringer's profits, the amount may be determined according to the appropriate 
multiple of the patent's licence fee under exploitation contract.374 This provision makes 
it is possible for the rights holder of the patent to obtain compensation beyond the 
actual economic losses.375  
3) Burden of proof. Under the 1992 Patent Law, the second paragraph of Article 60 
provided that the reverse of the burden of proof is applied in the infringing disputes for 
process patents. Any entity or individual manufacturing the identical product needs only 
to furnish the proof of the process used in the manufacture of its or his product.376 In 
conformity with Article 34 of the TRIPS Agreement, Article 57 of the amended 2000 
Patent Law provides that any entity or individual manufacturing the identical product 
must prove that a different process was used in the manufacture of its or his product.  
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4) Some important lacunas remain regarding enforcement measures under the 2001 
patent law, particularly when compared to Article 41.1 of TRIPS:  
Firstly, some observers have suggested that the damages provided by Chinese law are 
inadequate and fall short of the requirements of, ‘expeditious remedies which constitute 
a deterrent to further infringements,’ as envisioned by TRIPS Article 41.1,377 although it 
is debatable how to interpret this ambiguous TRIPS requirement about the threshold of 
damages rewards.378  This argument is generally grounded in the fact TRIPS 
implementation in China did not result in a reduction in the level of counterfeit goods in 
China.379 
Secondly, Article 41.1 also requires the establishment of safeguards against the 
malicious use of enforcement procedures to prevent legitimate competition and other 
lawful acts. Article 48 specifies that measures should be taken to ensure against 
economic injury of a defendant due to abuse of the enforcement measures. A similar 
concern was also found in the TRIPS Preamble, in which it pronounces that measures 
and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights should not themselves become 
barriers to legitimate trade. Article 8.2 also specifies the need to prevent the abuse of 
IPRs by rights holders. The abusive use of enforcement measures is of particular 
concern in the pharmaceutical field, and this has been proven to be a conventional 
method by which brand-name companies employ strategic litigations to exclude 
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competitors from the market.380 These provisions emphasize the concept of abuse of 
enforcement procedures, indicating ‘the Agreement’s search for a balance between the 
protection of IPRs and the interests of third parties’.381  
In the 2000 Chinese patent law, there is no provision concerning restrictions on the 
abuse of patent rights. This is an important inconsistency when compared to the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
China’s particular political and economic environment makes it unique in the way it 
developed its national pharmaceutical patent system. In its first patent law adopted in 
1984, China demonstrated its willingness and ability to transplant foreign laws within 
its legal system. Subsequently, even though bound by new obligations of an alien nature 
to its legal culture by virtue of its membership of the Paris Convention, China 
maintained a large degree of legal autonomy to design its own national patent law, 
however cautiously it did this. As a result, the 1984 Chinese patent law managed to 
integrate two national development agendas: to promote ‘socialist legality with Chinese 
characteristics’ and to support national interests in access to pharmaceutical products 
and technology. The political agenda that sought to maintain some state control over the 
rules concerning the new, alien rights to protect these national interests, however, 
created legal barriers to legitimising the new property rights interests of patent rights 
holders provided under the patent law.  
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Furthermore, a growing dependence upon US markets and technology increased 
China’s vulnerability in its negotiations of the Sino-US bilateral economic relationship 
prior to its WTO membership. Instead of the cautious approach to adopting new and 
alien legal concepts on private property rights taken under the 1984 Chinese patent law, 
China was pressurized into adopting a pro-patent approach under both the Sino-US 
bilateral IPRs agreement (1992 MOU) and the 1992 law amendment. Consequently, 
Chinese patent rules governing pharmaceuticals were ‘ratcheted up’ to TRIPS-
compliant standards ten year before China joined the WTO. 
 
In addition, the prevailing economic-centred ideology directing national economic 
reform contributed to the evolution of the Chinese patent system. This ideology 
prioritises economic interests over others and encourages the institutionalisation of any 
policy instruments which facilitate economic growth. The objective of the Chinese 
patent system was dedicated to promote mainly economic interests without considering 
how this might affect wider social issues. The adoption of such a narrow functionalist 
approach may well have caused China to have fewer qualms over adopting a pro-patent 
regime on pharmaceuticals than other developing countries.  
 
Lastly, a comparative study of the 2000 Chinese patent law with the related provisions 
in the TRIPS Agreement has revealed that the Chinese harmonisation efforts were 
focused on the strengthening of patent rights in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, 
although significant discrepancies remain in terms of compulsory licensing and 
enforcement measures. By far the most remarkable gaps, perhaps, lie in the lack of 
measures to prevent both abuses of IPR rights and anti-competitive practices. 
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Chapter 5 Evaluation of pharmaceutical patent standards 
in China from a public health perspective  
 
This chapter examines how China has exercised its limited legislative authority and the 
policy it has adopted in formulating its national pharmaceutical legislation under the 
TRIPS framework. The investigation seeks to answer four questions. Firstly, has China 
defined appropriate standards for patenting pharmaceuticals in its law or applied them in 
legal practice to ensure the patent system works for its dual national objectives of 
promoting access to medicine while also encouraging the R&D of new drugs? The 
second question asks whether China has made effective use of the safeguard 
mechanisms available in the TRIPS Agreement to protect public health interests. If the 
findings indicate it has not, then a third query is: has China opted to adopt TRIPS-plus 
patent provisions emerging from the FTAs that either restrict the use of TRIPS 
flexibilities or impose higher levels of patent protection? Finally, given the predominant 
use of the Utility Model (UM) form of protection for pharmaceuticals in China, 
subsection 5.4 below responds to the question and attempts to open a debate about 
whether UM protection is an appropriate form of IP protection for pharmaceutical 
products for China.  
 
5.1 The relevant legislative framework 
The legal assessment will examine the following legislation:  
 
1. Patent laws of the PRC:  
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The first patent law of the PRC was promulgated in 1984 and then amended three times 
in 1992, 2000, and 2008, respectively. The 1984 patent law was structured with 
significant limitations on patents and drugs that were excluded from patentability. The 
changes and new rules introduced under the 1992 and 2000 patent laws focused to a 
large extent on strengthening the state’s control of rights. The most recent amendment 
may demonstrate the growth of Chinese legislative discretion in balancing the interests 
between the patentees and users.   
 
2. Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the PRC (Implementing 
Regulations of the CPL) 
Chinese laws have traditionally been drafted in general and broad terms. Their 
implementation then requires the effective interpretations from various authorities. 
These various interpretations therefore form important sources of law. Chinese laws 
would be unusual, if not meaningless, without these interpretations.382 The 
Implementing Regulations of the CPL were formulated to guide the effective 
interpretation of patent laws. So far four versions have been published.  
 
3. Drug administrative law:  
The first comprehensive Drug Administrative Law was promulgated in 1985; it 
stipulates the responsibilities and obligations of drug manufacturers, distributors and 
medical research institutions. It requires the premarket testing of safety and efficacy for 
the approval of new drug products. This law was revised in 2001 and remains in force 
and unchanged.383   
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4. Implementation Regulations for the Drug Administration Law  
These regulations were promulgated on September 15, 2002. It was under these 
regulations that China first incorporated data exclusivity for pharmaceutical registration 
data. This regulation remains unchanged since its enactment.  
 
5. Measures of the Administration of Drug Registration  
The Chinese modern regulatory system for pharmaceuticals has a very short history. In 
1979, the Ministry of Health and the State Pharmaceutical Administration of China 
jointly promulgated the New Drug Management Regulation. Under this regulation there 
were no requirements for systematic scientific proof of safety and efficacy for the 
approval of new drugs. Thus, the national marketing of a drug by local companies was 
easily authorised through the provincial regulatory department. Then, in 2002, China 
promulgated a its first law regulating the registration of drugs used in China. After a few 
years of experience, it enacted new and better informed rules called Measures on the 
Administration of Drug Registration, in 2005 and updated in 2007.  
5.2 The patentability of pharmaceutical inventions in China: laws and 
practices 
5.2.1 Patentability criteria for pharmaceuticals  
Promoting access to medicine and healthcare has become a major public issue in China. 
A 2004 study by the PRC Ministry of Health, The Third National Healthcare Survey, 
indicated that 48.9% of people on average (73% in rural areas) who should have sought 
medical treatment chose not do so because of the high cost of health treatment and 
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medicines.384 Current discourses commonly blame this problem on the poor coverage of 
health insurance, the government’s reluctance to invest in health, and misconduct within 
the medical services.385 Yet, there has been little discussion of or attention paid to the 
impact of current laws on patent protection on the access to medicine in China in the 
post-TRIPS era. 
 
The TRIPS Agreement rules out the traditional legal approach386 and requires higher 
patent protection standards to be applied to pharmaceuticals in China.387 The 
strengthened patent protection can provide strong economic incentives to stimulate 
more pharmaceutical R&D activities, but this legal change can also close off traditional 
revenue options and redirect firms’ production, marketing and R&D activities. 
Consequently, this can affect the price of medicines and decrease the choice of sources 
of medicines.388 The standards of patentability and the quality of patent examination 
also matter for access to medicine. Low standards of patentability and poor examination 
of pharmaceutical inventions can not only lead to the proliferation of patents, which 
erect a ‘patent wall’ blocking the introduction of more useful health products,389 but also 
delay the entry of generic competition. 
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Given the efffect of patents on drug prices and availability, the criteria that are applied 
to examine and grant pharmaceutical patents are directly relevant to public health 
policies.390 Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement states that an invention, in order to be 
patentable, has to be new, involve an inventive step and be capable of industrial 
applicability. But the Agreement does not dictate the definitions of these three criteria, 
leaving member countries free to adopt their particular standards of patentability 
adapted to the characteristics of their legal systems and developmental needs, as long as 
the minimum legal mandate is met.391 It can be debated what constitutes the desirable 
patentability criteria for developing members in TRIPS implementation. However, a 
basic guideline is that policymakers and patent examiners are obliged to design or 
execute the patent system in a health-sensitive manner, since their decisions have direct 
implications on the health and life of humanity. In addition, a well-recognised general 
rule is advocated by Carlos Correa as below:  
Obviously, the narrower the novelty standard, the lower the bar to assess 
inventive steps, and the broader the concept of industrial applicability or utility, 
the greater the number of applications that may be granted in a particular 
country. A greater number of grants made on the basis of low standards of 
patentability may lead to unnecessary limitations on competition without any 
significant trade-off in terms of more innovation to address society’s needs.392 
 
In this sense, given its public health needs, industry structure and low technical 
competitiveness, it may suit China to adopt the standard of patentability which only 
admits pharmaceutical inventions that are truly new, having taken substantive inventive 
steps, with immediate industrial applicability,  
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5.2.2 Novelty 
China had applied a ‘relative’ novelty standard for patentability until 2009 when its 
amended patent law changed this to an ‘absolute’ novelty standard.393 Table 5.1 below 
shows the various definitions of the ‘novelty’ requirement under the four versions of the 
Chinese patent laws. Under the 1984, 1992 and 2001 laws, China provided a ‘relative’ 
novelty standard for patentability. This meant that an invention was deemed to be ‘new’ 
if it was both (1) not publicly disclosed in publications from anywhere in the world 
before the date of filing; and (2) not used or made by any other means within China. 
This two-pronged approach to novelty applied a universal novelty standard to 
publication and a local novelty standard for prior public use. This implied that the use of 
inventions outside China did not destroy its novelty within China. As such, China’s 
novelty standard was long structured more narrowly than the single absolute novelty 
standard widely adopted in other jurisdictions. 
 
The 2008 amendment replaced the relative novelty standard with absolute novelty. It 
introduced and defined the concept of ‘prior art’ under Article 22.4. It defines ‘prior art’ 
as any technology known to the public anywhere in the world before the filing date of 
the patent application in China or abroad. The new provision raises the threshold on 
public use and knowledge from ‘in China only’ to any part of the world. This means 
that if an invention is accessible to the public or known to the public anywhere in the 
world before its Chinese filing date, it loses its novelty and is therefore no longer 
patentable in China.394  
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Nevertheless, Chinese practitioners appear to have doubts about the practical effects of 
this change. In legal practice, the application of the novelty standard depends on the 
interpretation of the concept of ‘known to the public’ by the Chinese Patent Office 
(CPO), the Patent Examination Units (PEUs) and the courts. In China, the CPO, the 
Patent Re-examination Board (PRBs) and the courts have tended to construe novelty to 
be lost only when the ‘art’ or invention is freely available to any individual. 
Accordingly, the novelty of an invention is not necessarily destroyed if its essence is 
only disclosed to a number of people without placing them under an obligation of 
confidentiality.395 For example, when technology that embodies a particular invention is 
the subject of a direct sale in another country then such a sale may be regarded as a 
private sale in China; hence, its novelty may not be destroyed in Chinese jurisdiction.396 
It is anticipated that the concept of ‘known to the public’ will continue to be applied by 
the Chinese patent offices. Such a practice is susceptible to manoeuvring by 
experienced patent applicants in order to overcome novelty barriers. 
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Table 5.1: Novelty standards under Chinese patent laws 
 
 
 
Provisions (Article 22.1)  
 
Nature 
1984 "Novelty" means that, before the date of filing, no identical 
invention or utility model has been publicly disclosed in 
publications in the country or abroad or has been publicly 
used or made known to the public by any other means in the 
country, nor has any other person filed previously with the 
Patent Office an application which described the identical 
invention or utility model and was published after the said 
date of filing.  
Relative 
Novelty 
(RN) 
1992 The same as the above  RN  
2000 The same as the above, except replacing ‘the Patent Office’ 
with ‘the Patent Administration Department’ in the last 
sentence.  
RN 
2008 "Novelty" means that the invention or utility model shall 
neither belong to the prior art, nor has any entity or 
individual previously filed before the date of filing with the 
patent administrative department under the State Council an 
application on an identical invention or utility model which 
was recorded in patent application documents or other 
gazetted patent documents published after the said date of 
filing. 
Absolute 
Novelty  
 
Source: Chinese patent laws of 1984, 1992, 2000, and 2008 
 
5.2.3 Non-obviousness or inventiveness  
 
It is widely recognised that the application of a strict standard of inventiveness would be 
the best policy from the perspective of public health,397 as a strict requirement for ‘non-
obviousness’ or ‘inventiveness’ can promote genuine innovation, avoid unnecessary 
limitations to generic competition,398 and prevent the granting of patents on variants of 
existing drugs or minor development with no medical significance.399 
 
                                                 
   
397
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398
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399
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As Table 5.2 below shows, before the 2008 Chinese patent law, the legal definition of 
‘non-obviousness’ or ‘inventiveness’ had remained the same. The provision sets very 
general and vague criteria in which an invention has to embody ‘prominent substantive 
features’ and to ‘represent notable progress’. The legal explanations for these criteria 
are not provided under either patent laws or the related implementation regulation but 
are specified under the Patent Examination Guide (PEG). However, according to the 
CPOs examiners, the explanations under the PEG are overly broad and confusing. The 
examiners have had difficulties in applying the standard in their examinations. This 
could result in an arbitrary patent grant or patent denial.400 A recent study of the 
examination practice of the CPO also suggests that the determinations of ‘non-
obviousness’ or ‘inventiveness’ are largely subject to the patent examiners’ subjective 
decisions. Examination methods applied by the office are not as sophisticated as those 
in the United States and Europe.401   
 
To ensure a strict assessment of inventiveness, it is critical to have a clear criterion for 
defining who constitutes the ‘person skilled in the art’. Correa has suggested that 
‘person skilled in the art’ should not be simply someone with a very general or ordinary 
knowledge but an expert in his technical field.402 In chapter 4 of the Examination 
Guideline of the SIPO, ‘The person skilled in the art’ is defined as: 
…a fictional ‘person’ who is presumed to be aware of all the common technical 
knowledge and have access to all the technologies existing before the filing date or 
the priority date in the technical field to which the invention pertains, and have 
capacity to apply all the routine experimental measures before that date…403 
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Chinese criterion defines ‘the person skilled in art’ as a technician with ‘common 
technological knowledge’ rather an expert. This definition confers a lower standard than 
that under the interpretation recommended from a public health perspective. In reality, 
the application of this standard among the courts or the office is various wide ranging. 
Some scholars have suggested that professional experts with superior knowledge are 
frequently appointed by the courts to assess their inventiveness.404 Others have claimed 
that ‘the person skilled in the art’ is, in many cases, sourced through personal contacts 
rather than selected based upon their professional skills in some local courts.405 These 
problems may undermine the inventiveness standard in the patent law in practice and 
thus lead to a proliferation of patents for trivial developments. 
 
                                                 
404
 Li, YH (2010), p130. 
405
 Communication with Huang You Li and Tian Li Rong, patent attorneys, Ke Hai Patent Office. 
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Table 5.2: Standards for Inventiveness under Chinese patent laws 
 
 
 
Patent provisions (Article 22.2)  
 
Implementation provisions  
1984  "Inventiveness" means that, as 
compared with the technology existing 
before the date of filing, the invention 
has prominent substantive features and 
represents notable progress and that the 
utility model has substantive features 
and represents progress.  
 
None definition about the 
‘ existing technology’406  
1992 The same as the above  The existing technology 
referred to in Article 22, 
paragraph three of the Patent 
Law means any technology 
which has been publicly 
disclosed in publications in the 
country or abroad, or has been 
publicly used or made known 
to the public by any other 
means in the country, before 
the date of filing (or the 
priority date where priority is 
claimed), that is, prior art. 
 
2000 The same as the above,  The same definition with a 
minor difference in wording.  
2008 The same as the above, but add: 
The “prior art” referred to in this Law 
refers to any technology known to the 
public before the filing date of the patent 
application in China or abroad. 
 
 
 
Sources:  
1. Chinese patent laws of 1984, 1992, 2000, and 2008 
2. Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China PRC  of 1984, 1992, 
2000, 2008 
 
 
                                                 
406
 ‘Existing technology’ instead of ‘Prior art’ was officially used in the Chinese patent laws before the 
2008 Chinese patent law. 
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5.2.4 Utility or Practical Application   
 
It is a general principle of patent law that it should protect a technical solution to a given 
problem rather than abstract knowledge. Hence, a patent claim should contain a viable 
technical solution rather than a speculative or intended result.407 Utility under the 
Chinese patent law is termed a ‘practical application’ rather than industrial application. 
The definition of ‘practical application’ remains the same under all four versions of the 
Chinese patent laws. The provision provides that ‘practical application’ implies that the 
inventions can be made or used and can produce ‘effective results’. The guideline for 
patent examination elaborates this standard as follows: (1) To be patentable an invention 
has to be able to solve a technical problem and be put into practice. In other words, if 
the application relates to a product, this product shall be able to be made industrially and 
solve a technical problem; if it relates to a process, the process shall be able to be used 
industrially and solve a technical problem.408 (2) The ‘effective results’ means that the 
economic, technical or social effects of the subject matter of a patent application for 
invention or utility model shall be positive and advantageous and can be considered 
likely to be achieved by a person skilled in the art.409 The wording of these definitions 
suggests a narrow concept of industrial application. 
 
In practice, however, there are inconsistencies between the law and the procedure 
applied in the process of patent examination in terms of the interpretation of the 
concepts of ‘effective results’ or ‘positive and advantageous results’ among the various 
patent offices and courts. For example, SIPO patent examination tends to interpret 
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‘positive result’ or ‘effective result’ as ‘not negative or non-harmful effect’. The latter 
are much lower standards, for any invention whose effect is neither negative nor 
harmful can fall into this requirement.410 The 2008 amendment did not make any 
changes or provide clarification to the criteria of ‘practical application’ either in the 
patent law or the implementation rules. If the particular interpretation with the SIPO 
patent examination procedure continues, the standard of utility in China will remain 
broad in legal practice. 
 
In summary, the above evaluation has found that the Chinese patent system had a 
relative novelty standard until recently and that the rather lenient examination procedure 
tended to result in a low threshold for findings of inventiveness and industrial 
application. Some commentators have suggested that the low standards for patentability 
may be a deliberate Chinese government policy to promote domestic patenting 
activities.411 However, such a policy is not necessarily helpful for China’s technology 
catch-up agenda, and it inevitably enables the patenting of a large number of inventions 
associated with variants of existing drugs or minor modification of existing drugs. 
5.3 TRIPS implementation approach: TRIPS minimum or TRIPS-plus? 
The TRIPS flexibilities are built-in mechanisms for enabling WTO member countries to 
balance private IP interests against a variety of wider national socio-economic interests. 
The effective use of these flexibilities requires governments to clarify their own national 
interests and then to adopt the new IPR rules to fit within those interests as best as 
possible. The problem is that the institutional capabilities are often insufficient in many 
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developing countries, particularly as the property concepts being adopted are usually 
alien to the nations’ legal cultures.412 This section 5.3 investigates whether China has 
manifested competent institutional capacities in its use of TRIPS flexibilities in seeking 
to achieve its objectives for its public health interests. The legal evaluation centres on 
the evolution of key exceptions and limitations relevant to pharmaceuticals under the 
four versions of Chinese patent law in relation to TRIPS. The review also draws on 
some implementation practices from other developing countries.  
 
5.3.1 Transitional period  
China was required to implement its TRIPS obligations from the start of its accession, 
while other middle-income developing countries, like Brazil and India, have benefited 
from the transitional periods.413 It may be debated whether China could have taken 
advantage of transitional periods before it was committed to full compliance with the 
TRIPS Agreement. The answer may depend on two factors: (1) whether the legal option 
was available to China when it was negotiating the terms for its WTO accession; and (2) 
what terms were reached through the bargaining between China and the incumbent 
WTO members? 
Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement provides a number of transitional periods on 
particular conditions for WTO members to utilise in bringing their IPR legal framework 
into full conformity with the TRIPS obligations. The benefits provided by Article 65 are 
explicitly applicable to the founding members of the WTO; however, China was not a 
founding member when the TRIPS Agreement entered into force. Thus, Article 65 is 
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not directly applicable to China. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the possibility of 
China enjoying the benefits of a transitional period based on three grounds. Firstly, the 
notion of transitional period is deemed to be a recognition that the WTO shall grant a 
new member the time necessary to bring itself into full conformity with the obligations 
required by the Agreement.414 China acquired a conditional status as a developing 
country when it joined the WTO as it was then a developing economy in the process of 
transforming from a centrally-planned to a market economy.415 The global IPR system 
was a major new institutional mechanism for China, and there was a little IP experience 
and expertise at its disposal. Up to the present it has found implementation and 
enforcement to be problematic. It may be argued that China requires a transitional 
period to bring its domestic IPR system fully in line with the TRIPS rules.  
Secondly, the particular accession terms for each new WTO member are the result of 
separate negotiation processes,416 although each state must comply with all obligations 
of all WTO agreements when they join.417 TRIPS is silent about whether or not a new 
member benefits from transitional periods. China therefore may have had an 
opportunity to negotiate over the terms of benefits of transitional periods enjoyed by 
other members at comparable levels of development. Thirdly, as a one-time applicant 
country with one of the largest negotiating powers of any applicant to the WTO’,418 
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China would presumably have had a good opportunity to use this strength to bargain for 
transitional periods if China valued this benefit highly.  
 
Little is publicly known about the details of WTO accession negotiations.419 It is 
therefore not clear whether a transitional arrangement was included or what the 
positions of the parties were on this issue in China’s WTO accession negotiations. 
However, China seemed neither to recognise the need for transitional periods nor to 
value the benefit of transitional periods highly. In fact, political statements made at the 
time heralded the commitment to full compliance as an achievement in itself. This view 
can be observed from the following explanation of Guo Li Lin, the then Commissioner 
of the SIPO: ‘…following the 1993 Amendment, China’s Patent Law was, at least in 
principle, in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. There is no need for China, as a 
developing country or a country in transition from a central planning economy to a 
market economy, to have a four-year transitional period…’.420 What is unclear is 
whether this was an isolated or at least a minority view, whether the Chinese negotiators 
were somehow misdirected in arriving at this conclusion. 
 
5.3.2 Compulsory licences 
The term compulsory licence refers to a license granted by a government authority 
enabling the use of a patented invention without the rights holders’ consent under the 
justification of a public interest. The TRIPS Agreement recognises such licences under 
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its Article 31. However, the clause sets forth certain conditions for issuing such licences, 
but it does not limit the grounds that might be used to justify compulsory licensing.421 
This gives WTO states flexibility to define their own nationally appropriate grounds. 
Such legal flexibility was reaffirmed by Rule 5 (b) of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which provides that ‘[e]ach Member has the right 
to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which 
such licences are granted’.  
 
Under current Chinese patent law, there are six possible grounds for granting 
compulsory licences:  
• Article 48.1 reintroduces the working requirement which was specified under 
the 1984 Chinese patent law but deleted in the 1992 and 2001 patent laws. This 
ground is explicitly permissible under Article 5 A (2) of the Paris Convention. 
The clause indentifies the failure to exploit the patent or insufficient exploitation 
after expiration of three years from the grant of the patent rights, or four years 
from the date of application, as the first ground for granting compulsory 
licensing. Rule 73 of the Implementing Regulations further states that 
insufficient exploitation implies that the scale and method of exploitation by 
either the patentee or the licensee does not meet the domestic demand for the 
patented products.   
• Article 48.2 provides a ground for granting a compulsory licence to reduce or 
eliminate the negative impact of anti-competitive acts determined by law. This 
ground is also specified under Article 31(k) of TRIPS.  
                                                 
421
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• Article 49 defines a national emergency or any extraordinary state of affairs as 
the third ground. Combined with Article 54, the requirement of prior negotiation 
is not required for such grounds. In addition, the ground of public interest is also 
provided under this provision, although the patent law and its implementation 
regulations do not provide specifications about what constitutes public interest.    
• Article 50 states that the patent administrative authority under the State Council 
may grant a compulsory licence for the production of a patented drug and its 
subsequent exportation to countries or regions allowed under the international 
treaties China is under contract with if required by the interests of public health. 
This provision adapts to the Chinese role as a major world generic drug supplier 
and has thus established a useful mechanism for the promotion of access to 
medicines domestically and internationally.  
• Article 51 states that a compulsory licence may be granted if a new invention 
requires the use of pre-existing inventions to working, on the condition that the 
new invention has both economic significance and important technical features. 
This ground is specifically provided under Article 31 (l) of TRIPS.  
 
Compulsory licensing was recognised under the 1984 Chinese patent law since its first 
establishment in the PRC. The legal terms of the clause have been substantially changed 
when compared to the provisions under the first version and those under the most recent 
version. Table 5.1 summarises the grounds and conditions under the four versions of the 
Chinese patent law. Several useful observations are highlighted below:  
 
First: the provision on ‘working requirement’ was first introduced under the 1984 
Chinese patent law and was then removed by the 1992 amendment. This change was 
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made pursuant to with the requirements of the bilateral IP agreement with the US (the 
MOU) in 1992. 422 In the 2008 revision, it was reintroduced as the first ground for 
issuing a compulsory licence.  
 
Second: the contrast between the breadth of conditions and the narrow scope of grounds 
for issuing compulsory licences under the 1992 and 2001 laws provides useful evidence 
about the contraction of legislative capability as policy effects of the TRIPS 
implementation.   
 
Third: new rules on compulsory licences under the 2008 Chinese patent law and 
Implementation Regulations present a more balanced compromise between conditions 
and grounds for granting a compulsory licence. Although so far no compulsory licences 
have been issued423 or attempted in China to the best of the author’s knowledge: the 
advancement of these rules may increase the feasibility and likelihood of compulsory 
licences being employed in China when the need occurs.424  
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Table 5.3: The conditions & grounds for the issuance of compulsory licences under four versions of Chinese patent laws 
 
 
 1984 1992 2001 2008 
Grounds - Working 
requirement 
( Art 51 &52 ) 
- Dependent patents  
(Art 53) 
- Refusal to licence  
(Art51) 
- National emergency 
& extraordinary state of 
affairs ( Art 52) 
- Public interest 
 ( Art 52) 
- Dependent patents  
  (Art 53) 
- Refusal to licence  
(Art 48) 
- National emergency & 
extraordinary state of 
affairs  
- Public interest (Art 49) 
- Dependent patents  
Art 50 
- Failure to exploit or insufficient 
working 
(Art.48.1) 
- Remedy for anticompetitive 
practices 
(Art.48.2) 
- National emergency & 
extraordinary state of affairs occurs 
(Art.49) 
- Public interest (Art.49) 
- Public health (Art.50) 
- Dependent patents (Art.51) 
Conditions -Prior negotiation for 
all grounds 
- Reasonable 
commercial terms  
- Notification 
-Non exclusivity 
-Non-assignment 
-Remuneration, 
-Judicial review - 
 
-Prior negotiation for 
all grounds 
- Reasonable 
commercial terms 
- Notification 
-Non exclusivity 
-Non-assignment 
-Remuneration, 
- Judicial review  
 
 
-Prior negotiation for all 
grounds 
- Reasonable commercial 
terms 
- Notification 
- Scope and duration 
- Termination 
-Non exclusivity 
-Non-assignment 
- Remuneration,  
- Judicial review  
- Predominantly for the domestic 
market with exceptions of the uses 
under Art 48.2 & Art 50 
- Prior negotiation & Reasonable 
commercial terms and period of time  
for the  uses under Art.48.2 &Art.51 
- Notification 
- Scope and duration 
- Termination 
-Non exclusivity 
-Non-assignment 
- Remuneration,  
- Judicial review  
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Sources: 1984, 1992, 2001 and 2008 versions of Chinese patent laws, 
              1984, 1992, 2001 and 2008 versions of Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the PRC 
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5.3.3 The exhaustion doctrine and parallel importation 
The exhaustion doctrine is a concept under IP laws whereby IP rights holders can lose 
their exclusivity rights after selling their patented products on the market. This principle 
is provided under Article 6 of TRIPS and confirmed by the Doha Declaration. The Doha 
Declaration provides that WTO members are free to establish their own regime of 
exhaustion of rights without challenge.425 
 
The exhaustion doctrine is an important mechanism for improving access to medicines, 
especially for low income countries. The application of the exhaustion doctrine enables 
parallel importation in which health providers can purchase drugs from the cheapest 
international sources.426 Parallel importation has other price-reducing impacts, such as 
working as a negotiation tool with the original manufacturers, and it is also a means of 
technology transfer.427 These benefits are practically relevant to Chinese health 
providers. 
The 1984 Chinese patent law had established a form of national exhaustion rule. Its 
Article 62.1 provided that the ‘[u]se or sale of a patented product after it has been made 
by the patentee or with the authorization of the patentee and subsequently sold’ shall not 
be deemed an infringement. This provision did not include ‘import’ of a patented 
product in its conditions. Given the territorial nature of IPRs laws, this provision 
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provided national coverage of the exhaustion doctrine. This rendered parallel 
importation impermissible.  
The amended provision under the 2001 Chinese patent laws may still be deemed to 
establish a national patent exhaustion regime. It provides in Article 63.1 that acts such 
as non-infringement, ‘[w]here, after the sale of a patented product that was made 
or imported by the patentee or with the authorization of the patentee, or of a product that 
was directly obtained by using the patented process, any other person uses, offers to sell 
or sells that product’. This provision may be interpreted to mean that the exhaustion 
principle can only be applied to a sold product which has been made or imported by the 
rights holders. There is no specification in regard to the importation of a product sold 
outside China into the domestic market by the rights holder.  
The new exhaustion provision under the 2008 revision clearly establishes both national 
and international exhaustion regimes. It specifies that it is not deemed an infringement 
when ‘any person uses, offers to sell, sells or imports a patented product or a product 
directly made from a patented process, which was sold by the patentee or an entity and 
individual with the authorization of the patentee.’428 Under the current rule, parallel 
importation can be used as a drug price containment mechanism in China.    
5.3.4 Exceptions to patent rights  
States conventionally provide a variety of patent exceptions in areas where public 
interests are superior to those of the patentees, with the scope and content adapted 
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differently to national conditions. Some of these exceptions are particularly relevant to 
public healthcare.429  
 
Article 30 of TRIPS allows members to make limited exceptions to patent rights, 
provided certain conditions are met: they should not unreasonably conflict with the 
normal exploitation of the patent, they should not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, and they should take into account the legitimate interests 
of third parties. This provision does not specify the nature and extent of exceptions to 
the exclusive rights of the patentee and it leaves considerable policy space for members 
in this matter.430 Note that, in practice, however, the existing scope of flexibilities is 
under pressure to be narrowed down from bilateral and multilateral treaties. I will 
elaborate on this point further in the next section.  
 
In reality, there are counter factors limiting the national scope of exceptions to patent 
rights. Under the FTAs negotiated with the US, the parties are obliged to ban the export 
of any product made for testing and to provide a patent term extension under a 
Regulatory Review exception. Also, the parties adopting the exhaustion doctrine are 
also limited in adapting to the US-restricted international exhaustion principle. Finally, 
efforts under the WIPO to harmonise members’ IPR regimes may also result in 
narrowing down the available scope in this area.431  
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Surveys on the existing practice indicate that the following exceptions are most 
commonly provided under national legislation and which are deemed to be TRIPS-
compliant:432  
 
1. The early working exception: This device permits the use of a pharmaceutical 
invention to conduct tests and to obtain the regulatory approval of a generic alternative 
before the expiry of the patent. This exception may facilitate the more rapid 
commercialisation of a generic medicine upon patent expiration of the original drug.  
 
2. Experimental and scientific use exception: This exception allows third parties to 
conduct experimental or scientific activities associated with the subject matter of a 
patent. It is widely adopted in many countries based on the principle that patent 
protection should not hamper the progress of science and technology.433  
 
3. Individual prescription exception: This permits the use of pharmaceutical patents in 
preparing individual prescriptions by medical professionals. The exception, adopted 
under the EU’s Community Patent Agreement in 1989, may be used as a reference.   
  
The Chinese patent law permits experimental and scientific use of a patented invention 
from its initial establishment. But the early working exception was not codified in the 
law until the recent 2008 amendment. This revision introduced a new provision stating 
that: ‘it is not deemed as an act of infringement if a patented drug or medical equipment 
is manufactured, used or imported solely for the purposes of providing information for 
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administrative approval.’434 China is a major producer of generic medicines for both the 
domestic and international markets. This new exception has important implications for 
the development of generic products in China.  
 
The individual prescription exception has not been incorporated into Chinese law so far. 
It seems that the utility of this exception has not become an issue in China, where 
generic drugs are the dominant medicinal supply, and pharmacies and doctors are 
generally not in a position to have comparable technologies and resources to make 
generic medicines.  
 
It is noteworthy that China does not provide patent term extensions, although it affords 
patent linkage measures for the registration data of originator companies. Both measures 
are not deemed as obligations under TRIPS,435 but critics point out that the introduction 
of the early working exception undermines the utility of patent linkages measure,436 and 
they insist that measures like patent term extension should be incorporated as balancing 
provisions to the new exception.437  
5.3.5 Exceptions from patentability  
Exception from patentability refers to the exclusion of certain subject matters from 
protection to prevent the grant of patents from certain areas.438 The implementation of 
this exception is in the interest of a country for public health purposes, for this 
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mechanism may prevent too many secondary patents granted to new uses, especially 
second uses of previously known medicines.  
 
However, there are sharp disagreements over the validity of the patentability of new 
uses, especially second medical uses of known products. The proponents of the new 
uses patent justify this on the basis that a second medical use is also of importance for 
public health,439 and in addition, that the discovery of a new use of known medicine 
may require the same level of R&D as for the original use of a new product.440 The 
opponents of new use patents contend that the amount of work and investment claimed 
in making such inventions are applied to a very limited number of cases, if any. In fact, 
the protection of new uses, especially second medical indications, has been routinely 
employed as a business strategy enabling the originator company to extend the patent 
period and block the entry of generic drugs.441  
 
The TRIPS Agreement does not specify the patentability of new uses of known products. 
Article 27.1 defines the patentable subject matter. It states that a patent should be 
provided for any inventions, whether they are products or processes, in all fields of 
technology. This mandate rules out the practice of excluding the patentability of 
pharmaceutical products commonly provided in many countries prior to TRIPS. Thus, it 
only explicitly obliges protection on products and processes. This leaves flexible policy 
space for member countries to determine whether or not new uses or second medical 
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uses are eligible subject matter under their own national laws.442 In the US, the 
patenting of new uses is limited to ‘method to use’ and does not provide protection for 
products as such,443 for example, claims of medical treatment for humans and surgical 
procedures are both patentable.444 In contrast, the patentability of a new use of a known 
product is allowed under Article 54(5) of the European Patent Convention. 445  
Article 25 of the Chinese patent law defines the subject matter excluded from 
patentability by law. When comparing the most recent version of the Chinese patent law 
with its 1984 revision, the only major change was the removal of 25(5) pharmaceutical 
products and substances obtained by means of a chemical process in the 1992 revision. 
The subject matters excluded from Chinese patent law included: 1) scientific 
discoveries, 2) rules and methods for mental activities, 3) methods for diagnosis and for 
the treatment of diseases, 4) animal and plant varieties, 5) and substances obtained by 
means of nuclear transformation. 
The exception of methods for diagnosis and for the treatment of diseases implies that no 
patents shall be granted to new uses of inventions or known pharmaceutical compounds 
in China if they are claimed as new methods for the treatment of diseases.446 In practice, 
the patentability of the new uses of pharmaceuticals lies in the proper wording of the 
claims in China.447 The second medical use can be patentable under Chinese patent law 
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as long the claim is presented in the form of ‘Swiss-type’ claims.448 In fact, the current 
application guidelines provide information on how to patent a second medical use in 
China. The exemplified form of these claims reads as ‘use of compound X in the 
preparation of a medicament for the treatment of disease Y’. 449  
5.3.6 Pharmaceutical registration data protection 
Pharmaceutical registration data refers to data results from preclinical and clinical 
studies on the efficacy and non-toxicity of original pharmaceutical products. Such data 
is required as the justification for national health authorities in their decisions on the 
granting of manufacturing or marketing licences for pharmaceutical products containing 
new chemical entities (NCEs).450   
 
National drug authorities conventionally do not require generic companies to repeat the 
same safety and efficacy testing as conducted by the originators, but they do require 
‘bioequivalence testing’ from generic companies to show their products are chemically 
identical to the original products and possess the equivalent safety and efficacy. Most 
health authorities relied on pharmaceutical registration data submitted by originator 
companies or foreign approval or commercialisation to approve subsequent applications 
of generic alternatives prior to TRIPS.451  
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A. Data exclusivity, a TRIPS-compliant or TRIPS-plus standard?  
The international agreement about the standard of protection of such data is essentially 
provided under TRIPS Articles 39.1 and 39.3. The wording of the provisions specifies 
that pharmaceutical registration data submitted for market approval shall be protected 
against ‘unfair commercial use’.452 There is considerable debate and controversy about 
how to interpret this provision within national laws.453 Research-based pharmaceutical 
companies and their supporters argue that since clinical test data is expensive, risky and 
time-consuming to produce, they should be protected under a fixed period of exclusivity 
rights. It is ‘unfair commercial use’ if the marketing approval of generic copies is 
allowed to use these data.454   
 
Under strong lobbying from the industry, the US and the European Union are urging 
other members of the TRIPS Agreement to implement the Article 39.3 obligation 
through a system of exclusivity rights on pharmaceutical registration data in their 
national laws. The US/EU system is sometimes referred to as ‘marketing exclusivity’ or 
‘data exclusivity’, rather than ‘data protection’, due to its high threshold, which is 
considerably beyond the minimum obligations under TRIPS.455 The US model provides 
5 years of data exclusivity to new drugs containing new chemical entities (NCEs) and 3 
years of data exclusivity to new indications of already approved drugs.456 The EU data 
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exclusivity protection is based on a system of the 8+2+1 formula: 457 8 years of data 
exclusivity for new pharmaceutical products; 2 years of marketing exclusivity during 
which generic companies are allowed to submit bio-equivalence tests referring to the 
data of the original product but they are not yet allowed to market their generic 
substitute; 1 year of a ‘non-cumulative’ period of data exclusivity for new indications of 
an existing substance.  
 
The alternative interpretation contends that Article 39.1 makes it clear that the 
obligation of the protection on pharmaceutical registration data under Article 39.3 is to 
be conferred under the principle of unfair competition as provided in Article 10bis of 
the Paris Convention.458 Article 39.3 does not sustain the requirement of data 
exclusivity, and members have to meet their obligation under Article 39.1 when their 
national laws protect the data by prohibiting ‘dishonest’ uses of data, such as in 
situations when a competitor obtains data through fraud or breach of confidence, for 
example, and uses it to apply for market approval of their own products. 459 
 
Nevertheless, a review of the national legislation of 49 countries has revealed that 43% 
of them have not provided a data protection provision.460 Under the national legislations 
adopting the provision related to data protection, the majority do not provide data 
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exclusivity approaches, although this situation may change with the increasing numbers 
of FTAs negotiated outside the WTO, which require data exclusivity to be incorporated 
within national laws.461  
B. Evaluation of Chinese pharmaceutical registration data protection  
 
The modern regulatory system on pharmaceuticals has a very short history in China. In 
1979, the New Drug Management Regulation was jointly promulgated by the Ministry 
of Health and the State Pharmaceutical Administration of China. Under this regulation, 
there were no requirements for systematic scientific proof of safety and efficacy for the 
approval of new drugs. 462 National marketing of a drug by local companies was easily 
authorised through the provincial regulatory department.463 The first comprehensive 
Drug Administrative Law was promulgated in 1985 and amended in 2001. It required 
the premarket testing of safety and efficacy and the approval of new drug products. 
However, no provisions on protection of the submitted testing data were provided under 
drug regulation laws during this period. 
 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that pharmaceutical registration data could be 
protected under the anti-competition law passed during the pre-TRIPS period in 
China.464 Article 10 of this law requires that a business operator must not infringe upon 
trade secrets. Article 10.2 specifies that obtaining, using or disclosing the trade secrets 
of others by a business operator is deemed an infringement upon the trade secrets. ‘trade 
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secrecy’ is defined as utilised technical information and business information which is 
unknown by the public, which may create business interests or profit for its legal 
owners, and which is also is maintained in secrecy by its legal owners.465 In addition, 
Article 219 of the Chinese criminal law code has similar definitions and also 
criminalises such acts of infringements on trade secrets.466 Therefore, pharmaceutical 
registration data may be protected through the law on trade secrecy during the pre-
TRIPS period, in theory.  
 
In compliance with Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, China first incorporated a 
six-year data exclusivity rule on pharmaceutical registration data in September 2002 in 
Article 35 of the Regulations for Implementation of the Drug Administration Law of the 
People's Republic of China. The rule was also included in Article 14 of the 
Administrative Measures for Drug Registration (2002). Under the 2002 drug 
registration law, generic applicants are permitted to submit their applications two years 
before the expiry of patents.467   
 
China’s approach toward pharmaceutical data protection is deemed to be exceptional in 
comparison with other developing countries.468 China and Vietnam exceptionally 
provide six-year and five-year data exclusivity, respectively.469 It is reported that many 
developing countries have not provided a specific provision for data protection under 
their drug laws. For example, India has not yet incorporated a legal provision for 
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pharmaceutical data protection.470 Countries which do provide such protection mainly 
adopt a form of protection from unfair commercial use, using language similar to that 
provided in the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, China has adopted a much stronger standard 
of pharmaceutical registration data protection than other developing countries at 
comparative levels of development.  
 
Nevertheless, China’s implementation of of its data exclusivity provision has created 
great confusion and uncertainty. Chinese drug registration law provides a very 
ambiguous procedure for registration of data for protection. One of the key concerns 
here is the definition of ‘new chemical entities’ under Chinese data exclusivity law. The 
law does not define the term, ‘new chemical entities’, but provides that ‘Application for 
new drugs refers to application for registration of drugs that have not been marketed 
within the territory of People's Republic of China.’471 This creates great confusion about 
what qualifies as a new chemical entity and thus to data exclusivity protection under the 
Chinese registration law. In 2005, in the US-China Joint Commission on Commerce and 
Trade Medical Device and pharmaceutical Subgroup Pharmaceutical Task Force 
Meeting (JCCT), the US delegation requested clarification of this point. The PRC 
SFDA representative acknowledged that ‘the definitions of fundamental terms have yet 
to be adopted’ and ‘more information on data protection is needed’. He also noted that 
there were three existing interpretations. 
 There has been the suggestion that any chemical entity within two years of marketing 
should be considered a NCE [new chemical entity]. It has also been suggested that if a 
chemical entity has not been marketed in a country, it should be considered a NCE to 
that country. Then there is the opposite thought that DE [data exclusivity]. should 
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apply to product first marketed in any market in the world, rather than first marketed 
in China.472  
 
Based on the available information, the answer to this question remains uncertain. Since the 
US WTO delegation has repeatedly requested clarification at the JCCT meetings held in at 
least in 2005, 2006 and 2008,473 and the powerful US lobbying group, the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), has continued to complain about the 
ambiguity of this term, including in its 2012 PhRMA Special 301 submission.474 
 
The issue of what qualifies as a NCE has a profound impact on the scope and term of data 
exclusivity. If any chemical drug not previously been marketed in China can be registered 
as a NEC, this could lead to the extension of the scope of data exclusivity to non-NCEs. In 
fact, new indications of known drugs have been patentable as long as the claim is presented 
in the form of ‘Swiss-type’ claims in China.475 Presumably, this type of drug can easily 
claim data exclusivity. In this sense, it would be possible for patent originators to enjoy 
between six to twelve years of data exclusivities. If data exclusivity is further employed to 
extend the protection of NCEs or even non-NCEs in China, the suppliers of cheaper generic 
alternatives from Chinese local firms will be serious affected, and as a direct consequence, 
public health. 
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5.3.7 Patent registration linkage 
A. A TRIPS-compliant or TRIPS-plus requirement linkage?  
Patent registration linkage is seen as a mechanism to ensure that marketing approval of 
generic drugs will not be granted until the expiry of the relevant originator’s patent.476 
The legal status of this mechanism is controversial. There are ongoing debates on the 
validity of patent registration linkage as a measure to enforce patent rights, particularly 
relating to pharmaceuticals. Research-based companies and their supporters have argued 
that Article 28 and Article 41 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement imply the concept of patent 
linkage.477 They interpret these provisions as obligating national drug regulatory and 
patent offices to communicate with each other in order to ensure that applications for 
approval to market generic drugs are only authorised upon the expiration of relevant 
patents.478  
In contrast, opponents have rejected the argument that the TRIPS provisions mandate 
the establishment of such patent registration linkage measures under national laws. 
Instead, they have viewed this patent linkage system as another TRIPS-plus measure 
and an additional barrier used to delay generic competition.479 They have also warned 
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that the viability of compulsory licences would be undermined if national health 
regulatory bodies withheld the generic registration until the related patents expired.480  
In reality, the obligation to link regulatory approval to patents varies in national 
jurisdictions. While some countries, like the US, China, Canada and Australia, have 
incorporated patent linkages into their national law, many others, including the EU, 
have not accepted it, without violating their obligations under the TRIPS. In fact, it is 
well-known that the EU has made use of the ‘Bolar’ provision to patent rights provided 
under Article 30 of the TRIPS. 481 The EU Directorate General for Competition (DGC) 
recently stated that: 482  
Patent registration linkage refers to the practice of linking the granting of MA 
[marketing approval], the pricing and reimbursement status or any regulatory 
approval for a generic medicinal product, to the status of a patent (application) for 
the originator reference product. Under the EU law, it is not allowed to link 
marketing authorisation to the patent status of the originator reference 
product…. …Since the status of a patent (application) is not included in the 
grounds set out in the Regulation and in the Directive, it cannot be used as an 
argument for refusing, suspending or revoking …MA. ....patent-linkage is 
considered unlawful under Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 and Directive (EC) No. 
2001/83. 
Nevertheless, the patent registration linkage requirement, along with other TRIPS-plus 
measures, such as ‘pharmaceutical data exclusivity’ and ‘patent term extension’, has  
increasingly spread to more countries by means of terms imposed by entry into free 
trade agreements with the US.483 
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B. The practice in other jurisdictions: Bayer v. UOI and Cipla 
Recently, the divide between opponents and proponents of patent registration linkage 
was highlighted in the case of Bayer v. UOI and Cipla.484 Bayer Corporation (Bayer) 
had filed a writ before the High Court of India in Delhi against Cipla ltd, the Drug 
Controller of India (DGCI) and the Union of India, seeking an order to restrain 
marketing approval of Cipla’s generic version of Bayer’s patented cancer drug 
Sorefanib (sold as ‘Nexavar’). Initially, the court ordered an injunction to stop the 
DGCI from proceeding with Cipla’s application for marketing approval. On appeal by 
Cipla, the appeal court reversed the decision and dismissed Bayer’s petition, on 28 
August 2009, on the grounds that there was no ‘parliament-mandated’ patent 
registration linkage system established in Indian law and that the DCGI had no authority 
or nor was it obliged to use patent policing powers in the process of marketing 
authorisation. The appeal court also criticised Bayer for trying to ‘tweak public policies 
through court mandated regimes’.485  This case could contribute significantly to the 
jurisprudence on patent registration linkage in India if no further appeal is pursued or 
won by Bayer and Bayer does not seek a decision by the WTO Dispute tribunal.  
C. Evaluation of the Chinese Patent registration linkage provision in 
relation to the Hatch-Waxman Act  
Revisiting the Hatch Waxman Act  
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Under US law, patent registration linkage is provided statutorily in the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the Hatch-Waxman Act).486 The 
Hatch Waxman Act requires that the FDA make publicly available a list of approved 
drug products with monthly supplements, titled ‘Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations’ and widely referred as ‘the Orange Book’.487 The 
two main aspects of this mechanism are highlighted below:  
- Assertion of non-infringement or invalidation: Once a right holder of a New Drug 
Application (NDA) lists its patent in the database of the Orange Book, a generic 
company applying for marketing authorisation of the same drug is required to assert that 
the relevant patent listed in the Orange Book is somehow invalid or will not be 
infringed by its ANDA application.488  
-  Automatic 30-month stay of FDA approval: Once the generic applicant makes the 
said assertion, the patent holder should be notified and given 45 days to file an 
infringement suit. During the litigation, the relevant generic application, the ANDA, has 
to be frozen for 30 months with the FDA. 489 
 
The US application patent registration linkage system has generated a great deal of 
litigation in the US.490 This is mainly because the system of automatic 30-month stay 
has been used as a scheme for brand-name companies to delay the entry of generic 
competition of their much more expensive, blockbuster drugs. When an ANDA from a 
                                                 
486
 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A)(iii), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/21/usc_sec_21_00000355----000-.html, accessed on December 7, 
2009. 
487
 See Orange Book Preface, at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079068.htm, accessed on December 7, 
2009. 
488
 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/21/usc_sec_21_00000355----000-
.html, accessed on December 7, 2009. 
489
 Ibid.  
490
 Borecki, T (2001), 'The Hatch-Waxman Act and Abbreviated New Drug Applications '. 
www.law.washington.edu/casrip/symposium/.../1-Borecki.pdf;  accessed on December 7, 2009; 
Finston Consulting (2006).  
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generic company is filed, the original drug company almost always sues the generic 
company for patent infringement.491  This action triggers a 30-month stay of the ANDA 
application with the FDA without further proceedings. Moreover, a pioneer drug patent 
holder could list several patents in the Orange Book, including invalid patents,492 or 
additional patents with minor modifications, in many cases, without regard for safety or 
efficiency. 493   
 
Much of the problem may be that the Hatch Waxman Act does not contain a mechanism 
for ascertaining the accuracy of the listing. While the Act allows all NDA applicants to 
list all patents that are part of their products reviewed by the FDA in the Orange Book; 
the FDA has no authority to check the validity of the listed patents.494 Consequently, the 
brand-name company is free to choose any one or all of its multiple patents listed to file 
numerous lawsuits to delay the entry of the generic ANDA application through multiple 
30-month stays.  
 
To stop the abuse of the 30-month stay system, the Medicare Act of 2003 limits the use 
of the automatic 30-month stays to one. While this amendment improves the certainty 
for generic entry and minimises costly and wasteful litigation, it does not prevent brand-
name companies from seeking other strategies to delay or block generic competition. 
For instance, it has been reported that some brand-name pharmaceutical companies have 
                                                 
491
 Maureen, R (2002), 'Beyond Hatch_Waxman: Legislative Action Seeks to Close Loopholes in U.S. 
Law that Delay Entry of Generics into the Market', Cenear, 80 (38), pp53-59. 
492
 Finston Consulting (2006), p11. 
493
 Maureen, R (2002), 'Beyond Hatch_Waxman: Legislative Action Seeks to Close Loopholes in U.S. 
Law that Delay Entry of Generics into the Market'.  
494
  'Hatch Waxman: A Work in Progress’.supra note 77. 
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even offered payments to generic companies to postpone the launch of their products for 
a certain period or until the patents expire.495   
 
The Chinese system of patent registration linkage  
 
There has been a great deal of harmonisation between the US and Chinese regulatory 
systems governing drug registration. As reviewed in Chapter 4, US-based 
pharmaceutical companies had vigorously lobbied the US government to press China to 
reform its pharmaceutical legislation to conform with the US model in the 1990s. The 
introduction of the patent registration linkage mechanism was one feature included in 
such Chinese reforms. A Chinese SFDA representative has suggested that Chinese 
legislators were following the recommendations of PhRMA when they first introduced a 
patent registration linkage system in 2002 under Articles 11 of the newly promulgated 
Administrative Measures of Drug Registration as well as when it was updated in 2007 
in Article 18.496 The following are its main elements:   
 
- Assertion of non-infringement: the law requires that all generic applicants have to 
issue a statement of non-infringement of any existing patents.  
 
- SFDA database:  the SFDA is obliged to publish the information of all reviewed and 
approved registrations and the statements of non-infringement from generic applications. 
   
- Injunction procedure for patent disputes: the law provides that any patent disputes 
occurring relating to drug registrations should be settled in accordance with relevant 
                                                 
495
 Maureen, R (2002), 'Beyond Hatch_Waxman: Legislative Action Seeks to Close Loopholes in U.S. 
Law that Delay Entry of Generics into the Market'.  
496
  This was suggested by Zhang Wei, a representative of SFDA to the US-China Joint Commission on 
Commerce and Trade Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Subgroup: pharmaceutical Task Force, see the 
minutes of the meeting dated on April 8-9, 2008, available at www.trade.gov/td/health/jcctpharma04-
08summary.pdf, accessed on December 8, 2009. 
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patent laws or regulations. Article 66 of Chinese patent law (2008) provides   a pre-
litigation injunction procedure for patent disputes.  
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Table 5.4: Comparison of features of patent registration linkage under the US and 
Chinese systems 
 
 
 
US 
 
China 
Relevant statute(s) Hatch Waxman Act -Regulation on Drug 
Registration (Article 18)  
- Provisions under the 
patent law (Article 66) 
Methods of linking 
generic approval to 
patents  
Orange Book  
Accession of non-
infringement or 
invalidation (Paragraph IV 
Certification) 
 
SFDA database  
Accession of non-
infringement 
Procedure in case of 
patent disputes 
Automatic 30-month stay 
of FDA approval 
Resorting to the procedure 
under the patent law: pre-
litigation injunction  
 
Table 5.4 above summarises the main features of patent registration linkage in the US 
and China. The two systems have similarities as well as differences. The Chinese 
system shares a framework similar to that established under the US Hatch Waxman Act, 
and both systems maintain two similar tracks of patent registration linkage measures, 
i.e., publication of drug registration information and ownership declarations. The 
differences are outstanding and significant, particularly concerning procedures to 
resolve patent disputes occurring during the process of drug registration. In the US 
system, the FDA directly applies an automatic 30-month stay in response to allegations 
of infringement. As mentioned above, this mechanism is now only allowed to be used 
once against the alleged infringing act, and the rights holder involved must file the case 
within 45 days.   
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Under the Chinese system, the drug administration law does not establish a direct legal 
solution for the patent dispute occurring during the drug registration. Instead, it directs 
claimants to the special process provided under the patent laws. Article 66 of Chinese 
patent law provides a pre-litigation injunction for right holders to prevent possible and 
unrecoverable damages caused by infringements that are occurring or imminent. The 
provision orders the suspension of the alleged infringement acts upon the filing of a 
complaint detailing the allegations and requesting an injunction.497 However, in contrast 
with the stricter US rules, there is no time limit on the suspension period or on the 
injunction applicant’s pursuit of its case in the courts. Nor are there measures to prevent 
repetitive litigation relating to the same act. Furthermore, Chinese patent law allows 
two-years for initiating legal proceedings against an alleged infringement.498 Thus, 
Chinese law gives originators several legal advantages that help them gain more time to 
prevent generic rivals from entering the market, whether their patents are valid or not.  
 
Finally, Table 5.5 below summarizes the development of the special patent provisions 
most relevant to medicines under the four versions of Chinese patent law in relation to 
the TRIPS standards. It is observed that China opted to exceed the TRIPS minimum 
standards in implementing TRIPS in its 1992 and 2000 patent reforms. This TRIPS-plus 
approach toward pharmaceutical patents was very problematic from a public health 
policy perspective. Yet, the 2008 Chinese patent reforms revealed a policy shift in 
favour of utilizing TRIPS flexibilities. China’s experience may reflect its inexperience 
with IPR matters as well as a traditional trial and error approach towards new law and 
policy. 
                                                 
497
 Article 66, Chinese Patent Law  (2008). 
498
 Article 68, Chinese Patent Law (2008). 
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Table 5.5: The use of TRIPS flexibilities in Chinese legislations in relation to 
TRIPS provision 
 
 
Mechanism  
 
Applicable Chinese 
legal sources  
 
Chinese provisions 
 
TRIPS provisions 
Local working 
requirement, see 
table 3  
for other 
elements under 
compulsory 
license  
1984 Chinese patent 
law Art 51 &52 
1992 Chinese patent 
law 
2001 Chinese patent 
law 
2008 Chinese patent 
law Art.48.1 
 
Yes, 3 yrs from 
grant 
No 
No 
Yes, 3 yrs from 
grant, 4 yrs from 
application 
 
To be authorised by 
Paris Convention 
(Art5 A (1) 
 
 No direct 
prohibition in 
TRIPS 
 
Jurisprudence from 
EC-Canada, WTO 
case indicates 
member is free to 
adopt such 
provision 499 
Exhaustion 
doctrine  
1984 Chinese patent 
law ,Art.62.1 
1992 Chinese patent 
law, Art.62.1 
2001 Chinese patent 
law, Art.63.1 
2008 Chinese patent 
law,  Art.69.1 
National exhaustion  
National exhaustion  
National exhaustion  
International 
exhaustion  
Article 6 of TRIPS  
 
Para 5 (d) of Doha 
Declaration. 
Selected 
Exceptions from 
patent rights   
 
1984 Chinese patent 
law, Art 62.5 
1992 Chinese patent 
law, Art 62.5 
2001 Chinese patent 
law, Art 63.4 
2008 Chinese patent 
law Art 69.4 &5 
Experiment 
exception  
Experimental 
exception 
Experimental 
exception 
Experimental 
exception + early 
working exception  
Art. 30,  
Selected 
exceptions from 
patentability  
 
1984 Chinese patent 
law, Art.25.3 &5 
 
 
 
 
1992 Chinese patent 
law, Art.25.3 
 
 
Pharmaceutical 
products + methods 
for diagnosis and for 
the treatment of 
diseases, but new 
medical uses can be 
patentable if claimed 
by ‘Swiss formula’ 
approach 
 
No specification, 
members are free to 
decide the 
patentability for 
new medical uses 
invention 
Free to adopt 
Swiss-formula 
approach 500 
                                                 
499
 UNCTAD-ITCSD (2005), 'Resource Book on TRIPS and Development', p482. 
500
 UNCTAD-ITCSD (2005), 'Resource Book on TRIPS and Development', p357. 
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2001 Chinese patent 
law, Art.25.3 
2008 Chinese patent 
law,  Art.25.3  
methods for 
diagnosis and for the 
treatment of 
diseases, but new 
medical uses can be 
patentable if claimed 
by ‘Swiss formula’ 
approach 
 
Same as the above  
Same as the above  
Data protection  Regulations for 
Implementation of the 
Drug Administration 
Law(2002), Art 35 
‘Measures on the 
Administration of 
Drug Registration 
Provisions for Drug 
Registration’ (2007), 
Art.20 
 
6 yrs data 
exclusivity for  
NECs 
6 yrs data 
exclusivity for new 
medical uses  
Data protection 
against unfair 
competitive 
practices, no 
specification about 
the duration of 
protection 
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5.4 Special issues: utility models for pharmaceutical inventions?  
 
A Utility Model (UM) is a form of IP that is not covered by the TRIPS Agreement. It is 
a flexible mechanism lying outside the Agreement.501 WTO Member countries, 
therefore, have legislative freedom to decide whether to provide such models of 
protection. Those who do recognise this model do not need to conform to the disciplines 
contained in the TRIPS Agreement502 and enjoy considerable autonomy to design and 
execute this form of protection.503  
  
Therefore, UM is one of only a few areas of IP subject matter where developing 
countries might be able to exercise meaningful legislative discretion in the TRIPS era. 
China has adopted UM in its patent law. In fact, UM has been intensively used by 
domestic innovators. Since 1985, of the three forms of Chinese patents, most domestic 
applications filed and granted were for UM patents.504 This trend is also reflected in the 
pharmaceutical technical field. The survey conducted for this thesis has found that the 
number of domestic applications and grants for UM patents far exceeded that for 
invention patents since the introduction of the patent system. During the period from 
1987 to 2006, Chinese inventors filed 75,912 applications for ‘invention’ patents with 
only 15,590 granted and 93,173 applications for ‘UMs’ with 66,962 granted, a much 
greater percentage of successful submissions.505  
 
                                                 
501
 WIPO 'Advice on Flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement',  <http://www.wipo.int/ip- 
development/en/legislative_assistance/advice_trips.html>, accessed on May 31, 2010. 
502
 Correa, C (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (New York: Oxford University Press Inc.), p36. 
503
 UM is recognised under the Paris Convention, but this treaty allows the members considerable 
flexibility to develop and enforce their own national patent law.  
504
 Yang, HJ (2008), 'Examination And Approval Of Patent Applications', in JC Wang, et al. (eds.), Guide 
to the Newly Amended Patent Law (Beijing: State Intellectual Property Office Press),. p258,in Chinese. 
505
 See the survey presented by the empirical studies in Chapter 7. 
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For the Chinese government to realize its policy of promoting and protecting public 
health, it is important for it to consider the potential impacts of the existence of 66, 962 
UM pharmaceutical patents on access to medicine in China. This section evaluates the 
appropriateness of applying this model of IP protection to pharmaceuticals in China.  
5.4.1 Main characteristics of the UM system  
 
The UM is a patent-like exclusivity right that allows a rights holder to prevent others 
from commercialising the protected invention without the rights holder’s consent for a 
limited period of time. However, a right under the UM system differs from a patent in 
the following significant aspects: (1) The requirement for acquiring a UM is less 
stringent than for a patent, for UM applications the bar for ‘inventive step’ or ‘non-
obvious’ is always lower; (2) The term of protection for UM is considerably shorter 
than that for patents; (3) The registration of UM is not only cheaper but faster than 
patents due to low costs and no requirement for examination in most  countries where 
UM protection is available; (4) UM is considered particularly useful for SMEs that 
make minor and adaptive innovations to mechanical products.506   
The TRIPS Agreement neither obliges nor limits the legislation of UM in member states, 
the provision of UM protection is subject only to the national treatment obligation 
established by the Paris Convention (Article 1 (2)).507  In practice, UM is not provided 
as a standard feature within the intellectual property regime in many countries. It is 
currently available in approximately 70 countries. While countries such as the United 
                                                 
506
 WIPO, 'Protecting Innovations by Utility Models', 
<http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/utility_models/utility_models.htm>, accessed on September 2, 
2009; Correa, C (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the 
TRIPS Agreement, p36. 
507
 Correa, C (2002 d), 'Protection and Promotion of Traditional Medicine - Implications for Public Health 
in Developing Countries ', (Geneva: South Centre), p36. 
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States, the United Kingdom and Canada do not provide ‘UM’ protection; it is available 
in other equally significant countries like Germany, France, Italy and Japan etc.508  
UM has been adopted under the Chinese patent law since 1984. The law does not 
specify patentable subject matters but stipulates in a general manner:  ‘this law is 
enacted to protect patent rights for inventions-creations….,’ and ‘In this law, inventions-
creations means inventions, UM and designs.’509 However, the implementation rule 
defines that ‘UM’ refers to any new technical solution relating to the shape, the 
structure, or their combination, of a product which is fit for practical use. The duration 
of a UM patent is 10 years from the date of filing or the priority date.510 UM 
applications are subject to only a preliminary examination which simply requires 
compliance with formalities.511  
5.4.2 The benefits of the UM system  
UM is perceived as a cheaper and faster alternative to protect IP rights than patent, 
given its advantages in terms of registration cost and procedure.512 It is also suggested 
that UM is of particular interest to developing countries, given that the innovation 
taking place there tends to be small, incremental and cumulative in nature.513 
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 Suthersanen, U, Dutfield, G, and Chow, K (2007), Innovation without Patents: Harnessing the 
Creative Spirit in a Diverse World (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. ),p19; WIPO, 'Where can 
UMs be Acquired?',http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/utility_models/where.htm, accessed on 
September 8,2009.  
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The Chinese pharmaceutical industry has become one of the world’s largest producers 
of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs).514  However, its capability to innovate is 
still very limited.  Few drugs are discovered and developed by domestic industry despite 
the recent boom of patenting activities. More than 95% of the drugs produced by the 
domestic industry are generic and me-too versions of drugs.515 A lack of financial 
resources is one of the major obstacles to the new drug discovery in China. Considering 
financial constraints and the general low technical level of the domestic industry, it is 
expected that the majority of its R&D activities will fall into the types of minor and 
incremental innovation. In this context, UM might provide a useful economic incentive 
for individual businesses to engage in more incremental innovation. The successful 
commercialisation of UM patents can help the industry to expand revenue that can 
potentially improve the funding capability for the higher level of R&D in the further. 
From a public health perspective, minor or incremental therapeutic advances may also 
increase the value of a drug and hence yield health benefits to customers or patients.516 
5.4.3 Uncertainties of UM system  
 
Once granted, UMs benefit from the same exclusivity rights as invention patents. The 
existence of such large numbers of pharmaceutical UMs in China is certain to affect the 
costs of medicines and competition. Consequently, there is a need to examine the 
validity of the application of UMs to pharmaceuticals in China. This subsection 
investigates several policy issues relating to the operation of Chinese pharmaceutical 
UMs. 
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A. Is UM sufficiently low-priced in China?  
The UM system is generally conceived as offering an inexpensive and manageable 
model of IPRs to protect the ‘petty innovations’ of individual researchers and Small 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs). A recent study reveals that a UM patent is not necessarily 
much less costly than an ‘invention’ patent in Germany where a UM system is well-
established.517 Is this also the case in China? Table 5.6 sets forth the fees charged by the 
SIPO applicable to both invention and UM patents. It shows that there is not a 
significant difference in the administration fees for UM and invention patents. In 
addition, the application for UM requires the same structure as that for an invention 
patent, which suggests that drafting and preparation burdens will not significantly 
influence an inventor’s decision between applying for a UM or an invention patent. 
 
Table 5.6 Charges for application for Invention and UM patents  
 
(Currency: Chinese Yuan) 
 
Items  Invention UM 
Application fee  900 500 
Renew fee: 1-3 months  900 600 
                   4-6 months 1200 900 
                   7-9 months 2000 1200 
                  10-12 months 4000 2000 
Registration, printing & stamp duty  255 205 
Each claim additional to the 10th claim 150 150 
Source: SIPO patent fee check list, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/zlsqzn/sqq/zlfy/200905/t20090515_460473.html 
                                                 
517
  Königer, K (2009), 'Registration without Examination: the Utility Model - a Useful Model?’ pp25-26. 
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B. What is the quality of the pharmaceutical UM in China?  
 
Under the Chinese UM protection process, inventions are not substantively examined, 
hence they tend to be very vulnerable to invalidation challenges.518 A revision of 
Chinese patent law in 2000 introduced a provision by which UM rights holders may 
request SIPO to issue ‘a search report’ relating to the validity of a UM if they are 
involved in infringement disputes in a court or administrative agency.519 Nevertheless, 
this procedure cannot guarantee the quality or the level of inventiveness of the UM.520 It 
is reported that a major cause of the high patent invalidation rates relates to UMs and 
that 95% of revocation requests have been filed against UM patents, and more than 60% 
of cases have resulted in the nullification of the UM right.521The poor quality and 
endurance rate of many UM patents indicates that this model may not be an appropriate 
form of IP protection for pharmaceutical products to help China realize its policy of 
promoting and protecting public health.  
C. Is the UM system an appropriate form of protection for pharmaceutical 
inventions?  
Since a ‘Utility model’ right applies to a minor technical improvement relating to the 
shape, structure, or their combination, of a product patented under the Chinese patent 
law,522 it is unlikely that a pharmaceutical UM will greatly benefit patients. In practice, 
the management and regulators interviewed for this thesis testified that it is not difficult 
to obtain a Chinese UM protection for the improvement of the shape of the 
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 Law360 (June 10, 2009), 'Real and Present Danger: Patent Litigation In China'. www.law360.com, 
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pharmaceuticals.523 In these cases, the therapeutic contributions of UM rights to the 
state of the art are rather limited. 
 
From a public health perspective, therefore, UM rights do not confer any real benefits. 
They can raise the prices of medicines in the same way invention patents do in China. 
As one form of Chinese patent rights, the UM enjoys the exclusive rights that allow the 
rights holders to prevent others from commercially using the protected invention, 
without their authorisation, for ten years.524 This enables the rights holders to adopt 
monopoly prices over the products commercialised successfully from UM inventions. In 
China, despite the adoption of a national price-containing policy since 1996 aimed at 
controlling expenditures on healthcare products,525 patented medicines, produced 
domestically or imported, are excluded from the drug price list issued by the National 
Planning Commission.526 Under the market principle, it is reasonable to assume that 
UM-based healthcare products can be priced as high as their monopoly position will 
support. Thus, the UM system may function as an additional obstacle for access to 
medicine in China. 
 
A final issue surrounding UMs is the problem of infringement. There is a general 
consensus among IP practitioners that the Chinese UM system is heavily abused.527 UM 
rights are allegedly granted to local ‘inventors’ for inventions imported from 
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overseas.528 It is also alleged that the UM rights are frequently used as a guise of 
counterfeiting activities in China.529 It is reported that 8% of over-the-counter medicines 
sold in China are counterfeit.530 China is now regarded as a production centre of 
counterfeit medicines.531 It is claimed that ‘counterfeiters are now employing the UM 
and design patent system to claim protection for their modified versions of goods and 
products which are protected under foreign patents’.532 
 
This subsection has addressed special issues concerning the suitability of the use of 
utility models rights for pharmaceutical inventions from a public health policy 
perspective. The issues addressed raised questions regarding the excessive use of the 
Chinese UM system in the pharmaceutical field. The investigation has found that the 
current procedures for pharmaceutical UM registration are not sensitive or tied to health 
issues in China. The UM is a flexible IP tool outside of the TRIPS Agreement and 
hence not confined by the principles of the TRIPS Agreement, and it is submitted that 
state policy makers could make better use of the legislative freedom available and adapt 
the UM system to balance both public health and other development interests.  
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5.5 Concluding remarks 
The above evaluation of pharmaceutical patent standards in China has found that, until 
very recently, China had not exhibited sufficient legislative adaptability in developing 
its patent system to conform to government policies. It found that the design and 
application of the three criteria governing patentability may not be suitable for 
implementing China’s policies of promoting both public health and local innovation. 
This was because the system provided a narrow novelty standard until recently, it also 
offered inventors an undemanding, low bar to cross to satisfy criteria required for 
‘inventiveness’ and ‘industrial application’, and patent examination procedures were 
often lax. 
 
Secondly, China’s TRIPS implementation approach has limited its ability to implement 
its national public health policies. China has opted to interpret the TRIPS Agreement to 
provide a high level of protection for patents on pharmaceuticals. It has also 
implemented key TRIPS-plus patent provisions providing even stronger patent 
protections under bilateral trade agreements, and it abandoned or dismissed TRIPS 
flexibilities available to it under the TRIPS Agreement in its 1992 and 2001 versions of 
the patent law. Key TRIPS flexibilities have only been introduced in the recent patent 
reforms in 2008. It is uncertain whether or not these newly adopted TRIPS flexibilities 
can be effectively utilised for safeguarding public interests, given that various TRIPS-
plus provisions are already established in the Chinese patent system. There will be a 
need to examine and reconcile any conflicting provisions. 
 
Finally, China has not made maximum beneficial use of the utility model (UM), a 
system of creating flexible IP rights not covered by the TRIPS Agreement, in seeking to 
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achieve its policy goals. China has applied TRIPS’ non-discrimination principle in 
designing and executing this IP subject matter. This policy has resulted in the patenting 
of remarkable numbers of pharmaceutical inventions either with trivial medical benefits 
or borrowed technology in China. Considering the  therapeutic insignificance, negative 
impacts on drug prices, substantial legal uncertainties and costs associated with UM 
pharmaceutical inventions, this thesis suggests that policy-makers should check the 
application procedure and the validity of the UM system in the pharmaceutical 
technology field.  
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Chapter 6 Evaluation of pharmaceutical patent 
enforcement in China   
 
International users of the Chinese patent system have widely criticized it for the 
inadequacy of legal enforcement of IPRs.533 While the debate has centred on claims that 
Chinese enforcement procedures are not severe enough to deter violations, this chapter 
argues that the Chinese enforcement system has actually undertaken standards for 
pharmaceuticals beyond the minimum required by TRIPS and the system has also been 
hampered by loopholes facilitating abuse and over-enforcement. This section employs a 
legal assessment and a case study to illustrate this argument. 
 
The first section of this chapter provides an overview of Chinese obligations in 
implementing TRIPS enforcement procedures; the second section engages in a legal 
assessment of the Chinese patent enforcement procedures regarding its compliance and 
inconsistency with the TRIPS Agreement. The assessment is based on the ‘under-
enforcement’ allegations made by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA), a major representative of US users of the Chinese pharmaceutical 
patent system. 534 In light of the allegations in question, a legal evaluation is carried out 
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failure has often been deemed as the main cause for the prevalence of counterfeit medical products 
originating from China in both domestic and international markets .See Matthews, D (2008), 'The Fight 
Against Counterfeiting and Piracy in the Bilateral Trade Agreements of the EU', (Brussels: European 
Parliament ), p24  & Morris, J and Stevens, P (2006), 'Counterfeit Medicines in Less Developed 
Countries: problem and solutions', (London: International Policy Network ); PhRMA (2007), ‘PhRMA 
Special 301 Submission 2007'; PhRMA (2009) , ‘PhRMA Special 301 Submission 2009’. 
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on the legal provisions relating to administrative enforcement, criminal liabilities and 
their applicability to these claims. The third section looks at the Chinese enforcement 
procedure from the anti-abuse of patents’ perspective. It focuses on the legal 
deficiencies of the newly introduced injunction remedy. Then, a case study on Eli 
Lilly’s strategic litigation against Chinese generic competitors is provided to illustrate 
the point. 
 
6.1 China’s international obligations regarding the enforcement of 
pharmaceutical patents  
 
In legal practice, the effectiveness of enforcement may be subject to different 
interpretations. In terms of the objective of the TRIPS implementation, however, 
national enforcement remedies are deemed to be ‘effective’ and ‘adequate’ if they are 
consistent with the Agreement’s obligations.535 Therefore, to assess the sufficiency of 
Chinese enforcement measures, the fundamental question is: what are China’s 
obligations under the TRIPS framework?  
 
Paragraph 1.2 of China’s accession to the WTO Protocol 536 states that 
[t]he WTO Agreement to which China accedes shall be the WTO Agreement as 
rectified, amended or otherwise modified by such legal instruments as may have 
entered into force before the date of accession. This Protocol, which shall include 
the commitments referred to in paragraph 342 of the Working Party Report, shall 
be an integral part of the WTO Agreement. 
 
                                                 
535
 Correa, C (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (New York: Oxford University Press Inc.), p1-2. 
536
 WTO (2001), 'Accession of the People's Republic of China', (WT/L/432, 23 November 2001) ( China 
WTO Accession Protocol). 
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Accordingly, China’s international obligations concerning IPRs enforcement, including 
pharmaceutical patents, come from both the TRIPS Agreement and China’s WTO 
Accession Protocol (including the Working Party report537). It is interesting to note that 
only a one-way set of commitments on the part of China was provided under both 
China’s WTO Accession Protocol and the Working Party Report. This feature is in 
contrast with other international treaties which are presumed to provide a mutual 
balance between rights and obligations.538  
 
• TRIPS enforcement obligations:  
 Part III of the TRIPS Agreement sets out detailed procedural standards of a civil, 
administrative and criminal nature, with aims to improve the adequacy and effectiveness 
of IPRs enforcement.539 It provides provisions covering the general obligation (Article 
41), the requirements concerning civil, administrative procedure and remedies (Articles 
42-49), provisional measures (Article 50), and border measures (Articles 51-60), 
criminal procedures (Article 61), and transparency requirements (Article 63). These 
provisions are primary benchmarks to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of IPR 
protection in China. 
 
• Chinese commitments under the report of the working party 
Under the working party report, China has committed itself to broad, specific and 
detailed IPR enforcement obligations which are also under the WTO Accession 
                                                 
537
 WTO (2001), 'Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China ', (WT/ACC/CHN/49,1 October 
2001) ( The Report of the Working Party). 
538
 Lei , JQ (2006), The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China, (London: Cameron May), 
p154. 
539
 Dreier, T (1999), 'TRIPS and the Enforcement of Intellectual property Rights', in F Abbott, T Cottier, 
and F Gurry (eds.), The International Intellectual Property System: Commentary and Materials (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International).  
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Protocol and the TRIPS Agreement.540 In Section D, China confirmed it would 
effectively implement Articles 42 and 43 under judicial rules of civil procedure;541  
China promised to amend relevant rules to ensure full compliance with Articles 45 and 
46 of TRIPS, and to ensure that damages paid by the infringer to the rights holder would 
be adequate to compensate for the injury suffered.542 As far as provisional measures are 
concerned, China confirmed that its relevant provision under the Chinese patent law 
would be implemented and fully consistent with TRIPS Article 50.1-4.543  
  
Most IPR enforcement measures have been introduced through administrative actions in 
China.544 To respond to concerns expressed by members of the Working Party about the 
inadequacy of administrative sanctions, China committed to enhance its enforcement 
efforts, including through: (1) more effective administrative sanctions; (2) empowering 
the relevant the authorities to confiscate and seize evidence of infringement, such as 
equipment used for making infringed products, inventories and documents; (3) 
empowering the relevant authorities to impose sufficient sanctions to prevent or deter 
further infringement; and (4) transferring appropriate cases, including those involving 
repeat offenders and wilful piracy and counterfeiting, to the relevant authorities for 
prosecution under criminal law provisions.545 China is also obliged to update its existing 
border measures to be fully consistent with Article 51-60 of TRIPS. Lastly, China 
confirmed that the relevant administrative authority would recommend the judicial 
authority to make the necessary adjustments to lower the thresholds so as to address the 
concerns of the Working Party.  
                                                 
540
 Lei , JQ (2006), The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China, p158. 
541
 Para.291, The Report of the Working Party. 
542
 Para, 292, The Report of the Working Party. 
543
 Para, 296, The Report of the Working Party. 
544
 Para, 297,  The Report of the Working Party. 
545
 Para, 299, The Report of the Working Party. 
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• Chinese commitments under China’s WTO Accession Protocol  
Under China’ WTO Accession Protocol, China is required to provide information about 
the implementation of all of its commitments under the WTO Agreement and the 
Protocol.546 In terms of its TRIPS obligations, China must first provide all amendments 
of its IPR laws in full compliance and with a full application of the TRIPS Agreement, 
and the protection of undisclosed information;547 secondly, China must provide 
‘enhanced IPR enforcement efforts through the application of more effective 
administrative sanctions as described in the Report’ (italics added). 548 
 
The second provision explicitly states that China’s commitment in enforcing IPRs is to 
establish stronger administrative remedies rather than criminal sanctions. This casts 
doubt over the US position concerning what constitutes China’s full compliance in 
enforcement procedures. This has been a contentious issue between the US and China; 
while the former presses the need for stronger criminal and civil penalties regarding 
infringements in China, China responds that it has complied with TRIPS requirements 
through stronger administrative penalties.549 
 
Upon its accession, China became bound by all of the TRIPS commitments that it 
confirmed under its Accession to the WTO Protocol and the Report of the Working 
Party. Numerous existing studies have demonstrated that the current IPR enforcement 
                                                 
546
 Article 18.1, China WTO Accession Protocol. 
547
 Annex 1, VI (a), p17, China WTO Accession Protocol. 
548
 Ibid.  
549
 Annex 1A Pt. VI(b), in WTO (2001), 'Accession of the People's Republic of China', (WT/L/432, 23 
November 2001). 
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procedures and remedies under Chinese IPR law have been harmonised in accordance 
with the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement and the Protocol.550  
 
Yet, Chinese IPR enforcement continues to be criticised as inadequate and weak. In the 
context of pharmaceutical patents, PhRMA has been a prominent critic of the Chinese 
enforcement system. The following section examines the legal nature of Chinese 
enforcement process and remedies in light of PhRMA’s allegations. 
6.2 The enforcement problems with pharmaceutical patents: rights 
holders’ perspectives  
6.2.1 PhRMA’s allegation 
As the major representative of the US leading pharmaceutical research and 
biotechnology companies, PhRMA, has played a leading role in monitoring IP laws and 
practices as well as lobbying for legislative changes in China.  The PhRMA submits 
annual reports, known as PhRMA Special 301 Submission Reports, to the US Trade 
Representative (USTR) with the list of its allegations and demands for legal changes 
concerning the Chinese IPRs and pharmaceutical regulatory systems. In its recent 
Special 301 submissions, while it acknowledges the efforts of the Chinese government 
in reforming the IPR system as well as the improvement of Chinese IPR operating 
environment,551 PhRMA continually emphasizes its dissatisfaction with IP enforcement 
practice and some regulatory problems.  
 
                                                 
550
 Lei , JQ (2006), The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China, (2006), p217 & Guo, SK 
and Zuo, XG (2007), 'Are Chinese Intellectual Property Laws Consistent with the TRIPS Agreements?’. '  
551
 PhRMA (2007), 'Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacture of American (PhRMA) Special 301 
Submission 2007', p52, available at http://members.phrma.org/international/, accessed on 10 November 
10, 2009. 
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The prevalence of counterfeit pharmaceuticals within and originating from China is one 
of the major concerns raised in the PhRMA Special 301 submission reports. It is 
claimed that PhRMA members lose approximately 10 to 15 % of their annual revenue to 
counterfeit products made in China.552 Despite a series of actions to combat drug 
counterfeiting by the Chinese government, PhRMA believes that China is ‘the world’s 
leading exporter of counterfeit drugs and bulk chemicals’.553 The 2009 report alleges 
that ‘China is the country of origin for 80% of all counterfeit goods seized while 
entering the US.’554 
   
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America identified the following 
major deficiencies with the Chinese IPRs enforcement system: 555  
• Administrative penalties lack deterrent effects.  
• There is an imperative need for the administrative authorities to transfer more 
cases to the courts for the initiation of criminal liabilities.  
• Excessive criminal thresholds are perhaps the most significant barrier to 
effective trademark enforcement.  
 
Counterfeit drugs are a very serious threat to public health, and China is obliged to 
improve its enforcement measures if the problems have their roots there. In light of 
these allegations by PhRMA, the following section reviews relevant Chinese 
enforcement remedies, i.e. administrative enforcement and criminal liabilities, their 
                                                 
552
 PhRMA Special 301 Submissions 2004’, available at 
http://members.phrma.org/international/resources/13.02.2004.586.cfm, accessed on November 10, 2009. 
553
 PhRMA Special 301 Submissions 2007, p54. available at http://members.phrma.org/international/, 
accessed on November 10, 2009. 
554
 PhRMA Special 301 Submissions 2009, p9 & p10.  
555
 PhRMA Special 301 Submissions 2007, p54; PhRMA Special 301 Submissions 2009, p 42. 
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relationship to TRIPS obligations, and their applicability with respect to the IPR claims 
made by PhRMA.  
6.2.2 Administrative enforcement and its deterrent effect   
A. The prevalence of the administrative model of enforcement in 
China 
Under Chinese patent law, there are two enforcement avenues provided for a patentee to 
enforce his patent rights .He may resort to judicial enforcement by filing a complaint to 
the People’s Court, which has jurisdiction over the case. Alternatively, he may seek 
administrative enforcement by filing a complaint to the governing administrative 
authority for patent affairs. 556  
 
In legal practice, administrative enforcement is the first and most common form of 
enforcement in China.557 Throughout most of the 1990s, infringement disputes were 
almost exclusively handled by the competent administrative authorities.558 Despite the 
recent greater use of judicial enforcement, the administrative model of enforcement is 
still commonly used by both foreign and domestic patentees when enforcing their rights 
in China. Table 6.1 shows that the numbers of cases dealt with through administrative 
enforcement were seven times greater than those through judicial enforcement in 2004. 
                                                 
556
 Article 57, the 2001 Chinese Patent Law (2001); Implementation Regulations of the PLC (2001)  
557
 'Protect  Your IPR in China: a practical guide for the US companies ', U.S. Department of Commerce 
International Trade Administration, available at 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/China/Docs/BusinessGuides/IntellectualPropertyRights.htm#CHINAS_IPR_EN
FORCEMENT_SYSTEM, last accessed on July 28, 2010; Thomas, K (2007), 'The Fight against Piracy: 
working with the administrative enforcement system in China', in P Torremans, J Erauw, and HL  Shan 
(eds.), Intellectual Property And Trips Compliance In China: Chinese and European perspectives 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited). p86.  
558
 Browning, T and Wang, C (2004), 'Ten years of enforcement in China ', Managing Intellectual 
Property, China IP Focus 2004, available at 
http://www.managingip.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=1321688, accessed on July 29, 2010. 
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The use of juridical enforcement significantly increased in 2008, but the scale was still 
much smaller in comparison to that of administrative enforcement, although there are no 
available statistics relating to copyright administrative enforcement. 
Table 6.1 Numbers of cases filed for administrative and judicial enforcement in 
2004 and 2008 
 
 
 Trademark 
Administrative 
enforcement  
Patent 
administrative 
enforcement  
Copyright 
Administrative  
enforcement  
Judicial 
enforcement  
2004 51851 1455 9691 8717 
2008 56634 1126 not available 24406 
 
Sources:   
1) The 2004 data were taken from Table 4 in Thomas, Kristie (2007), 'The Fight against Piracy: working 
with the administrative enforcement system in China', p88. 
2) The 2008 data were taken from ‘White Papers on China’s Intellectual Property Rights Protection’, 
SIPO 
 
B.  The level of administrative sanctions 
Given the prevalence of administrative enforcement in China, an adequate weight of 
administrative sanctions is essential for patent enforcement to be effective. Table 6.2 
summarises the administrative sanctions established under the four versions of the 
Chinese patent law. Several observations can be made from a review of these statutes.  
 
First, the early Chinese patent law only gave a vague outline of administrative sanctions 
on patent infringements. No detailed relevant procedural and remedial rules were 
provided under patent law and its Implementation Regulations in either the 1984 or 
1992 patent laws. Considering the general inexperience of Chinese IP institutions, it is 
not hard to envisage the difficulties encountered when trying to use administrative 
enforcement in China under the early Chinese patent enforcement system.  
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Secondly, the legal reforms in 2001 and 2008 have arguably brought Chinese 
enforcement measures into conformity with the TRIPS requirements. In the 2001 
Chinese patent law, the scope of infringing acts was more clarified; the amount of 
administrative penalties was specifically provided. However, the mild level of penalties 
may not bear a deterrent effect as required under Article 41 of TRIPS,559 considering the 
consistent and rampant infringements in China. As far as patent infringement is 
concerned, the administrative penalty provided under the 2001 and 2008 Chinese patent 
laws only orders the infringer to stop the infringing act.  
 
 In the case of patent counterfeiting,560 numerous penalties are provided under both the 
2001 and 2008 revisions of the Chinese patent law. With respect to administrative 
penalties, Article 58 of the 2001 Chinese patent law authorised the confiscation of 
illegal earnings and an option to pay a fine on the illegal earnings of no more than three 
times the amount of these earnings; a fine of no more than RMB 50.000 was specified 
in cases where no illegal monies were earned. The level of administrative sanctions 
under the 2001 Chinese patent law was widely viewed as providing insufficient 
deterrence, considering the huge investment made in developing the products and the 
great potential for obtaining profits from the patented technology. 561 However, Article 
63 of the 2008 Chinese patent law updated the amounts of the fine on illegal earnings 
from three times to four times the amount of the earnings. It also increased the amount 
of monetary penalties imposed in cases of non-existent illegal earnings of up to no more 
than RMB 200.000 Yuan. The deterrent effects of these new measures remain to be seen 
in the coming years.   
                                                 
559
 Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement specifies that enforcement remedies shall provide a deterrent to 
further infringements. 
560
. Chinese patent law distinguishes patent infringement from patent counterfeiting while the TRIPS 
Agreement does not use the terminology of counterfeiting. 
561
 Browning, T and Wang, C (2004), 'Ten years of enforcement in China '. 
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Thirdly, foreign users of Chinese enforcement systems, like PhRMA, have called for a 
greater use of criminal procedures and sanctions for patent infringements in China. Yet, 
China has insisted that addressing its enforcement problems through greater 
administrative or civil sanctions is consistent with its commitments made under its 
WTO Accession Protocol.562 Moreover, the TRIPS agreement only requires the 
application of criminal sanctions to trademark and copyright infringements.563 It can 
therefore argue that the PhRMA’s pressure for a greater use of criminal enforcement in 
the patent area is a TRIPS-plus demand.  
                                                 
562
 Annex 1A, § VI(b). The Report of the Working Party. 
563
 Article 61, the TRIPS Agreement. 
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Table 6.2: Administrative penalties under Chinese patent laws (CPL) in 1984, 1992, 2001 & 2008 
 
CPL Act of infringements  A Acts of passing off patented products or process 
as on one’s own 
Acts of passing off any non-patented 
products or process as patented 
products or process 
1984  -To order the infringer to 
stop 
 the infringing act  
-To compensate for the 
damage 
.(Art 60) 
  
1992  
 
 
-To order the infringer to 
stop the infringing act  
-To compensate for the 
damage  
  
2001 - Order the infringer to stop 
the infringing act 
immediately  
- Civil action is provided.  
(Art 57)  
 
-To order the rectification of  the infringing act  
and   the order is to be published  
-To confiscate the illegal earrings 
- To impose a fine of not more than 3 times his 
illegal earnings 
-To fine  not more than RMB 50.000  Yuan , in 
case of no illegal earnings  
- To initiate criminal liabilities in case a 
counterfeiting act constitutes a crime, (Art 58) 
- To order the rectification of  the 
infringing act  and the order is to be 
published 
-To fine  not more than RMB 50.000 
Yuan (Art. 59)  
2008  - Order the infringer to stop 
the infringing act 
immediately  
- Civil action is provided.  
( Art60 ) 
-To order the rectification of  the infringing act  
and the order is to be published 
-To confiscate the illegal earrings 
 
(To be continued on next page )  
(see the note below) 
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-To impose a fine of not more than 4 times his 
illegal earnings 
-To fine not more than RMB 200.000 Yuan, in 
case of no illegal earnings 
-To initiate criminal liabilities in case a 
counterfeiting act constitutes a crime, (Art 64) 
 
 
Note: In the 2001 Chinese patent law, patent counterfeiting is categorized as 1) acts of passing off patented products or processes as on one’s own, and 2) acts of passing off 
any non-patented products or processes as patented products or processes. However, the newly-updated 2008 patent law combines the above two types of act under a patent 
counterfeiting act. Chinese patent law distinguishes patent infringement from patent counterfeiting while the TRIPS Agreement does not use the terminology of 
counterfeiting.
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6.2.3 Criminal liability and its deterrent effect  
The PhRMA has objected to the threshold for Chinese criminal law to apply to patent 
violations. It has complained that China’s threshold of criminal penalties is set too high 
to constitute a deterrent for infringing activities.564 This section examines the legal 
sources of China’s criminal law relating to the infringement of IPRs law and issues 
relating to threshold for the applicability of Chinese criminal liability. 
A. Legal sources  
Initially, criminal procedures and penalties for infringement of IPR rules were 
introduced under Article 127 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China in 
1979. The provisions were later updated in more detail under the revised Criminal Law 
of the People’s Republic of China in 1997 (Criminal Law 1997).565 
 
To facilitate better applicability of these legal provisions, China’s Supreme People’s 
Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate jointly issued two legal interpretations in 
2004 and 2007. They included: the ‘Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and 
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of Several Issues Concerning the Specific 
Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving Violations of Intellectual 
Property Rights’ (2004 Interpretations on violating IPRs), and the ‘Interpretation by the 
Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of Several Issues 
Concerning the Specific Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of violating 
Intellectual Property Rights (II)’ (2007 Interpretation on violating IPRs). 566 The acts of 
                                                 
564
 PhRMA Special 301 Submission 2007. 
565
 Lei, JQ (2006), The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China, p214. 
566 Annex A-1, Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of the United States, WTO (2009), 
'China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Report of 
the Panel ', (WTO: Dispute Settlement Body). 
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violating IPRs are defined in Chapter III, Section 7, and are entitled ‘Crimes of 
Violating Intellectual Property Rights’. According to Chinese legal practice, the legal 
interpretations from the Supreme People's Court (SPC) and the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate (SPP) have direct effects on the implementation of the law.  
B. The threshold of Chinese criminal liabilities in relation to TRIPS  
Criminal remedies against IP crimes have been at the centre of the criticisms about the 
inadequacy of Chinese enforcement provisions. Paradoxically, comprehensive criminal 
measures have already been provided under Chinese law. This section provides an 
overview of criminal measures in terms of the scope, content and standards in relation 
to TRIPS.  
1. Scope: 
Article 61 of TRIPS details obligations to provide for criminal procedures and penalties 
in some areas of the infringement of IPRs. The scope under this provision only includes 
cases involving infringement acts in the specific areas of trademark and copyright, i.e. 
trademark counterfeit and copyright piracy. Patents and other IPRs are not covered. 
Members are free to decide whether or not the same rule can be applied to other areas of 
intellectual property law. 
 
Chinese Criminal Law 1997 specifies criminal offences against IPR and their 
punishment. 567 They include three types of trademark offences (passing off another’s 
registered trademark,  selling products bearing the counterfeit trademark, and illegally 
producing and/or illegally selling produced representations of a registered trademark) 
                                                 
567
 Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated in 1979 and revised in 1997, 
available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/newLaws/criminalLawENG.php.   
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(Articles 213–215), counterfeiting patents (Article 216), copyright infringement 
(Articles 217–218), and infringing on business secrets (Article 219). Thus, the scope of 
Chinese criminal procedure or penalties exceeds that required under TRIPS, i.e. for 
copyright and trademark, and it covers the areas of patents and business secrets as well. 
  
It is important to note that China adopted criminal liability rules applicable to patents in 
its revised patent law of 2000. Article 58 provides that where any person passes off the 
patent of another person as his own and his infringement constitutes a crime, he shall be 
prosecuted for his criminal liability. 
2. Content: 
 
Under TRIPS Article 61:  
(a) The second and third sentences of the provision specify that remedies must include 
imprisonment or monetary fines, while members may provide either measures or other 
criminal penalties to their own discretion.  
(b) The judicial authority in ‘appropriate cases’, as stipulated in Articles 46 and 59, 
should be empowered to order the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringing 
goods and of any materials.568 It should be noted that the measure ‘destruction of the 
infringing goods’ is a quite strong sanction. It may lead to significant economic waste 
and might be socially unacceptable, especially in developing countries.569  
 
Chinese criminal remedies are provided under both the Chinese Criminal Law and the 
Chinese patent law, including:  
                                                 
568
 Lei,JQ (2006), The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China, P213. 
569
 UNCTAD-ITCSD (2005), 'Resource book on TRIPS and Development', p620. 
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(a) There are three types of sanctions provided under Article 216 of the Chinese 
Criminal Law: a fine, alone or in combination with criminal detention, or imprisonment 
for up to three years; 
 
(b) Other forms of criminal procedures under TRIPS Article 61, such as the seizure, 
forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods and other related subjects, are 
provided under the Chinese Criminal Law and other IPRs laws. In addition, Article 134 
of the General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China also stipulates 
a variety of forms of civil remedies. Among others, it specifies that the people’s court 
has the power to confiscate or forfeit the property used in carrying out illegal activities 
and the illegal income obtained thereby.570 
 
(c) The 2008 amendment of Chinese patent law has added more forms of criminal 
procedure and penalties required by TRIPS Article 61. Specifically, Article 64 
introduces measures such as evidence preservation, seizure or forfeiture, which may be 
applied to the proved counterfeit patent products.571   
 
On the other hand, the remedy of the destruction of infringing goods is not provided in 
either the Chinese civil law or the Chinese patent law to date. Nor has such power been 
authorised under Chinese trademark law (2001).572 Such omissions may suggest that 
China considers this measure to be wasteful and unacceptable socially and politically.  
                                                 
570
 General Principle of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (1986), available at http://www.law-
bridge.net/english/LAW/20065/1322572053247.html. 
571The 2001 amendment of the Chinese patent law spelled out two types of patent infringing acts, namely 
1) ‘passes off the patent of another person’, and 2) ‘passes any non-patented product off as patented 
product or passes any non-patented process off as patented process’. However, under the 2008 
amendment, these two types of patent infringements were combined as one termed as ‘counterfeiting 
patent of another person’. 
572
 In term of administrative sanction, China’s copyright administrative authorities are empowered to 
order the destruction of the infringed copyright work by law. Article 39 of the Measures for 
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It is interesting to note that the recent US formal complaints against China under the 
WTO dispute settlement procedure were related to the measure of ‘destruction of 
infringing goods’, but only in terms of certain acts of trademark counterfeiting and 
copyright piracy. 573 The US alleged that the ‘compulsory sequence’ set under Chinese 
Customs provisions took away the authority of China’s Customs to order the destruction 
or disposal of seized goods.574 However, The WTO panel concluded that ‘the United 
States has not established that the Customs measures are inconsistent with Article 59 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, as it incorporates the principles set out in the first sentence in 
Article 46 of the TRIPS Agreement’.575 It also upheld some of the Chinese border 
measures, like the use of donations and sales,576 noting that WTO members are allowed 
the flexibility to introduce additional measures beyond TRIPS.577 However, the panel 
ruled that the measure of auction was insufficient for WTO requirements;578 
furthermore, the WTO panel recognised that China had extended protection to all forms 
of infringement, which is beyond the scope of the TRIPS agreement which only covers 
piracy and counterfeiting.579  
3. Standard:  
The TRIPS Agreement requires remedies to be sufficient as a ‘deterrent’ to 
infringement as well as consistent with ‘the level of penalties applied for crimes of a 
                                                                                                                                               
Implementation of Administrative Penalties Concerning copyright (2003), See note 41, Lei , JQ (2006), 
The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China , p202. 
573
 WTO (2009), 'China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights: Report of the Panel ', (Dispute Settlement Body). Note that this complaint only targeted on 
trademark and copyright areas. 
574
 Para 3.1 (b), WTO (2009), 'China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights: Report of the Panel ' 
575
 Para8.1(b) II, Ibid.  
576
 The existing Chinese customs provisions allow border measures such as, to donate confiscated goods 
to charities, to sell them back to rights holders, or to auction them once the trademark infringing features 
have been removed, as alternatives to the destruction of confiscated goods. See Yu, Peter (2009), 'The 
US-China WTO cases explained', Managing Intellectual Property.  
577
 Paragraphs 7, 323, 7.324 and 7.326, WTO (2009), 'China – Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Report of the Panel ', pp68-69. 
578
 Paragraphs 7.393, 7.394, Ibid, p81. 
579 Yu, Peter (2009), ' The US-China WTO Cases Explained'. 
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corresponding gravity’. It does not specify the level of threshold of criminal liabilities 
that members have to meet in their national law. In practice, the establishment of 
criminal sanctions among members varies in their strength and scope. 580 For example, 
the US federal law applies criminal penalties and stiff civil remedies to acts of 
intentional counterfeiting.581 Federal criminal penalties include:582  
 (a) fines for individuals up to $2,000,000 ($5,000,000 for subsequent offences), 
or imprisonment not exceeding ten years (twenty years for subsequent 
offences),or both; and fines for corporations or partnership up to $5,000,000 
($15,000,000 for subsequent Offences); and (b) destruction of articles bearing 
the counterfeit mark. 
 
 The thresholds for criminal prosecution in China are provided under Article 216 of 
Chinese Criminal Law (1997), and 2004 Interpretations on violating IPRs and 2007 
Interpretations on violating of IPRs from  the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate. Article 216 reads as:  
‘Whoever counterfeits the patent of another shall,583 if the circumstances are     
serious, be sentenced  to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years 
or criminal detention and shall also, or shall only, be fined’.   
 
Article 10 of the ‘2004 Interpretations on violating IPRs’ further specifies the acts of 
patent counterfeit that are subject to criminal penalties in China as the below: 584 
 Any of the following acts falls under the definition of "counterfeiting patent of 
another person"  stipulated in Article 216 of the Criminal Law: (1) Citing patent 
number on the commodities or the packing of the commodities one produces or 
sells without permission of the owner of the patent; (2) Citing patent number in 
advertisement or other publicity materials without permission of the owner of 
the patent so as to make people think that the involved technology is the 
patented technology of another person; (3) Citing patent number in contract 
without permission of the owner of the patent so as to make people think that the 
                                                 
580
 UNCTAD-ITCSD (2004), 'Resource book on TRIPS and Development'. P 620. 
581
 Ibid.  
582
 See note 151, in UNCTAD-ITCSD (2004), 'Resource book on TRIPS and Development', p620. 
583
 The term ‘patent counterfeiting’ herein refers to the offence of misrepresenting counterfeit good as 
patented products even though the TRIPS Agreement doesn’t use this terminology. 
584
 SPC &SPP (2004) ‘Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate on Several Issues of Concrete Application of Laws in Handling Criminal Cases of 
Infringing Intellectual Property’, available at http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/laws/laws/others/232859.shtml. 
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involved technology in the contract is the patented technology of another person; 
(4) Counterfeiting or altering the patent certificates, patent documents or patent 
application documents of another person. 
   
Article 4 of the ‘2004 Interpretations on Violating IPRs’ establishes specific 
quantitative or monetary thresholds for punishing acts of patent counterfeit with 
criminal prosecution stipulated by Article 216 of the Chinese criminal Code.585 The 
provision reads:  
Whoever counterfeits the patent of another person in any of the following 
circumstances and thus falls under the definition of "the circumstances are 
serious" stipulated in Article 216 of the Criminal Law shall be sentenced to fixed-
term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall 
also, or shall only, be fined for committing the crime of counterfeiting the patent 
of another person: (1) the amount of illegal business volume being more than 
RMB 200,000 or that of illegal gains being more than RMB 100,000; (2) causing 
direct economic loss of more than RMB 500,000 to the owner of patent; (3) 
counterfeiting more than two patents, the amount of illegal business volume being 
more than RMB 100,000 or that of illegal gains being more than RMB 50,000; (4) 
other circumstances of a serious nature. 
 
In addition, ‘2007 Interpretations on Infringement of IPRs’ further provides:586  
People’s Courts should decide monetary penalties on the basis of the illegal gains, 
the illegal business volume, the losses suffered by the right holder, and relevant 
harm to society etc. The amount of fine shall be established/ set between the range 
of one time and five times of the illegal gains, or between one half and one time of 
the illegal business volume.  
 
Table 6.3 summarises the Chinese criminal procedures in relation to the TRIPS 
standards. It focuses on the criminal liabilities applied to patent infringement.  
                                                 
585
 'The Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate of Several 
Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Infringement of 
Intellectual Property Rights (II)', in SPC & SPP (ed.), (2004:19), in Chinese  
 available at http://www.court.gov.cn/sfjs/show.php?file_id=98384&key=%B7%A8%CA%CD, last 
access on December 15, 2009. 
586
 Article 4,  'the Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate of 
Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Infringement 
of Intellectual Property Rights (II)', in SPC & SPP (ed.), (2007:6), 
in Chinese, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=117517, accessed on 
September 25, 2010. 
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Table 6.3 Criminal Procedures under the TRIPS and Chinese law 
 
(With a focus on criminal liabilities for infringing patent) 
 Scope 
 
Content Standard 
TRIPS  1.Trademark counterfeiting 
2.Copyright piracy  
  
1.Imprisonment and /or  
2.Penalties 
3.The seizure and forfeiture of 
infringing products 
4. Destruction of infringing 
products  
The remedies should 
1. be ‘sufficient to provide a deterrent’ 
2. be consistent ‘with the level of penalties 
applied for crimes of a corresponding 
gravity’ 
  
 
Chinese laws 1. Passing off another’s registered 
trademark 
2.Selling products bearing the 
counterfeit trademark 
3.Illegally producing/selling 
produced representations of a 
registered trademark 
4.Counterfeiting patent  
5.Copyright infringement  
6.Selling infringing reproductions 
7.Infringing on business secret  
1. Imprisonment  
2. Penalties   
3. The seizure and forfeiture of 
infringing products 
In case of counterfeiting patent, serious 
crimes shall be subject to ‘fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years 
or criminal detention and shall also, or shall 
only, be fined’. 
The seriousness of the crime is defined as in 
following circumstance:  
1. the amount of illegal business volume 
being more than RMB 200,000 or that of 
illegal gains being more than RMB 
100,000; 
2. causing direct economic loss of more 
than RMB 500,000 to the owner of patent;  
3. counterfeiting more than two patents, the 
amount of illegal business volume being 
more than RMB 100,000 or that of illegal 
gains being more than RMB 50,000;  
4. other circumstances of a serious nature 
The amount of  penalties shall be set as  
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1.more 100% time and less than 500 % of 
the illegal gains, or,  
2. more than 50% and less than 100% of the 
illegal business volume.   
 
Sources: the legal sources referred are listed below:  
(1) Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China.  
(2) SPC& SPP (2004): the Interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of Several Issues Concerning the Specific 
Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights  
(3) SPC&SPP (2007):  the Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate of Several Issues Concerning the Specific 
Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights (II) 
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The above analysis of China’s enforcement remedies in light of the PhRMA criticism 
has found some of PhRMA allegations to be warranted but not others. It has confirmed 
the allegation that China’s administrative remedies appear to have insufficient deterrent 
effect for repeat offences. On the other hand, PhRMA’s demand for a greater use of 
criminal liability in the patent area is viewed here as a TRIPS-plus standard. The 
discrepancy between the level of Chinese enforcement measures and PhRMA’s 
expectations is foreseeable given their different interests in the interpretation of TRIPS 
rules. Nonetheless, the Chinese IPRs enforcement measures are deemed to be effective 
and adequate as long the provisions meet the minimum standards of the TRIPS 
Agreement, regardless whether foreign rights holders such as PhRMA argue that TRIPS 
minimum standards just provide a ‘floor’ rather than ‘ceiling’ for this implementation. 
Even so, the high level of counterfeit and piracy problems justifies the demand for the 
adoption of higher levels of enforcement than TRIPS minimum standards in China, but 
there may be other ways to accomplish this than by burdening the criminal legal system 
with endless criminal claims against individuals for violations of intangible property 
rights. 
6.3 ‘Over-enforcement’ of pharmaceutical patents in China: a pro-
competition perspective  
 
The interests of powerful Western pharmaceutical companies have ensured an intense 
scrutiny of the weaknesses in China’s developing IPRs enforcement system. Meanwhile, 
other weaknesses that benefit those same interests have been largely ignored, such as 
the system’s weakness in preventing abuses of the system. One of these abusive 
practices is an increasing misuse of the provisional enforcement procedure by originator 
 223 
companies that aim to delay or impede generic competition in China. The typical result 
of such strategic litigation is that the originator company loses the case but wins ‘the 
war’ for strategic gains at the expense of the public and generic competitors. This thesis 
defines such a scenario as ‘over-enforcement’. The following section illustrates this 
problem through an analysis of the preliminary injunction process in the Chinese 
enforcement system and a case study. 
6.3.1 Pre-litigation injunction in China   
Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement requires state members to adopt procedures for the 
granting of a preliminary injunction as one of the mandatory enforcement measures. 
This measure enables the rights holders to seek judicial relief to stop any act infringing 
upon their IP rights at the earliest stage. This provision was first codified into the 
revised Chinese patent law under Article 61 in its 2000 amendment. The Chinese law 
uses the term, ‘pre-litigation injunction’. Article 61 reads as follows:  
Where any patentee or interested party has evidence to prove that another person 
is infringing or will soon infringe its or his patent right and that if such 
infringing act is not checked or prevented from occurring in time, it is likely to 
cause irreparable harm to it or him, it or he may, before any legal proceedings 
are instituted, request the people's court to adopt measures for ordering the 
suspension of relevant acts and the preservation of property.   
 
This provision has a lacuna when compared with Article 52.2 of the TRIPS Agreement; 
the measure of evidence preservation is omitted. To close this loophole, the Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC) issued the SPC Stipulations on Preliminary Injunctions against 
the Acts of Infringement of Patent in June 2001. Article 16 provides that the People’s 
Court may simultaneously preserve the evidence or preserve the property in accordance 
with the provisions of Articles 74, 92 and 93 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law upon 
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application to the interested parties.587 Consequently, provisional measures required by 
the TRIPS Agreement have been implemented into Chinese law.  
 
The 2008 amendment has updated the existing provision under Article 66, which further 
clarifies the application procedures, such as the requirement for a security deposit from 
the petitioner, the 48-hour time limit for the court to make a ruling if it finds that all 
procedural requirements have been properly met, and the responsibility of the petitioner 
for any loss suffered by the respondent in the case of their mistake in requesting a 
motion for injunction.588  
 
Both the 2000 and 2008 amendments strengthen the protection of rights without 
balancing it with safeguarding mechanisms against the misuse of this system. The 
imbalanced legal provisions, coupled with the inexperience of the Chinese courts in 
executing this novel measure, have often resulted in uneven playing fields between 
originator companies and generic manufacturers under the system. The following 
analysis will illustrate the legal loopholes of Chinese pre-litigation injunction through a 
case study.  
6.3.2   A case study: Eli Lilly vs. Hansoh & SIPI 
A. Case brief  
In Eli Lilly vs. Hansoh & SIPI,589 the plaintiff, Eli Lilly, is a multinational 
pharmaceutical company which has been operating in the PRC since 1993.590 The 
                                                 
587
 SPC Stipulations on Preliminary Injunctions against the Acts of Infringement of Patent (2001) 
http://www.court.gov.cn/sfjs/show.php?file_id=37510&key=%B7%A8%CA%CD, in Chinese.  
588
 Article 66, Chinese Patent Law (2008). 
589
 Source: Judgment of  the case Eli Lilly and Company vs Hansoh Pharmaceutical Group & Shanghai 
Institute of Pharmaceutical Industry, Chinacourt.org  (Shanghai Supreme People’s Court ), available at 
http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=5657, in Chinese. 
 225 
defendants were Hansoh Pharmaceutical Group (Hansoh) and Shanghai Institute of 
Pharmaceutical Industry (SIPI), two domestic suppliers of generic products.591  The case 
continued through two trials, and lasted over four years, beginning on 15 May 2002, 
when Eli Lilly requested a pre-litigation injunction order against Hansoh & SIPI, to 13 
October 2006 when the final judgment was announced.    
Facts 
•  Eli Lilly and Company (Eli Lilly) obtained two patents, coded as 
ZL91103346.7 and ZL96192775.5 respectively, in China (hereafter referred to 
as 91 patent and 96 patent).592  
• Hansoh Pharmaceutical Group and the Shanghai Institute of Pharmaceutical 
Industry (Hansoh & SIPI) were granted a New Drug Certificate and Production 
Authorisation for their Olanzapine raw material and tablets on 17 December 
2001. 
Procedure  
• Eli Lilly believed that the preparation method of Olazapine and its use in clinical 
trials by Hansoh & SIPI had constituted an infringement against its 91 and 96 
patents. Thus Eli Lily brought Hansoh & SIPI to the Shanghai Second 
Intermediate Court and requested the court to issue a pre-litigation injunction 
against Hansoh & SIPI on 15 May 2002. Eli Lilly filed a patent infringement 
lawsuit against Hansoh & SIPI with Shanghai Second Intermediate Court (the 
first instance court) in 26 June 2002. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
590
 See ‘Company history in China’, at http://www.lillychina.com/china/1999year.html.  
591
 See Hansoh’s product profile at http://www.hansoh.cn/.  
592
  The patent names were omitted here due to translation problems. 
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• On 24 November 2004, Hansoh & SIPI requested the Patent Re-examination 
Board (PRB) to invalidate Eli Lilly’s 96 patent on the ground that its claims 1 to 
8 and 10 lacked novelty and inventiveness.  
 
• On 28 April 2005, Eli Lilly requested PRB to re-examine its 96 patent on the 
revised specifications which cancelled the original claims 1 to 8 and 10. PRB 
issued its decision to maintain Eli Lilly’s 96 patent based on its updated claim on 
20 May 2005.  
 
• On 25 November 2005, Shanghai Second Intermediate Court ruled in favour of 
Hansoh & SIPI, adjudicating that the technical features of the preparation 
methods for both Olanzapine raw materials and tablets are not covered by the 
scope of Eli Lilly’s patents claims. The decision cancelled the order of injunction 
against Hansoh & SIPI. 
 
• Eli Lilly disagreed with the ruling and appealed to Shanghai Supreme People’s 
Court (the appellate court).  (It is noted that Eli Lilly withdrew the allegation in 
which it claimed the defendants infringed its 96 patent. This request was 
accepted by the court during the trial on 28 April 2005).  
 
• The appellate court made the final judgment rejecting the appeal from Eli Lilly 
and maintaining the original ruling on 31October 2006.    
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Issues593  
 
Did the court of first instance observe the procedure required for the issuance of a pre-
litigation injunction strictly?  
Has the court balanced the right holders’ interests with those of the accused parties and 
the patients in its consideration? 
Why did it take so long to cancel the injunction order? 
Holding  
Initially, Shanghai Second Intermediate Court approved the request for a preliminary 
injunction from Eli Lilly and granted a motion of suspension of production and 
marketing of Olanzapine raw material and tablets against Hansoh & SIPI. 
 
Shanghai Second Intermediate Court adjudicated, on 25 November 2005 that the 
technical features of the preparation methods for both Olanzapine raw materials and 
tablets were not covered by the scope of Eli Lilly’s patents claims. 
 
Reasoning  
Concerning pre-litigation injunction, Shanghai Second Intermediate Court approved the 
request for a preliminary injunction from Eli Lilly on the ground that its application was 
in accordance with the law. Eli Lilly’s request for a motion was based on the claims that 
the defendants had completed the preparation needed to infringe Eli Lilly’s patents. 
They had applied for and obtained the production and market authorisation for the 
alleged infringing drugs from SFDA on 15 May 2002. Eli Lilly provided US$20,000 as 
guarantee for their request.  
                                                 
593
  This part of writing was drafted from the perspective of this research, rather than following the 
conventional writing formality of a case brief.  
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Regarding the verdict of the court of first instance, the technical examination was 
conducted by the IPR Division of the Science and Technology Department from 29 
August 2003 to 21 October 2004. These results demonstrated that the technical features 
of the preparation method for both Olanzapine raw material and tablets are not covered 
by the scope of Eli Lilly’s patents claims. 
 
The final decision by the appellate court was that the Shanghai Supreme People’s Court 
adjudicated that the ruling from the first instance was in accordance with facts and legal 
procedure and thus upheld its decision, while rejecting the appeal from the appellant for 
lacking factual support.  
 
B. Implications  
1. Undue injury to the defendants and other social costs  
 
As the below sales statistics show, Eli Lilly has greatly profited from its 1996 patent in 
the Chinese market before Eli Lilly itself cancelled the majority of the original claims of 
the patent (9 out of 10) upon the invalidation challenge in 2005. .On the side of Hansoh 
& SIPI, both the courts of first instance court and appeal ruled that the company’s new 
products did not infringe the remaining one claim of Eli Lilly’s 1996 patent, the 
company eventually won the case but paid enormous costs. Their losses may include at 
least the following aspects:.  
• The preliminary injunction delayed the market entry of its product by at least three 
years. In contrast, it is reported that Eli Lilly’s related branded product (Zyprexa) 
enjoyed good sales in China during the period of litigation. Eli Lilly obtained sales 
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income of RMB Yuan (CY) 8,850,000, CY $ 80,430,000 and CY 150,220,000 in 
2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively, and global sales amounted to over US $40 billion 
in both 2004 and 2005.594  
• The first-mover business advantages previously possessed by Hansoh & SIPI might 
have already been lost when it returned to the market after the cancellation of the 
preliminary injunction. They might have bleak prospects of recouping their 
investment in given products.   
• The total loss for Hansoh & SIPI is far beyond the compensation that could be 
provided by the guarantee of $ 20,000 Eli Lilly deposited when it requested the 
injunction order, compared with the profited obtained by Eli Lilly during the period 
of litigation.  
 
What lies behind the economic loss of Hansoh & SIPI is the otherwise unnecessary cost 
that patients or governments have paid for Olanzapine (Zyprexa), Eli Lilly’s patented 
medicine priced at an advantage of exclusivity.  In this case, Eli Lilly effectively 
delayed the market entry of its generic competitors by resorting to two means: its weak 
patents, consisting mostly of invalid claims, and patent litigation including the 
injunction order.  
 
It is important to note this case is just one of increasingly instances of litigation that Eli 
Lilly has recently launched against local generic competitors in China. Eli Lilly filed a 
series of injunction motions and legal proceedings against other local generic 
                                                 
594
 Xu, W (5 August 2008), 'Win the Case but not the Market’, http://www.qxyc.net/html/23428.html,,  in 
Chinese, accessed on November 20, 2009. 
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competitors, such as, Gan &Lee Pharmaceutical Ltd,595 and Changzhou &Watson 
Pharmaceuticals Incorporated. 596 Eli Lilly lost its litigations against Gan &Lee 
Pharmaceutical Ltd at the first instance court the Beijing Second Intermediate People's 
Court and the second instance court the Beijing High court. The legal status of Eli 
Lilly’s lawsuit against the Changzhou &Watson Pharmaceuticals is unclear so far due to 
the unavailability of the official documents. Eli Lilly is now known and cited for advice 
on how local firms can avoid becoming embroiled as victims of the abusive use of pre-
litigation injunctions in China.  
2.  Loopholes of the Chinese injunction measures  
To understand the legal origin of the over-enforcement problem in the above case, the 
following section reviews the terms of the Chinese injunction provision and their 
possible application to the case.   
   
Relevant provisions under the TRIPS 
 
Injunctive relief is one of the mandatory enforcement measures against any act of IPR 
infringements required under the TRIPS Agreement. Article 41.1 states the basic 
obligations and the conditions for establishing this measure. Article 50 provides 
procedural rules to guide legal actions against infringements that take place or are 
imminent (Article 50.3). A combined reading of these two provisions indicates that 
member states should adopt provisional measures under the following principles: 
(1) Injunctive relief is one of the provisional measures established in national 
laws against any act of infringement on IPRs (Article 41.1). The judiciary 
                                                 
595
 See the ruling decisions at 
http://case.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/case/info/Article.jsp?a_no=236734&col_no=1390&dir=200809, accessed on 
September 25, 2010. 
596
 The Supreme People’s Court’s Notification on the Jurisdiction appointed to the Patent Dispute 
between Eli Lilly and Company and Changzhou &Watson Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated.   
http://www.lawyee.net/Act/Act_Print.asp?RID=316644,There is a lack of access to the official documents 
about the progress of the case so far.  
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authorities should be empowered to use preliminary injunctions to prevent 
the occurrence of infringements against any IPR (Articles 50.1, 2 and 3).  
(2) The application of injunctive measures also requires: ‘These procedures shall 
be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate 
trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse’ (Article 41.1). 
 
 Injunctive relief under Chinese laws and judicial practice   
 
Article 61 of the Chinese patent law governs preliminary injunctive relief in the Chinese 
system, but the provision is drafted in general and imprecise terms.597 The detailed 
procedure for execution of such measure is specified through a Judicial Interpretation, 
‘Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning Pre-litigation 
Injunction against Patent Infringement’  (2001: No. 20), issued by the Supreme People’s 
Court (SPC) on 7 June  2001. 598   
 
Under the Chinese Regulations, it is rather easy for patent owners to obtain injunctive 
relief, and no requests for injunction orders by patent owners have been denied, at least 
in the early stage of the implementation of this system.599 To obtain a pre-litigation 
injunction, the plaintiff is only required to satisfy certain formal procedures by 
presenting: 
                                                 
597
 Chinese laws are usually drafted in general and imprecise terms, and their implementation requires the 
further interpretations from various authorities. Three types of authoritative interpretations are provided 
under the Chinese legal system: legislative, administrative and judicial. Judicial Interpretations are 
provided by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, See Chen, JF (1999), 
Chinese Law: Towards an understanding of Chinese law, its nature and development (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International ), p106. 
598
 'Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning Pre-litigation Injunction 
against Patent Infringement', (2001) (China: SPC), available at 
http://www.court.gov.cn/sfjs/show.php?file_id=37510&key=%B7%A8%CA%CD, in Chinese, accessed 
on November 23, 2009.  
599
 Zhang, GL(2001), 'Remedies for Patent Infringement: Comparative Studies of US and Chinese law', 
John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law, 1 (35), p58.  
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 (1) Documentation of ownership and validity of the patent or patent licence agreements 
(Rule 4.1&2); 
 (2) Documents of evidence that demonstrate that that patent is being infringed or that 
infringement is imminent (Rule 4.3); and  
(3)  Payment of a sum of valid security (Rule 6).  
 
Rule 9 requires the court to issue a written decision ordering the cessation of the alleged 
infringing act within 48 hours, if the application for such decision meets the 
requirements under Rule 4.1–4.3. The decision must be effected immediately. In 
addition, Rule 6 requires the applicants to deposit a reasonable and valid security. In 
general, the requirements for using this system may be no more than a mere formality. 
 
The terms for obtaining a Chinese pre-litigation injunction make it rather easy for right 
holders to gain rapid injunctive relief. In comparison, the rules for obtaining a 
preliminary injunction in the US are deemed to be far more demanding and complex.600 
The key requirements are: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success in the lawsuit; (2) 
proof of irreparable harm if no injunction were issued; (3) the balance of interests of 
both parties; (4) a tolerable effect on the public interests.601 It is apparent that the US 
preliminary injunction system has adopted a more difficult and balanced approach for 
patentee claims than the Chinese system does. 
 
Returning to the case of Eli Lilly vs. Hansoh & SIPI, the plaintiff requested an order for 
a pre-litigation injunction in the Shanghai Second Intermediate Court on the following 
evidence:  
                                                 
600
 Zhang, GL (2001 & WJ (2012), ' Si, WJ (2012), 'The Pre-litigation Injunction to Cease Patent 
Infringement Law in China ', (DeBund Law Offices ) ' 
601
 7 Donald..S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 20.04, at 659 (2000) cited in Zhang, GL (2001);. 
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(1) Documentation alleging that the preparation method of one of the defendants’ 
new products might have violated its Chinese patents.     
(2) A claim of imminent and irreparable injury on the ground that the defendants 
had obtained the licences for manufacturing and marketing the alleged 
products     
(3) The plaintiff had paid security of US$20,000 as a guarantee.  
 
The report of the Eliy Lilly decision does not describe the legal procedure used nor 
contain the reasoning behind the court’s decision to approve Eli Lilly’s application for 
the injunction. However, the case history reveals that the majority of the patent claims 
Ely Lilly included in its application were later found to be invalid. Moreover, the 
amount of its security was manifestly insufficient in relation to the direct damages 
suffered by the defendant as a result of this action. As a policy matter, it is cause for 
concern when a decision by one of China’s most highly regarded, competent and 
experienced courts can cause so much damage to a party because it is inhibited from 
exercising sound judgment by procedural rules effectively prohibiting discretion and 
demanding a rapid decision. 
 
This case highlights several legal and policy deficiencies of Chinese injunction system. 
Firstly, the requirements for granting an injunction order are too vague and loosely 
defined and too readily met by applicants. The applicant is only required to state reasons 
rather than to prove the alleged irreparable harm. Secondly, the procedures for 
application or grant injunction are biased in favour of the convenience of rights holders 
and provide no proper consideration of the interests of the accused party. For example, 
there is no compulsory hearing before the decision is made, and the respondents are not 
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equal in the procedures and have no opportunity to submit evidence and refute the 
applicant’s claims.602 Lastly, there is a lack of measures to safeguard against patent 
abuses, such as limits on the length of an injunction, a required deadline for initiating 
the case in the court, and checks on filings of consecutive litigation against the same act. 
If the law and the court had adopted a more balanced approach, the injunctive order in 
this case may not have been issued or may have been granted on stricter terms that 
could have reduced defendants’ damages. 
 
Demand for technological development in the Chinese market has intensified frictions 
between right holders and their aspiring competitors It is likely that this will increase 
rights holders interest in using injunctions. In fact, Chinese courts now routinely grant 
pre-litigation injunctions. This enforcement measure is a drastic and extraordinary 
remedy. It restricts courts in their exercise of discretion in granting the injunction order 
in situations where judicial prudence is needed. The Eli Lilly case illustrates the serious 
need for additional safeguards in the Chinese system and for improvements to the 
courts’ capabilities and discretion in making their decisions on issuing injunctions in a 
more balanced manner.  
6.4 Concluding remarks  
 
This chapter has found that the adequacy of Chinese enforcement measures differs from 
the conventional perception. In addition to its administrative remedies, Chinese law 
includes criminal liabilities for IP infringements covering not only trademark and 
copyright but also patents and trade secrets. This is a higher enforcement standard than 
required by the TRIPS Agreement. Chinese legal reforms to strengthen enforcement 
                                                 
602
 Si, WJ (2012), 'The Pre-litigation Injunction to Cease Patent Infringement Law in China ', (DeBund 
Law Offices). 
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have focused on toughening administrative sanctions. This approach is in line with the 
TRIPS rules and Chinese WTO accession commitment, and is therefore TRIPS-
compliant.  
 
On the other hand, the legal evaluation also found the system to be at risk of over-
enforcement, particularly in the abusive use of the enforcement procedure known as the 
pre-litigation injunction measure. The legal ‘loopholes’ and the inexperience of the 
courts create room for manipulating the system. As the case of Eli Lilly demonstrates, 
this measure is now routinely used by and granted to originator companies to impede 
generic competition in China. This trend raises a great concern about China’s 
capabilities in designing and implementing a pro-competition and pro-health patent 
system.  
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Chapter 7: Economic effects of TRIPS implementation on 
Chinese pharmaceutical innovation 
 
This chapter moves from the foregoing legal evaluations to the second research question 
of this thesis: what effect has China’s patent policy and law had on the development of 
domestic pharmaceutical innovation within China? To this end, it first assesses 
innovation performance of the domestic pharmaceutical industry during the past two 
decades. Then, it analyses the roles of patents and other government policies and 
economic factors on improving or impairing innovation in the Chinese pharmaceutical 
industry. 
 
The chapter is organised into five sections. Section 7.1 analyses the strengths and 
limitations of R&D indicators used in innovation measurement. Section 7.2 assesses the 
newly emerged innovation capability in terms of its scale, level and research 
orientations in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. Section 7.3 investigates the 
evolving patterns of FDI from the pharmaceutical MNCs following two major Chinese 
patent reforms. Section 7.4 discusses the roles of patents and other complementary 
factors in fostering local innovation. The last section of the chapter consists of some 
concluding remarks. 
 
7.1 Measurement of innovation 
 
Traditionally, innovation has been measured using two indicators: R&D expenditures 
and patent count. The R&D expenditure, together with numbers of R&D personnel, is 
used as a proxy for R&D input while patent count represents the direct output of 
 237 
R&D .603 The major advantages of using R&D expenditures and patents as indicators 
are that they are readily available, easily understandable, and have been, in general, 
consistently collected over time.604 Also, these measurements provide a statistical 
answer to important questions relevant to policy choices, such as the allocation of 
resources in R&D, the priority or the balance between R&D choices, and the efficiency 
of research.605 Thus, these indicators can be very useful for governments to assess the 
anticipated economic effects of their innovation policy and to help them define their 
policies for the future.  
 
Yet, these traditional innovation indicators have the disadvantage of constraining 
policymakers’ decision-making by reinforcing a linear model of innovation.606 Under a 
linear model, innovation is understood as a straight line production process which ‘starts 
with basic research, followed by applied research and development, and ends with 
production and diffusion’.607 A new understanding of innovation has developed that 
recognises that innovation is not such a simple and straightforward process in which 
‘funding and research are invested here and innovation pops out there’ 608 This current 
insight acknowledges that innovation involves complex and interactive processes 
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involving multiple actors of involved in a productive system.609 The productive system 
is commonly referred as the ‘National Innovation System’ (NIS), and it incorporates the 
entire body of policies, laws, infrastructure, and activities concerned with the creation, 
dissemination and utilisation of science and technology.610 In addition, recent empirical 
studies have revealed other shortcomings of R&D indicators. For example, R&D 
expenditure data do not provide insights concerning the ability to convert R&D efforts 
into successful innovative products. 611 Moreover, patent data are inadequate for 
capturing innovation relevant to the modern economy for inventions that are not 
patented or protected under intellectual property rights law.612 This has prompted 
policymakers to search for and develop new ways to measure innovation around the 
world.613  
 
With the above caveats, R&D expenditures and patent counts should be used with 
caution in studies of innovation and developing innovation capacities. Nevertheless, the 
nature and pattern of innovation are often industry-specific; different industries innovate 
differently. Although patents and R&D spending may fail to measure innovation in 
many sectors, they are still widely deemed to be valuable innovation indicators for the 
pharmaceutical industry.614  For pharmaceuticals, novel product design is the key to 
competitiveness so companies are highly motivated to engage in R&D in the industry. 
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615
 On the other hand, there are potentially great risks and high costs involved in 
develop and testing new pharmaceutical chemical entities to satisfy national regulatory 
standards on safety and efficiency before they can reach the markets. To recoup R&D 
costs and generate a substantial profit, the industry therefore relies on patent law much 
more than most other industries.616 Furthermore, the industry ia also inclined to take 
advantage of patent laws as tools to improve their competitive advantages against 
imitations and alternative products.617 Thus, the pharmaceutical industry invests more 
money in R&D and is more interested in filing patents for their products than many other 
industries. Patent and R&D expenditure as indicators may capture the innovation of the 
pharmaceutical industry better than other sectors.618 These reasons may explain why these 
two indicators are the main ones applied in the existing innovation studies on the 
industry.619 
 
The research examined in this chapter focuses on the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. 
Contemporary China is one of the largest and fastest growing markets for pharmaceutical 
products in the world, and thus, it has become one of the principal FDI destinations for 
pharmaceutical MNCs.620 As a result, competition for market share is intense for both 
foreign and domestic producers. The enhancement of patent protection and enforcement 
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rules in China has encouraged foreign companies to seek and enforce more and more 
patents there. The increased legal and technical challenges make it far more difficult for 
domestic players to compete, given their imitative nature in production and far weaker 
financial strength. To reduce these risks and sustain their vitality, many domestic companies 
have started to increase their R&D efforts to develop their own novel products.621 Despite 
such effort, thus far they have mainly only managed to develop minor innovations, or ‘me-
two’ or ‘me-better’ drugs. Nevertheless, their ability and inclination to use patents as 
competitive tools have become extraordinarily well developed. This provides another 
reason that the indicators of patent numbers and R&D expenditures remain very relevant 
measures to assist our understanding of innovation changes in the Chinese pharmaceutical 
industry.  
7.2 The emergence of new innovative capability: scale and nature 
The Chinese pharmaceutical industry has achieved remarkable growth in many aspects 
of its operations since 1990. Production and revenue have grown at an average rate of 
25 %  per year from 1995 to 2003.622 The industry has become one of the world’s 
largest producers of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs),623 with its largest 
exporting markets in the EU, the US, India and Japan.624 Moreover, its manufacturing 
sophistication has advanced so significantly that local firms have been manufacturing 
and exporting finished drugs to the US market since 2007.625  
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The harbingers of advanced local innovation have also emerged, particularly in the area 
of developing gene therapies in recent years. Chinese expertise in genomics, proteomics, 
stem cells, and other biomedical technologies has become particularly prominent at the 
international level.626 For example, there are more than 30 clinical trials for gene 
therapies currently ongoing in China.627 Also, in 2003, a Chinese company, SiBiono, 
successfully developed and commercialised the first gene therapy in the world for 
treating head and neck cancer. Furthermore, more gene therapy drugs, such as Oncine, 
Endostar and vaccines have also been developed and approved for marketing in 
China.628  
 
Nevertheless, a few successes in developing gene therapies do not represent the general 
innovation performance of the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. There is insufficient 
knowledge available relating to the general state and nature of innovation change for the 
whole industry for the past two decades of apparently increasing innovation. The 
following investigations are therefore devoted to gathering relevant data as empirical 
evidence to fill this knowledge gap.  
Survey 1: R&D inputs 
 
Chinese pharmaceutical companies traditionally have engaged in the production of 
generic drugs and devoted few resources to R&D activities. Nevertheless, in recent 
years, this has started to change as a number of factors have aroused their interest in 
engaging in innovation. Such influences include increased market competition, patent 
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incentives, government initiatives, increased profits and a greater availability of talented 
researchers at their disposal. Table 7.1 below documents the R&D expenditures 
invested and research personnel employed by large and medium-sized domestic 
pharmaceutical companies and research institutions in China between 2001 and 2007.629 
Both sets of data were obtained from the China Statistic Year Books for the years 2000 
to 2008. The relevant data were not available in the China Statistic Year Books prior to 
2000.  
 
The total amount of R&D expenditure invested by Chinese companies from 2001 to 
2007 was 57466330,000 RMB, which is equivalent to 7.1 billion US dollars,630 and the 
total number of research personal employed was 216,888. A general trend of rapid 
growth in financial inflow and in employment of technical engineers can be observed in 
terms of the aggregate numbers, despite the fact that the growth of R&D personnel in 
the years 2003 and 2004 was less. Most years saw a growth rate in double digits. The 
average growth in numbers of research personnel was at 14%, whereas the average 
increase in research funding was 42%. These growth rates clearly demonstrate the 
expansion of R&D investment in the local pharmaceutical industry during the period 
studied.  
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630
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Table 7.1: Domestic pharmaceutical R&D input from large and medium 
enterprises (2001-2007) 
 
Years 
 R&D personnel 
(Unit: per person)  
Annual growth 
rate of R&D 
personnel  
R&D expenditure 
(Unit: 10,000 yuan ) 
Annual growth 
rate of R&D 
expenditure  
2001 23542  243905   
2002 26139 11% 277383 14% 
2003 25646 -2% 359326 30% 
2004 22713 -11% 782073 118% 
2005 30716 35% 1054835 35% 
2006 39206 28% 1314779 25% 
2007 48926 25% 1714332 30% 
Average  216888 14% 5746633 42% 
 
Sources:  
1 Data were collected from the subsections ‘Basic Statistics on Scientific and Technological Activities 
Funds of Large and Medium-sized Industrial Enterprises in High-tech Industry’ and ‘Basic Statistics on 
Scientific and Technological Activities Outputs of Large and Medium-sized Industrial Enterprises in 
High-tech Industry’,   National  Statistic Year books from 2002 to 2008 , available at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
 
Survey 2: R&D outputs 
 
In this second survey, the numbers of patent applications are used as proxies 
representing the R&D output of local pharmaceutical innovators in China. Patent filing 
data provides not only good indications of the scale of innovative activities and the 
types of innovation,631 but also conveys information about who is patenting what types 
of innovations in a country. Such information can be very useful to determine the scale 
and level of Chinese pharmaceutical innovation as well as its competitiveness in 
comparison with foreign innovative activities in China.  
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  Li, X (2008), 'Patent Accounts as Indicators of the Geography of Innovation Activities: problems and 
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The objective of Survey 2 is to assess the scale of local innovative activities; however, 
the pattern of foreign patenting is also examined in order to compare foreign responses 
to Chinese patent law reforms with those of domestic players. The patent filing data 
were obtained from the Annual Statistic Year Books of the Chinese State Intellectual 
Property Office (SIPO) for the twenty-year period from 1987 to 2006. Although it 
would have been ideal to include in this evaluation the data for 1984, the year in which 
the first patent law was introduced into the country, the systems used to classify the 
statistics in the year books for 1985 and1986 were not compatible with the later system 
employed in the official gazettes and thus could not be used as comparables.  
 
Table 7.2 below presents the data available on the numbers of domestic and foreign 
A61632 pharmaceutical patent filings in China and their percentage growth rates from 
1987 to 2006. The data has shown that during the period 1984 to 1992, although not 
surprising, there was an impressively large number of initial pharmaceutical patents 
filed by domestic applicants in response to the newly established Chinese patent system, 
but there were very few foreign applications. After 1992, the strong growth trend in the 
filing of domestic patents continued, and the absolute number of domestic patents filed 
increased very rapidly. The total number of domestic applicants was 46,780 from 1993 
to 2000, nearly 3.7 times more than the total number of 12,692 in the earlier period of 
1987 to 1992. By 2006, the total number of filed patents from domestic applicants was 
155,566.  
 
In contrast, during the period from 1987 to 1992, the foreign patent filings generally 
decreased, except for a small growth in 1992. After 1993, however, the general rate of 
                                                 
632
 A61 is a standard code for patents in the pharmaceutical technology field under the International 
Patent Classification Code (IPC), established by the WIPO.  
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growth in foreign filings rocketed, although the annual growth rate was highly uneven 
between 1993 and 2000, with four years of highly positive growth and four of negative 
growth. The growth rates of the four years of positive growth were 99%, 28%, 659%, 
and 709% respectively. With regard to filings, the total number of foreign patent 
applications filed in the four years of negative growth was 2.4 times greater than the 
total filings during the entire six-year period from 1987 to 1992, (2981 versus 1239, 
respectively). The total number of foreign patent applicants was 8860 from 1993 to 
2000, 7.2 times more than the total amount of 1239 in the period from 1987 to 1992. 
After 2000, foreign patent filings exhibited a steady and significant pattern of growth, 
and by 2006, the total number of foreign patents filed reached a total of 32,135. 
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Table 7.2: A61 patent filings with the Chinese patent office from 1987 to2006 
 
Years 
Domestic 
filings 
Domestic growth 
rates 
Foreign 
filings 
Foreign growth 
rates 
1987 937  152  
1988 1519 62% 280 84% 
1989 1640 8% 221 -21% 
1990 2060 26% 208 -6% 
1991 2648 29% 185 -11% 
1992 3888 47% 193 4% 
1993 5404 39% 385 99% 
1994 5735 6% 492 28% 
1995 5720 0% 457 -7% 
1996 5892 3% 311 -32% 
1997 5228 -11% 2361 659% 
1998 5379 3% 341 -86% 
1999 5998 12% 2759 709% 
2000 7424 24% 1872 -32% 
2001 10229 38% 2280 22% 
2002 10383 2% 2813 23% 
2003 14138 36% 2445 -13% 
2004 13939 -1% 3509 44% 
2005 19910 43% 4965 41% 
2006 27495 38% 5906 19% 
 155566(Total) 21% (Average) 32135 (Total) 80% (Average) 
 
Taken together, the survey data shows a rapid growth trend in domestic patent filing, 
even before 1992 when Chinese patent law provided little protection to 
pharmaceuticals.633 In contrast, the filing of foreign patents presented a varying growth 
pattern with a negative increase in the early years, a rocketing period of growth between 
1992 and 2000, followed by a steady growth rate afterwards.  
 
The Chinese growth pattern confirms the relevance and importance of a patent system 
to innovation in China There was no meaningful legal protection provided for 
inventions or creations before 1984 in China. Regulations governing intellectual 
activities granted the right of inventions to the state and allowed all other organisations 
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 The 1984 Chinese patent law provided non-product patents for pharmaceuticals, a patent term was 
fifteen years, and legal remedies were very limited and weak. For further details, see Chapter 4. 
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to freely exploit them. The inventors were only entitled to nominal monetary rewards 
and honourable certificates. The introduction of the 1984 patent law not only recognised 
the private ownership of inventions, but also provided comprehensive rights of 
exclusivity at right holders’ disposal. These new rights, coupled with the prospect of 
rapid market expansion and other instructional stimuli, undoubtedly provided 
individuals and enterprises unprecedented motivation for the engagement or investment 
in innovative activities.  
 
The low foreign interest in seeking patents under the 1984 Chinese patent law reflects 
the foreign drug originators’ preferences and demands for stronger patent protections 
discussed earlier. In response, China’s 1992, and 2000 patent reforms implemented a 
very strong TRIPS-plus patent legal regime for pharmaceuticals and took significant 
steps to strengthen it rules on patent enforcement. Furthermore, China continued to 
increase protections for patent holders in its 2008 law revision. With such legal changes 
in the Chinese context, it is reasonable to expect a surge in foreign interest in using the 
Chinese patent system and filing applications for patents for their pharmaceutical 
products with its patent office.  
 
In addition to a booming patenting activity domestically, Chinese companies have also 
started seeking patents and commercialising their pharmaceutical inventions in the 
advanced foreign markets. For example, before 1985 there was only one US 
pharmaceutical patent granted to a Chinese national, but by 2007, this number had 
increased to 215 (see Chart 7.1 below). Moreover, several Chinese biotech and 
pharmaceutical companies, such as Zesun Sci & Tech Co. and Hutchisom MediPharma, 
are now conducting clinical trials in Europe and the US while researching within China. 
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This strategy is taken as a fast-track way to move their products into the international 
market. These developments reveal the rising improvements in domestic Chinese 
pharmaceutical R&D capabilities. 
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Chart 7.1 Chinese pharmaceutical patents granted by the USPTO 
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Source: USPTO, ‘Patenting in Technology Classes, Breakout by Geographic Origin (State and Country), 
Count of 1963 - 2008 Utility Patent Grants, available at  
 http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecstca/clstc_gd.htm 
 
 
It needs to be stressed, however, that although the recent patenting boom may indicate 
the rapid expansion of R&D activities or the growing interest in using patents in 
competition, this does not necessarily mean the same thing as innovation attainment. 
Firstly, patents do not directly correlate to innovation in strict terms. Inventions can be 
transformed into innovation only after inventions are applied and commercialised 
successfully into marketable goods or services. The scope of innovation attainment thus 
depends not just on patents but also on firms’ other complementary business capabilities. 
Secondly, it is a well-known practice for originator companies to pursue ‘patent 
thickets’ in order to deter potential rivals from entering into the market.634 Patents 
secured for this purpose are often not truly innovative but have overlapping or dubious 
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(eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy (1: National Bureau of Economic Research). 
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features.635 These caveats warrant consideration and suggest using care in interpreting 
the above patent survey results.  
Survey 3: R&D orientations  
  
The second survey above has demonstrated a steady and rapid growth of pharmaceutical 
patenting from both domestic and foreign players in China since adoption of patent 
protection laws. This trend may soon transform the Chinese drug development system 
into a patent-based one not too long. This raises the question of how such a trajectory 
might affect public health and well-being? The lesson of the United States is that a 
powerful patent-based drug development system tends to reduce the public’s access to 
medicine.636 The accessibility problems are not only due to the high prices of patented 
medicines but also the unavailability of essential medicines. Pharmaceutical R&D 
orientations are driven by market profitability and the large firms are not interested in 
investing in drug markets with low profitability. This often results in the under-
provision of R&D targeted at health problems of the poor.637  This leads to the question 
whether China is now also experiencing such an under-provision in its domestic 
pharmaceutical R&D efforts? The following survey is intended to find empirical 
answers to this question. 
Method 
 
The following survey firstly studies three types of patenting data, i.e. relating to patent 
applications associated with the major infectious diseases, the major chronic diseases, 
and the sampled lifestyle therapies. Then, it compares the scale of each type data to the 
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aggregate number of domestic pharmaceutical patent applications filed over a span of 
twenty years. These comparisons aim to demonstrate the extent to which the domestic 
pharmaceutical R&D efforts have been oriented toward finding cures for the principal 
disease affecting Chinese patients.  
 
 There are three relevant variables, defined as follows: (1) ‘DBx’ represents the group of 
patent statistics associated with therapies concerning the major disease burdens in China. 
‘x’ stands for the variation of disease types. Specifically, ‘DBi’ stands for patents 
associated with infectious diseases and ‘DBc’ for patents related to chronic diseases; (2) 
‘LSx’ represents the group of patent statistics related to lifestyle therapies. Again, ‘x’ 
stands for the variation of the sample lifestyle conditions. (3) The total number of 
pharmaceutical patent filings is represented by ‘∑A61’.638 
 
After collecting the data for the above three groups of variables, the quotients were 
computed for DBx/∑A61 and LSx /∑A61. The result of the former represents the level 
of Chinese pharmaceutical R&D dedicated to medications relevant to the major health 
problems facing Chinese patients, while the latter corresponds to the amount of R&D 
effort allocated to the lifestyle luxury market.   
 Sources of data:  
 
1. China Health Statistic Digest 2004 
 
This digest was published by China’s Ministry of Health. It reported on the data on the 
Morbidity Rate of 10 Main Chronic Diseases and the Incidence and Death Rate of 27 
infectious diseases in China from 2003. The thesis sourced this information from a 
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 As mentioned previously, A61 is the international patent classification code for pharmaceuticals. 
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report assigned by the WHO Commission on IPRs, Innovation, and Public Health on 
China.639 
 
2. Chinese patent database 
This database is provided by the China Patent Information Centre, an affiliate of the 
State of Intellectual Property Office in China. The database is available in both English 
and Chinese versions. The Chinese version contains more abstracts than the English 
version. Therefore, this study used the Chinese version as the source of information. 
The Chinese patent database publishes the abstracts of patent applications which have 
passed preliminary examinations.640   
 Patent search  
 
The patent search was conducted using keywords regarding the targeted diseases and 
classifications concerning the patent types and the country of origin. The search period 
for infectious and chronic diseases covered the period from January 1, 1985 to May 24, 
2009.641 The search period for patent filings associated with lifestyle therapies covered 
the period from January 1, 1985 to December 23, 2010.642 It should be noted that patent 
search by keyword is not generally considered to be an exhaustive method given that 
therapeutic solutions may be described by chemical substances. However, the patent 
abstracts published in the China patent database have a special section where the key 
diseases targeted by the invention are described. By means of this section, it is believed 
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 Li, ZZ, Ke, W, and Guang, C (2005), 'Developing Innovation Capabilities in China to Meet Health 
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640
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 A comparative study herein was introduced in the later stage of the research. This is why the patent 
search concerning respective groups of diseases was carried out in the different dates.  
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that the patent search method employed by this research can result in a reasonable 
approximation of the total patent statistics useful for the analysis.  
 Assessment: 
1. The targeted diseases and lifestyle conditions 
 
The improvement of living standards in China has changed the disease burden structure 
of its population over the past two decades. Although infectious diseases remain a major 
health concern, the incidence of chronic diseases has grown very rapidly and has 
become another prominent threat to health. 643 According to the 2003 national health 
survey (see tables 7.5 & 7.6), the top 10 infectious diseases by incidence rate in China 
are: Pulmonary Tuberculosis, Gonorrhea, Measles, Syphilis, Malaria, Hemorrhage 
Fever, Scarlet Fever, Encephalitis B, Brucellosis, and Pertussis.644 In addition, 
HIV/AIDS, listed as number 17 by its significance in the national survey,645 was added 
to the analysis given its growth potential and the intensive attention from the global 
debate. The top 10 chronic diseases by morbidity rate are: Hypertension, Gastroenteritis, 
Rheumatoid Arthritis, Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), Cerebrovascular 
Disease, Cholelith & Cholecystitis, Diabetes Mellitus, Intervertebral Disc Disorders, 
Ischaemic Heart Disease, and Peptic Ulcer.646 
 
In the global debate on patents and public health, critics have argued that the incentive 
effect of patents tends to direct global research into lavish markets where customers are 
able and willing to pay high prices. The market for lifestyle medicines is a good 
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example of this market. In light of this argument, this thesis also chose to study the 
correlation between the lifestyle medicine market and the orientation of Chinese 
pharmaceutical patenting. The targeted lifestyle conditions include complexion beauty 
therapy, anti wrinkle therapies, slimming solutions, anti baldness therapy, and breast 
enlargement therapy.  
 
Table 7.4: Reported Incidence and Death Rates of 27 Infectious Diseases (2003) 
 
 
 
Source: China Health Statistic Digest 2004, Ministry of Health (MOH), 2004, cited in MIHR (2005), 
'Innovation in Developing Countries to Meet Health Needs: experiences of Brazil, China, India, 
and South Africa', (MIHR report to CIPIH, WHO Ref. CIPIH Study 10d).  
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Table 7.5: 2003 Morbidity Rates of 10 Main Chronic Diseases (%) 
 
 
 
Source: China Health Statistic Digest 2004, Ministry of Health, 2004, cited in cited in MIHR (2005), 
'Innovation in Developing Countries to Meet Health Needs: experiences of Brazil, China, India, and 
South Africa' 
2. Results and data analysis  
 
Table 7.7 illustrates the computed quotients between patent applications associated with 
the top 10 infectious diseases and the total number of pharmaceutical patent applications 
to the Chinese patent office from January 1, 1985 to May 24, 2009.647 The total record 
of pharmaceutical patent applications in the given period was 265, 296.  The results of 
the computed quotients were recorded under the category of DBix/∑A61. The quotients 
ranged from 0.0033 for HIV/AIDS down to only 0.000004 for scarlet fever. The 
average quotient was 0.0006, i.e. there were only 6 inventions targeting infectious 
diseases per 10,000 pharmaceutical patent applications. The data also showed that most 
of these patents were filed by domestic R&D applicants. The average percentage filed 
by domestic applicants was 88%. 
 
                                                 
647
 Note that there is a delay of the publication of patent application in the Chinese patent database due to 
the fact that the Chinese patent office publishes applications 18 months after the first date of filing by law 
(Article 34 of Chinese patent law 2008).  
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Table 7.6: Patent filings associated with top 10 infectious diseases (1985.1-2009. 5) 
 
Diseases targeted 
by inventions 
Total 
filings 
BDi / ∑A61(265296) 
 Domestic filings 
Pulmonary 
Tuberculosis 284 0.0010 93% 
Gonorrhoea 169 0.0006 91% 
Measles 96 0.0004 75% 
Syphilis 113 0.0004 97% 
Malaria 196 0.0008 37% 
Haemorrhage Fever 27 0.0001 89% 
Scarlet Fever 1 0.000004 100% 
Encephalitis B 26 0.00010 100% 
Brucellosis 6 0.00002 100% 
Pertussis 83 0.0003 99% 
HIV/AID 879 0.0033 82% 
 
Average  0.0006 88% 
 
Notes: 
EDi = the number patent filings associated with each infectious diseases 
∑A61= the aggregate amount of pharmaceutical patents = 265296 
 
Table 7.8 shows the computed quotients between patent filings related to the top 10 
chronic diseases and the total number of pharmaceutical patents applied for in the 
Chinese patent office from January 1, 1985 to May 24, 2009. The quotients of this study 
group were generally improved when compared to those concerning infectious diseases. 
The improvement of living standards following rapid economic growth has impacted on 
the disease burden in China. Chronic diseases have increasingly threatened public health, 
especially populations in urban areas.648 Given the growing demand for treatments, as 
well as the relatively higher profitability in treatments for chronic diseases than for 
infectious diseases, it is reasonable to assume that there is greater attention being paid to 
pharmaceutical R&D investment in the former rather than the latter. Yet, serious 
shortages of treatments and cures for some treatable chronic diseases remain. For 
example, patent filings devoted to therapeutic solutions for gastroenteritis, COPD, and 
                                                 
648
 Li, ZZ, Ke, W, and Guang, C (2005), 'Developing Innovation Capabilities in China to Meet Health 
Needs', p.40. 
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ischaemic heart disease were as low as 0.0006, 0.0002, and 0.0003, respectively. There 
was no research found on either medications or medical equipment dedicated to 
choleliths & cholecystitis. Considering the mortality rates of 10.3%, 7.5%, and 4.6 %, 
associated with these diseases, respectively (See Table 5.6), the under-provision of 
R&D on these health problems remains a great concern. 
 
Table 7.7: Patent filing associated with top 10 chronic diseases (1985.1-2009. 5) 
 
Diseases targeted by 
inventions 
Total 
filings  
BDc 
/∑A61(265296)  
Domestic 
filings 
Hypertension 3248 0.0122 67% 
Gastroenteritis 154 0.0006 87% 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 260 0.0010 96% 
COPD 62 0.0002 26% 
Cerebrovascular 
Disease 2399 0.0090 93% 
Cholelith & 
Cholecystitis 0 0  
Diabetes Mellitus 5559 0.0210 62% 
Intervertebral Disc 
Disorders 257 0.0010 100% 
Ischaemic Heart 
Disease 77 0.0003 57% 
Peptic Ulcer 456 0.0017 46% 
 
Average  0.0045 71% 
 
Notes: 
EDCx = the number of patent filings associated with each each chronic diseases 
∑A61= the aggregate amount of pharmaceutical patents = 265296 
 
This survey of R&D orientations also included a search of patents filed on inventions 
targeting five popular lifestyle treatments as examples used to illustrate the level of 
R&D attention devoted to the lavish market. Table 7.9 summarises the proportion of 
patent filings associated with each category of lifestyle therapy compared with the total 
amount of pharmaceutical patents filed (∑A61) between January 1, 1985 and August 10, 
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2010.  The number of ∑A61 stood at 211,065.649 The resulting quotients were 0.0137, 
0.0051, 0.0041, 0.0016, and 0.0005, respectively, for complexion beauty therapy, anti 
wrinkle therapies, slimming solutions, anti baldness therapy, and breast enlargement 
therapy. The average of the quotients was 0.005. 
 
Table 7.8 Patents filing associated with popular lifestyle therapies (1985.1-2010. 08) 
 
Inventions 
 
 
Total 
filings 
 
LSx/ ∑A61 
(211065) 
 
Domestic 
filings 
 
Complexion beauty therapy 2883 0.0137 80% 
Anti wrinkle therapies 1079 0.0051 67% 
Slimming solutions 874 0.0041 97% 
Anti baldness therapy 335 0.0016 83% 
Breast enlargement therapy 103 0.0005 89% 
 
Average  0.0050 83% 
 
Notes:  
LSx = the number of patent filings associated with each lifestyle therapy 
∑A61= the aggregate amount of pharmaceutical patents = 211065 
 
Comparing the above three statistical results, several observations can be made. 
 
 First, domestic companies show a greater interest in investing in R&D targeted at local 
health needs. This is evident from the fact that 88% of patent applications associated 
with infectious diseases were filed by domestic applicants. Infectious diseases tend to be 
                                                 
649 The patent search on the sampled lifestyle therapies was conducted on August 10, 2010 while the 
earlier patent search on infectious and chronic diseases was done on May 24, 2010. In consequence, the 
two aggregated numbers of patent application (∑A61) resulted from the two different search dates differ 
from each other. The ∑A61 record of 211, 065 on August 10, 2010 is smaller than that of 265,296 on 
May 24, 2010. There are two possible explanations for this difference: first, patent applications in China 
are published promptly after the expiration of eighteen months from the date of filling. Some applicants 
may decide not to request substantive examination and thus withdraw their applications after the 
publication. Secondly, the 2008 patent law amendment heightened the threshold of patentability from a 
‘relative novelty’ to an ‘absolute novelty’. This change may have also lead to either withdrawals or more 
failures in passing the substantive examination. These two possibilities may have reduced the numbers of 
patents in database.  
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more prevalent in rural populations than urban populations.650 Given the generally low 
income of the Chinese rural population, it is expected that foreign companies have little 
incentive to devote R&D effort to this market. 
 
Nevertheless, domestic R&D efforts are far from sufficient in their patent filings to 
adequately address the needs of the domestic major disease burdens. Patent filings 
associated with therapeutic treatments for the top 10 infectious diseases were the lowest, 
with a average quotient of 0.0006, while the relevant quotients related to chronic 
diseases and the sampled lifestyle therapies were 0.0045 and 0.0050, respectively. R&D 
efforts dedicated to lifestyle therapies were more than eight times higher than the level 
given to infectious diseases. This discrepancy demonstrates that the majority of 
domestic pharmaceutical R&D efforts are oriented by interests in private profit rather 
than public and humanitarian needs in China. 
Survey 4: R&D Level 
 
The previous analysis in Survey 1, 2, 3 centred on the quantitative growth of innovation 
in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry under its patent legal regime. This section turns 
to an examination of the qualitative change of innovation in the industry under this law. 
Qualitative change of innovation implies an evolution of the degree of sophistication in 
the technical characteristics of innovation. To this end, the research involved consulting 
and analysing the patenting data filed to and granted by the SIPO from local companies. 
Chinese patents have three definite forms: inventions, utility models (UMs) and design. 
Under the 2008 patent law,651 an invention patent and a UM share the same standard on 
Novelty and Utility, but the former requires a substantially higher threshold in 
                                                 
650
 Z.Z. Li,et al. (2005), 'Developing Innovative Capacity in China to Meet Health Needs’ pp.39-40. 
651
 Article 22.1, 22.3 of Chinese patent law 2008, available at 
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/lawsregulations/201101/t20110119_566244.html. 
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Inventiveness than the latter. Article 22.2 of the Chinese patent law provides that to be 
entitled to a Chinese Invention Patent, a new technical solution must ‘possess prominent 
substantive features and represent a remarkable advancement’, whereas, for a UM 
protection, inventions are only required to show ‘substantive features and an indication 
of advancement’. Given the different thresholds in Inventiveness, this research used 
data on the pharmaceutical invention patents as a proxy for substantial and breakthrough 
inventions, and pharmaceutical UM data signifying incremental inventions.652  
 
It is cautioned that this methodology may provide only an approximate distinction 
between various levels of innovations. As Shadlen has noted, ‘patents are imperfect 
indicators of innovations’; consequently, the assessment of the relations between 
invention patents and substantive or breakthrough innovations is rather general and 
inexact 653 To minimise any weaknesses in the methodology, this research also draws on 
information obtained from personal interviews and other relevant surveys to supplement 
the patent analysis. 
1. The consistent dominance of utility model patents 
 
The graphs in Charts 7.2, and 7.3 below illustrate the change over time in numbers of 
pharmaceutical patent applications (A61) filed by domestic and foreign applicants, 
respectively, from 1987 to 2007. It can clearly be seen that domestic filings for ‘UM’ 
far exceeded those for ‘invention’ in most years, except for 2005 and 2006.  As 
summarized above in Table 7.7, Chinese applicants filed 93,173 UM, and 75,912 
‘invention’ patents, whereas only 15,590 patents were granted for ‘invention’, but 
                                                 
652
 The data concerning design patents are dismissed herein due to the two reasons: i) they are not 
provided under the class of IPC in the Chinese patent gazettes; 2) the form of design patent is not very 
relevant to pharmaceutical inventions. 
653
 Shadlen, K. (2011), 'The political contradictions of incremental innovation: lessons from 
pharmaceutical patent examination in Brazil', Politics and society, 39 (2). 
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66,962 were granted for ‘UM’ by the SIPO. In contrast, the majority of foreign A61 
applications fell into the category of patents for ‘invention’, with only 588 ‘UM’ filings 
versus 33,444 ‘invention’ filings, whereas the numbers of patents granted for foreign 
A61 applications were 376 ‘UM’ versus 11,223 patents for ‘invention’. 
In summary, there have been far more patents filed and granted for UM protection than 
for invention patents under the Chinese patenting law. Given the limited nature of UM 
patents, this suggests that qualitatively, the majority of Chinese pharmaceutical 
innovations have been of a minor, rather incremental character. 
Chart 7.2: Type of patents filed by Chinese inventors 
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Chart 7.3: Types of patents filed by foreign inventors  
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Table 7.9: Comparison of types of A61 patents filed and granted by domestic and 
foreign innovators (the aggregate from 1987-2007) 
 
Inventions Utility models  
 
Application 
 
Grants 
 
Application 
 
Grant 
 
Domestic invention 
 
75,912 
 
15,590 
 
93,173 
 
66,962 
 
Foreign invention 
 
33,444 
 
11,223 
 
588 
 
376 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from SIPO gazettes from 1987 to 2007 
2. The scarcity of NCEs  
 
In recent years, Chinese pharmaceutical firms appear to have adopted ‘incremental 
innovation’ as an industrial strategy. Moreover, more researchers are finding that 
engaging in higher level innovation is ‘tough but unrewarding’ given the low level of 
technical and scientific capability available and the shortage of research funding. As a 
result, domestic R&D produces few inventions and instead, principally focuses on 
developing and producing ‘me too’ or ‘me-better’ results.654 A general consensus in the 
literature is that so far Chinese pharmaceutical companies have only very rarely 
developed new chemical entities (NCEs).655 Local researchers, drug administrators and 
lawmakers interviewed for this research also agreed with this observation.656  
 
There is only one Chinese drug, Qing Hao Su (QHU) (see Box 7.1 below), that both the 
literature657 and my interviewees have acknowledged as qualifying as a NCE. Chinese 
                                                 
654
 Li, YH (2010), pp53-54. 
655 Chen, Xh and Watanabe, M (2007), 'Pharmaceutical Industry in China-Intellectual Property 
Protection, Pricing and Innovation-', (Institute of Development Economics, Japan External Trade 
Organisation); Li, YH (2010), Imitation To Innovation In China: the Role of Patents in Biotechnology 
and Pharmaceutical Industries;  
656
 Interview with  Xong Hui, SCIIA, Wu Rui, Deputy Director of Sichuan Food and Drug Administration 
(SCFDA), Wen Xi Kai, China Intellectual Property Training Centre  (CIPRC).  
657
 Li, YH (2010), p57. 
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scientists developed and produced QHU, also called Artemisinin, during the 1970s and 
the early 1980s before intellectual activities in the PRC were oriented to or governed by 
a patent law system.658 Information about QHU and its derivatives was disseminated to 
the international community through publications from 1979 to the early 1980s. This 
promoted wider interest in researching and developing Artemisinin-based therapies 
around the world.659 After a decade of worldwide application, the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) recognised Artemisinin-based combination therapies, or ACTs, as 
‘the most effective treatment for falciparum malaria - the most lethal form of the 
disease’ and listed it as one of the essential anti-malarial drugs in the 2000 WHO Essential 
Drug List.660 It can be argued that open access to the knowledge about QHU and its 
derivatives in 1970s greatly facilitated worldwide access to Artemisinin-based therapies 
and thus, benefited malaria patients much earlier and at far less cost than would have 
been the case had patents been granted and in force. 
 
Despite its one major success, as several recent surveys conducted by industry analysts 
and Chinese patent examiners have found, in comparison with other countries 
, Chinese innovation still exhibits shortcomings in technological categories and 
sophistication. Firstly, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Associations (IFPMA) reports that 80% of domestic applications filed for plant 
medicines and healthcare products, only 3.7% were related to synthetic drug substances. 
                                                 
658
 Mount, D, Todd, G, and Navaratnam., V (1995), '‘Packed-column supercritical fluid chromatography 
of artemisinin (qinghaosu) with electron-capture detection’ ', Journal of Chromatography B: Biomedical 
Sciences and Applications, 666 (1). 
659
 Klayman, DL (1985), 'Qinghaosu (artemisinin): an Antimalarial Drug from China', Science 228 (4703), 
1049-55.  
660
 See http://www.who.int/features/qa/26/en/index.html, WHO listed Artesunate, a derivative of 
Artemisinin which was developed and produced by a Chinese pharmaceutical company Guilin 
Pharmaceutical Ltd, in the model list of Essential Medicines (12th Edition) in 2002,  p 25 in English 
Version, p26 in Chinese version, at http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/en/, 
accessed on March 12, 2009. 
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In contrast, 54% of foreign applications were for synthetic drug substances. 661  
Secondly, some SIPO examiners conducted a survey of patent applications for cancer 
therapies filed with the office from 1996 to 2006. They found that, in general, foreign 
applications were greater than domestic applications. In terms of the patents granted 
during 1996 to 2006, only 30% of Chinese patents were for synthetic drug substances, 
compared to 68.6% of US patents and 74.4% of Japanese patents. 662 Another survey on 
patenting therapies for AIDS prevention and treatment reported that although Chinese 
filings accounted for 45% of all applications, the majority of Chinese patents and 
applications were for traditional medicines. The rest mainly consisted of utility model 
patents and design patents, but few invention patents were related to novel chemical 
compounds.663  In contrast, foreign filing accounted for the majority of the remaining 
applications, with the US (28%) and Japan (5%) leading.  
 
                                                 
661
 FPMA (2004), 'Accelerating Innovative Pharmaceutical Research and Development in China: a case 
study', (Geneva: International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA), p16. 
662
 Liu, M, Xiu, W, and Fu, A (2009), 'Current Technical State and Trend of the Development of 
Patenting for Cancer Therapies in China'. Report on the State and Prospect of Chinese Patents of Key 
Industry (2008-2009) (Beijing: Intellectual Property Right Press) pp.188-189. 
663
 Ibid, p.217. 
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Box 7.2: The discovery of Qing Hao Su 
 
 
From the PRC’s early years, malaria was one of the principal epidemic diseases its 
national health policy makers targeted for a cure. The search for anti-malarial 
compounds accelerated after the (North) Vietnamese government asked China for 
medical aid and medications to combat the malaria that was threatening their 
soldiers’ lives during the Vietnam War.664 The National Science and Technology 
Committee( NSTC) together with the General Logistics Department of the People's 
Liberation Army (GLDPLA) convened a meeting on May 23, 1967, titled ‘The 
coordination meeting on Malaria medicine research’, bringing together political 
leaders and pharmaceutical professionals.665  This meeting endorsed a collaborative 
research project called the ‘1967-1970 Collaborative Planning on Malaria Medicine 
Research’, which was coded as the ‘523 Project’ due to the confidentiality 
requirements at that time.666 The project involved over five hundred researchers from 
prestigious research institutes throughout China.667 Scientists systematically 
examined indigenous plants used traditionally as the remedies for malaria in 
traditional, classical Chinese medicine. They isolated the substance responsible for 
anti-malaria action from a plant called Qin Hao in 1972, and scientists named it 
‘Qinghaosu’, meaning ‘active principle of qing hao’.668  
 
                                                 
664
  Liu, DW ‘China ‘523’Project’ at www.yyqhw.2008red.com/yyqhw/article_351_3838_1.shtml, 
accessed on March 14, 2009. To be noted, the Chinese source originally referred to the government as 
‘the Vietnamese government’.  
665
 Zhang Jf. A Detailed Chronological Record of Project 523 and the Discovery and Development of 
Qinghaosu (Artemisinin),Yangcheng Evening News Publisher, 2006. 
666
 Liu, DW ‘China ‘523’Project’ at www.yyqhw.2008red.com/yyqhw/article_351_3838_1.shtml, 
accessed on March 14, 2009. 
667
 Ibid.  
668
 Klayman, DL (1985), 'Qinghaosu (artemisinin): an Antimalarial Drug from China', Science, 228(4703), 
p1049. 
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In summary, this survey has shown that Chinese pharmaceutical inventions are 
overwhelming associated with imitative and low-level technologies, whereas patents 
held by foreign nationals are largely associated with the leading or ‘upstream’ 
technologies, and the presence of such foreign patents in China is rapidly growing. As a 
consequence, the prospect of foreign dominance in the leading or upstream 
biopharmaceutical technology could effectively raise roadblock for Chinese industry’s 
efforts at ‘incremental innovation’ and make its technological catch-up far more 
difficult for its pharmaceutical industry  
7.3 Patent strength and R&D-oriented FDI inflow in China   
 
 
An important objective of Chinese pro-patent policy is to attract greater inflow of 
foreign advanced technologies. This policy expectation assumes that patent strength 
correlates positively with the inflow of international technology transfer (ITT), which 
includes foreign direct investment (FDI) and technological licensing. The direct 
channels for the acquisition of foreign advanced technologies comprise international 
trade, FDI and licensing. Import of new products and service can transfer and diffuse 
technology to a country, but FDI and technological licensing are perceived to bring in 
greater technological advantages through local R&D spillover and direct transfer of 
advanced technology.669 Economic theory predicts that patent strength can affect 
MNCs’ incentives to choose between trade, FDI or licensing and that stronger patent 
protections induce higher levels of ITT.670 Nevertheless, the relationship between patent 
and ITT may be deeper and more complex than that and requires more evidence and 
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 Maskus, K (2000), Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (Washington DC: Institute of 
International Economics). 
670
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research.671 Survey 4 herein examines the Chinese experience with the relationship 
between the strengthening of its patent regime and levels of ITT.  
 
China has become one of the world’s top destinations for pharmaceutical FDI 
projects.672 According to FDI Intelligence, in 2005, China ranked second with 44 
pharmaceutical FDI projects, after the US, which ranked first with 52 projects, and India 
ranked third with 30 projects.673 This section looks at the forms of investment 
pharmaceutical FDI projects have taken in the Chinese market and how they have 
evolved to test the thesis posed above.  
Method  
This research collates data concerning the composition of FDI in China from the 12 
leading pharmaceutical MNCs from 1980 to 2009. This research collates data 
concerning the composition of FDI in China from the 12 leading pharmaceutical MNCs 
from 1980 to 2009. According to the Fortune Global 500, in July 2009 these MNCs 
were ranked as the world’s top 12 pharmaceutical companies by revenue.674 They 
included Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, Roche Group, Sanofi-Aventis, 
Novartis, AstraZeneca, Abbott Laboratories, Merck, Wyeth, Bristol-Myers Squibb and 
Eli Lilly, in order of their rank. In addition to being the global leaders in pharmaceutical 
R&D, they are also the major foreign pharmaceutical MNCs operating in China. Most 
of them commenced their Chinese operations in the 1980s. This research adopts the 
reasonable inference that the FDI considerations of these companies may represent the 
general concerns of pharmaceutical MNCs seeking R&D activities in China. 
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 Maskus, K (2000), p130, p150.  
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 Lippoldt, D (2006), 'Intellectual Property Rights, Pharmaceuticals and Foreign Direct Investment ', 
(Groupe d’Economie Mondiale de Sciences Po.), p4, p8. 
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 FDI Intelligence (2006), ‘Pharma pulls in $15bn”, cited in note 12 of Lippoldt, D (2006),  
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 The ranking list can be viewed at 
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Accordingly, the research involved gathering data on the forms of FDI these companies 
have undertaken. The data was collected from: (1) business reports, (2) targeted 
company information published on their official websites, and (3) company press news.  
Survey   
The forms of FDI can be categorised into distribution, production and R&D facilities. 
Table 7.4 below summarises the composition of FDI associated with the world’s leading 
pharmaceutical MNCs in China over the past two decades. Many of these companies 
started their operations as major exporters to China in the 1970s.675 Since China 
embarked on its policies of economic reforms and openness, it has attracted increasing 
numbers of pharmaceutical MNCs to operate in China, and by the 1990s, it had become 
one of the world’s top destinations for FDI for the world’s leading pharmaceutical 
MNCs.676  
 
This survey shows that in the 1980s and 1990s all 12 MNCs chose to limit their Chinese 
operations to the FDI forms of manufacturing plants or distribution. During this period, 
China was widely perceived as a risky place for investment-involved R&D and 
technology due its weak law on patent protection and enforcement.677 It was rational for 
the 12 MNCs to decide to explore the Chinese market only through trading or 
manufacturing. Nevertheless, the 12 MNCs did not respond consistently in their FDI 
decisions following China’s compliance with the TRIPS patent rules in 2000. The 
companies have either been slow to engage in R&D-oriented investment or have 
continued their traditional operational modes in China since the 2000 patent law reform. 
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Six of the companies opened R&D centres within five to six years and another four 
opened them within seven to nine years. Two of the companies continue to operate only 
as either manufacturers or distributors.  
 
The Chinese experience demonstrates that the association between stronger patents and 
ITT is not as straightforward as claimed by the mainstream economic theory. FDI 
decisions are far more complex and involve a variety of strategic factors. Sometimes, 
other factors can prevail over IPRs concerns even when essential legal protection 
exists.678 For example, this was evident in Roche’s recent R&D relocation decision. 
When Roche was planning to establish a R&D research headquarters in Asia (excluding 
Japan), several advanced cities in India and China were the first destinations which 
interested the company. After a number of fieldwork trips, Shanghai stood out and was 
selected as the site due to its excellent infrastructure, talent pool and preferential local 
policy toward IP-intensive sectors, even though the mixed IPR performance in China 
was still of concern to the company.679 In addition, the Chinese market also offered 
other advantages, such as the size of patient population, a broad diseases profile and the 
potential for rapid patient recruitment.680 Such strengths may have helped China to 
become one of the most attractive global locations to conduct clinical trials outside the 
US.681 In short, this Chinese experience indicates that strengthening patent protection 
can be a factor in attracting greater ITT to developing countries, but it is certainly not 
the only consideration. To increase ITT inflow also depends upon other national 
initiatives and economic factors. 
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. Table 7.3: The evolution of FDI composition from the leading pharmaceutical 
MNCs in China  
 
 
Companies 
 
Years 
 
Operation /Investment  
 
Location 
1. Johnson & Johnson   
 
1985 
1990 
1991 
 
 
2009 
 
Manufacturing Joint 
Ventures (JV) 
Xian Janssen 
Johnson Shanghai 
Johnson & Johnson China Ltd 
 
R&D projects 
J & J Pharmaceutical R&D 
Centre , Shanghai,  
 
 
 
Xian 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
 
Shanghai 
 
2. Pfizer  
1989 
 
1997 
 
 
2005 
 Manufacturing JV 
 Pfizer & Dalian pharmaceutical 
Joint Venture  
Pfizer Investment Cooperation  
 
 R&D projects 
Pfizer R & D Centre 
 
 
Dalian 
 
Shanghai 
 
Shanghai 
3. GSK (SmithKline) 
 
 
1970 
 
1987 
 
 
 
2003 
 
2007 
Exporting antibiotics to China  
First Joint venture TianJin 
SmithKline French Laboratories 
Ltd, a manufacturing site 
 
R&D projects 
OTC R&D organization Global  
 
GSK R&D centre  
 
TianJin 
 
TianJin 
 
 
 
Tianjing 
 
Shanghai 
4.Roche   
1994 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 
2007 
Manufacturing plants 
Shanghai Roche 
Roche Taishan Vitamin 
Products 
Roche Sunve Vitamins Ltd 
 
R&D projects 
Roche China R&D Centre 
Roche’s Pharmaceutical 
Development Centre China 
 
 
- 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
 
 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
5. Sanofi Aventis 1982 
 
 
2005 
 
Distribution Office 
 
R&D projects 
China Clinical Research Unit, 
R&D centre 
Beijing 
 
 
Shanghai 
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2008 Sanofi Aventis Biometrics 
Centre 
 
Beijing 
6.Novartis   
2008 
 
2009 
 
R&D projects 
Novartis Pharmaceutical 
Research ChangSu 
Novartis Institutes for 
Biomedical research shanghai 
 
 
Shanghai 
 
Shanghai 
 
7.AstraZenneca 
 
1985 
 
 
 
2006 
Manufacturing   
Sino-Swed Phrmaceutical 
Companies 
 
R&D projects  
 AstraZenneca R&D Centre 
 
Wuxi 
 
 
 
Shanghai 
8.Abbott laboratories  2000 
 
 
 
 
2009 
Joint Venture : Abbot 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 
Shanghai Plant 
 
R&D project 
Shanghai R&D Centre 
Shanghai 
 
 
 
 
Shanghai 
9.Merck   Merck Chemicals (Shanghai) 
Co., Ltd, Distribution   
 
Shanghai 
10Wyeth  
1994 
 
 
1995 
 
 
 
2006 
Manufacturing  
Wyeth Pharmaceutical 
Co.Ltd(China)  
 
Suzhou plant Shanghai  
Wyeth Nutritional Co. Ltd 
 
R&D project 
Clinical  trial centre  
 
 
 
 
Shanghai 
 
Suzhou 
 
 
 
Beijing 
 
11Bristol-myers squibb  
 
1982 
 
Manufacturing plants 
Sino American Shanghai 
Squibb,  
Mead Johnson Co Ltd, 
Squibb-ConvaTech Medical 
Products Ltd,  
Distribution: 
Zimmer Division  
 
 
Shanghai 
 
Guangzhou 
Shanghai 
 
 
Shenzhen 
12 Eli Lilly 1970s  
1995 
 
 
2008  
Exporting to China 
A Joint Venture 
 
R&D projects 
R&D Centre  
Suzhou 
 
 
 
Shanghai 
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7.4 The roles of patents and other complementary factors in innovation 
change  
 
7.4.1 Positive impacts  
Previous studies have found a correlation between the remarkable growth in Chinese 
domestic pharmaceutical innovation and ITT inflow along with the evolving system of 
stronger patent protections in China. Pharmaceutical players have become increasingly 
interested in seeking and enforcing their patents in China. The growth rate of patent 
application filings in the Chinese patent office is the highest in the world.682 Meanwhile, 
China is also becoming the world ‘leader’ in patent litigation.683 These trends indicate a 
growing importance of patents in innovation and business operation in the Chinese 
market. Indeed, one can argue that the stronger Chinese patent regime has led to 
national gains in pharmaceutical innovation and additional FDI and foreign R&D 
relocation in the Chinese pharmaceutical market.  
 
A major advantage of a patent law system lies in its information-disclosure function. In 
China, reverse-engineering is a common means for indigenous innovation. Patent 
documents may be the most important open source for local firms to absorb advanced 
technologies. More importantly, the introduction of a patent system and its incremental 
improvement has incorporated a formal rule of law governing intellectual activities in 
China. Innovative activities are now generally directed by business decisions rather than 
by political agendas. These include the recognition of the private rights of ownership of 
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inventions, the creation of requirements and obligations of protection, and the provision 
and terms concerning sanctions for violation of rights. Thus, with law in place and 
despite some imperfections, it is increasingly secure, predictable and rewarding for both 
domestic and foreign users to do business and engage in R&D in the Chinese market.  
 
Nonetheless, the roles of patents need to be considered together with other necessary 
policy and related factors relevant to improving Chinese innovation efforts. Firstly, it is 
essential for the state to have the educational policies required to develop the necessary 
skills and expertise essential to enable local business to benefit from the information 
function of a patent system. To learn from patent information, it is crucial to have expert 
scientific researchers capable of absorbing and improving new technologies. Another 
basic necessity for the attainment of the intended productivity is to have a workforce 
trained in fundamental technical skills, including the ability to operate various types of 
advanced equipments. To fulfil these needs requires the development of appropriate 
training and education policies.684 To foster local innovation, many Chinese cities and 
large domestic research institutes or companies have initiated a variety of policies to 
attract overseas Chinese talents. Many of these offer competitive salaries, funding 
support, executive positions, free housing, favourable conditions to encourage 
participants to set up and run start-up companies, and other benefits. For example, it is 
estimated that in recent years, Shanghai alone has attracted over 50,000 PhD level 
returnees from such programmes in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology fields.685 In 
addition, educational programmes in pharmacology and biotechnology are rapid 
expanding in Chinese universities. In 2006, Chinese universities produced 39,000 and 
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22,000 graduates in chemistry & pharmacology and biotechnology studies, 
respectively.686  
 
National fiscal initiatives have also contributed to the growth of indigenous innovation. 
In China, innovative biopharmaceutical research depends largely on the governmental 
financial support. Despite the remarkable growth achieved in the past two decades, the 
total scale of China’s domestic pharmaceutical industry remains small, and financial 
capacity to fund R&D activities is rather limited. The national government continues to 
plays a major role in supporting innovation and fostering development of research-
based industries. The main national fiscal initiatives are direct state funding and tax 
incentives.  
 
1. Direct State funding. One account has reported that the Chinese government has 
invested some US$180 million between 1996 and 2000 and US$600 million between 
2000 and 2005.687 The scale of funding support has been further enhanced recently. 
Under the Key New Drug Funding Scheme, the government has committed US$2.7 
billion for the period from 2008 to 2010 and has planned to invest a further US$6 
billion during 2011 to 2016.688 In addition, the government has also directly invested in 
many strategic laboratories to improve domestic R&D infrastructure. By 2003, China 
had established 6 new drug selection centres, 3 Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) centres 
and 3 GLP key laboratories.689 Local governments have played their part in founding 
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many hi-tech incubators to provide low-cost office space and strategic advice on issues 
such as management and financing.690 Such business services are important to help 
industry to turn new inventions into manufacturable and marketable products. 
  
2. Tax incentives.  China’s High-New Technology Enterprise (HNTE) Tax Scheme 
provides for a general tax relief for R&D-based enterprises. It offers a reduced 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rate of 15 % as compared with the standard CIT rate of 
25%, a tax exemption for the portion of income derived from technology transfer during 
a tax year not exceeding RMB 5 million, and a 50% reduction in CIT for the portion 
exceeding RMB 5 million. In addition, newly established HNTEs in the five special 
economic zones (Shenzhen, Hainan, Zhuhai, Xiamen and Shantou) and the high 
technical zone of Shanghai (Pudong New Area) may enjoy a ‘two plus three’ tax 
holiday. This means 2 years of full tax exemption followed by 3 years of a 50 % 
reduction in CIT.691  
 
Therefore, it can be seen that strengthening patent protection has promoted innovation 
to the extent that it has helped to foster a new national innovative spirit and encouraged 
greater R&D investment in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. Still, the scope of 
innovation achieved has depended to a large degree on the other governmental policies 
and complementary factors just discussed. 
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7.4.2 Concerns and uncertainties: 
The previous surveys have also raised some fundamental concerns about the 
implications of the new Chinese patent regime for the ability of local firms to supply 
low cost medicines and to advance their levels of innovation. Firstly, the growth in the 
numbers of pharmaceutical patents granted has been phenomenally fast. It can be 
expected that the Chinese drug development system will be transformed into a 
completely patent-based one before long. It is also observed that both foreign and 
domestic ‘big pharmas’ have increasingly been inclined to use their patents strategically 
to deter the entry of generic competition. Moreover, our patent surveys have also 
demonstrated that the newly emerged R&D efforts show little interests in doing research 
relevant to the national major health burden. All these trajectories could lead to rising 
costs of healthcare, declines in suppliers of low-cost medicines or even the under-
provision of essential medicines in China. 
 
Secondly, it is also a concern how the new Chinese patent regime could affect the 
ability of local firms in national technological catch-up. The previous studies have 
indicated that China has adopted a TRIPS-plus patent regime for pharmaceuticals, and 
that the scope of patent law is now extremely extensive and covers almost everything 
relating to drugs. Stronger patent protections and intensified competition have 
increasingly prompted the pharmaceutical MNCs to seek and enforce their patents in 
China.  
 
On the other hand, Chinese innovation remains tied to its long-standing imitative and 
incremental tradition. Most Chinese firms can only manage to develop and produce 
‘me-too’ drugs with technical characters closely resembling those of foreign NECs. 
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Consequently, many local companies are facing tremendous legal and technological 
challenges, with the related financial burdens involved in defence, and with some being 
forced to terminate their existence. To avoid infringement and compete effectively with 
foreign competitors, Chinese firms will need to advance their innovation levels.  
 
Limited by low innovative capacity and insufficient funding, Chinese firms now widely 
regard innovation targeted on developing ‘me-better’ drugs as a realistic step forward.692 
‘Me-better’ drugs are still imitated drugs, but they have a substantial difference in 
structure in comparison with the original drug.693 However, the problem with this 
strategy is that NCEs are now increasingly protected by the MNCs’ ‘patent thicket’ 
tactic. To innovate around patents, it is essential for Chinese firms to find the loophole 
in the original patent and develop drugs with distinctive characters. This requires 
experts with knowledge in both patents and pharmacology to design the drug which is 
based on the original drug but distinctive enough to be outside of the scope of original 
drugs’ patents. However, such expertise is rare in Chinese firms.694 Therefore, Chinese 
local firms are facing great legal and technical challenges in developing either me-too or 
me-better drugs. So until China can develop sufficient capacity to develop its own 
NCEs, the prospects for indigenous innovation appear bleak, and this would 
significantly affect the speed and ability of the Chinese pharmaceutical industry in its 
aspirations for technological catch-up. 
 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
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Based on the review of R&D indicators relating to the scale, level and research 
orientations, the statistical assessment of this chapter found a paradox in the innovation 
change for the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. While it empirically identified a 
remarkable growth in numbers of patent applications and grants, R&D expenditures, 
and ITT inflow, it also found that Chinese pharmaceutical innovation has retained its 
long-standing imitation-oriented nature. NCEs are rarely developed locally, and little 
R&D is devoted to research into the cure for major disease burdens. 
 
The studies in this chapter also have found a relationship between such consequences 
and the roles of patents and of other complementary factors. Firstly, strengthening 
patent protection has contributed greatly to promoting innovation growth and fostered 
greater ITT inflow; however, the scope of the attainment of such benefits has also 
depended on other complementary factors, such as education policy, fiscal policy, 
available talent pool and market advantages. Secondly patent can also impede or be 
detrimental to innovation. As reverse-engineering is the common means for local 
innovation in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry, a stronger patent regime that limits 
technology access can raise fundamental roadblocks that impede Chinese firms from 
advancing their level of innovation. 
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Chapter 8: The effects of China’s pro-patent policy  
This chapter argues that a ‘pro-patent policy’ has been the driving force behind China’s 
TRIPS-plus implementation approach and examines the effects of this policy on patents 
produced in China. It explores the questions of whether and how China’s pro-patent 
policy, its administration and enforcement have contributed to the proliferation of low 
quality patents and helped undermine domestic incentives to innovate. The chapter is 
organised into four sections. The first section looks at the how a pro-patent policy has 
affected the Chinese pharmaceutical patent legal framework. Section two then considers 
the impacts of pro-patent policy on the quality of patents. The third section turns to an 
exploration of how the pro-patent features of Chinese patent administration have 
affected the quality of patents. Section four studies the recent trend of excessive IP 
litigation in China. Finally, the last section sets out some conclusions. 
8.1 Pro-patent policy in Chinese law 
  
The traditional public policy purpose for the creation and existence of a legal system 
governing patents is to promote innovation and technical progress by creating private 
rights in the products resulting from intellectual efforts and protecting those rights by 
conferring temporary monopoly privileges on the originators.695 This public-benefit 
foundation of the patent law system vies with a rival conception that views its purpose 
as being to serve the commercial interests of those who seek and hold the rights. Under 
this rights-centred theory, the public interests are considered to be served by the 
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availability of a right that facilitates the spread of products in the marketplace.696 A 
system of patent strategies shaped by this theory is termed a ‘pro-patent policy’. Under 
a pro-patent policy, the driving force in patent design, implementation and enforcement 
is to promote the increase in kinds of and greater availability of patent rights. 
 
The rights-centred conception of the patent system has gained momentum in recent 
years, particularly in the process of TRIPS implementation. China has rather readily 
embraced this conception of a pro-patent policy. This tendency can be seen clearly in 
the objectives articulated in the four versions of Chinese patent law as listed in Table 
8.1 below. 
 
Table 8.1: The evolution of the objective of the Chinese patent law: 
 
 Legal text 
 
1984 & 
1992 
This law is formulated in order to protect patent rights for 
inventions, encourage inventions and facilitate their popularization 
and application, promote the development of science and technology 
and meet the ends of socialist modernization. 
2000 This Law is enacted to protect patent rights for inventions-creations, 
to encourage invention-creation, to foster the spreading and 
application of inventions-creations, and to promote the development 
and innovation of science and technology, for meeting the needs of 
the construction of socialist modernization. 
2008 This law is enacted in order to protect the legitimate rights of 
patentees, encourage invention-creations, promote the application 
of invention-creation, enhance innovative capacity, and promote 
scientific progress and economic social development. 
 
With slight variations of the wording, these provisions all express the same functions 
that the Chinese patent system is intended to serve: (1) protecting inventors’ rights, and 
(2) promoting innovation, scientific and technological progress, and economic and 
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social development. These objectives indicate two policy messages. Firstly, commercial 
rights are regarded as the primary driving force of the system. Secondly, in each the 
private rights purposes are superior to the public rights purposes, protect patent rights, 
encourage invention-creation, etc. versus meeting needs of socialist 
modernization/economic social development. This Chinese conception not only departs 
from the original intended objective for the introduction of the patent system, as 
commonly understood, of promoting a public good through the granting of private 
privileges to inventors,697 but it is also inconsistent with the objectives and principles 
expressly agreed under the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
As stated in the literature review above in Chapter 3, section 3.1.2, the objectives of 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement are contained in Articles 7 and 8. These 
articles provide that TRIPS implementation should fulfil multiple objectives, including 
‘protection and enforcement of IPRs… in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations’ (Article 7), protecting public health 
and other social interests (Article 8.1), and preventing abusive use of patents and anti-
competitive acts (Article 8.2). The express language in Article 7 and the existence of a 
mix of public and private interest objectives requires policymakers to balance private IP 
interests against a variety of interests that concern wider socio-economic issues in 
TRIPS interpretation and implementation. 
 
In comparison with the TRIPS objectives, the scope of the objectives of Chinese patent 
law is narrower and its weight is heavily placed on private patent interests and economic 
expectations of the system. There is no express or implied objective of balancing the 
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interests of rights producers against those of rights users and society in general. Such a 
reading may be explained by appreciating how the prevailing global political ideology 
of economic-centric development has dominated and influenced policy-making since 
the 1980s. Also, the use of such restrictive language may be attributable to the policy-
makers’ inadequate understanding of the implications of patents and TRIPS on China’s 
development. A third consideration is of the unforeseen effects that transplants of alien 
legal concepts into different legal cultures can have. As currently designed, the Chinese 
policy objectives could lead to an imbalance between rights and obligations and 
between commercial interests and the public, social interests in law formulation and 
application. 
 
Yet, China’s policy options between TRIPS flexibilities and TRIPS-plus provisions may 
provide opportunities for achieving a better form of pro-patent system. As reviewed in 
chapter 5, the interpretation of TRIPS under Chinese law has emphasised increasing the 
control of rights; while safeguarding measures for public interests has been largely 
ignored. Under the 1992 and 2000 patent reforms, the rights provided for 
pharmaceutical patentees were broadened and strengthened. In addition, Chinese 
legislation has incorporated other TRIP-plus measures negotiated under the bilateral 
IPRs agreement, such as data exclusivity, restrictions on the use of compulsory licences, 
and patent registration linkage. These measures provide a much higher level of 
protection than those mandated by the TRIPS Agreement.698 On the other hand, the 
earlier Chinese law failed to introduce TRIPS flexibilities, including the international 
exhaustion regime, the early working exception, provisions on anti-competitive 
practises, and the working requirement for the issuance of compulsory licences. 
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The 2008 patent reform is widely acknowledged with an improved balance between the 
interests of right producers and users. All the key TRIPS flexibilities are also 
incorporated into law. Nevertheless, it remains to be determined whether the 2008 
patent reform can ameliorate the entrenched bias in the Chinese pharmaceutical patent 
system. The new rules are widely acknowledged to have improved the balance between 
the interests of rights producers and users. Also, all the key TRIPS flexibilities are now 
incorporated into Chinese law. Yet, there are still some challenges under the reformed 
law. The first problem is that TRIPS-plus standards remain unchanged under Chinese 
patent law and drug regulations. Their presence could affect the effectiveness or reduce 
the scope of the newly introduced safeguarding measures. Secondly, various procedural 
or compensatory hindrances are built into the TRIPS framework, making the application 
of the TRIPS flexibilities difficult. Moreover, the effectiveness of the new rules also 
depends upon the availability of expert legal practitioners capable of applying them in 
their advice to clients and in actual cases. China is not yet well-equipped in this vitally 
required area. 
 
8.2 The quality of patents 
 
The currently prominent form of pro-patent policy as presented above is commonly 
perceived to have originated in the US during the late 1980s.699 This policy has created 
serious problems in the US that undermine the true invention incentive.700 The main 
problems have related to a proliferation of patents of poor quality and excessive 
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litigation. Since the late 1980s, many poor quality patents have emerged under the US 
pro-patent regime. A ‘poor quality patent’ is one likely to have invalid patentability or 
overly broad claims701. Patents with such qualities can deter or raise the cost of 
innovation. If a competitor has chosen to pursue R&D in the area improperly protected 
by the poor quality patent, this party is compelled to seek a licensing agreement, 
challenge the patent in court, or expend resources to avoid infringement by inventing 
around the patent. Whichever of these options is taken, it is likely to be very costly and 
in fact, wasteful.702  
 
In addition, poor quality patents have also been manipulated as tools to deter 
competitive products from reaching the market, or to prevent others from sharing ideas 
in order to maintain their own leading competitive position. It is also observed that 
many firms neither commercialise these patents nor licence their use to others, but 
merely put them on hold and wait. As others make the relevant commercial move, the 
patent holder will then file a suit against them for infringement. The litigation is 
expensive and time-consuming for all parties involved. Such litigation costs are 
wasteful and unjustifiably raise costs to business and ultimately to customers.703 In 2011, 
the US has passed ‘The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act’ to address these issues But, 
it remains an unclear whether this can fix the problem of excessive litigation under the 
US patent system.  
 
As mentioned above, China has embraced a pro-patent policy since the early 1990s. The 
effects of this policy can be seen in the wide domestic use of utility models and design 
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patents to protect trivial inventions, the traditionally lenient standards for substantive 
patent examination, and the significant rise in recent years following the law reforms of 
damage claims and court decisions granting such claims. A more direct effect of a pro-
patent policy can be seen in the benefits states’ grant to inventors or patent holders. For 
example, all local governments subsidise the entire patent application process of 
qualifies enterprises or individuals. Mere ownership of a certain number of Chinese 
patents increases a researcher’s chances to advance and acquire tenure in universities or 
research institutes, and qualifies companies as high-technology enterprises enabling 
them to take advantage of preferential corporation tax rates and tax holidays.704  
 
With all these pro-patent strategies in place, it can be expected to see an even greater 
increase in patents filed with or granted by the CPO, regardless of their quality. Already 
in 2010, China received 1,221,000 (391,177 invention patents) patent application filings, 
and it became the world’s second largest recipient patent office.705 Also in 2010, the 
Chinese patent office granted 815,000 patents, but most (680,000) were non-examined 
utility and design patents.706 The quality of such a vast amount of patents is highly 
questionable. Despite the large number of commentators sceptical of, the quality of 
many Chinese patents, no one has offered a precise measurement due to the constraints 
of methodology and limited data available.707 It is submitted that the observations of the 
professional users of the system may provide a useful gauge. The Intellectual Asset 
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Management/Thompson Reuters benchmark surveys conducted in 2009 and 2010 on the 
quality of patents granted by the world’s largest five largest patent offices, China stood 
at the bottom of the class with 22% and 23 % of in-house counsels considering the 
quality of patents granted by SIPO to excellent or very good in 2009 and 2010, 
respectively (compared to 71% and 74% for the EPO topping the list in 2009 and 2010, 
respectively) 708 With a more than 70 % dissatisfaction rate, it is reasonable to assume 
that the CPO is not commonly recognized as a quality patent issuing authority and that 
the quality of many Chinese patents is questionable. 
 
The proliferation of poor quality patents can be very detrimental to innovation in 
China.709 The persistence of Chinese indigenous innovation in being imitative and 
incremental means Chinese firms need to monitor new developments in patent 
technology closely to develop their own ‘me-too’ or ‘me-better’ drugs. Transaction 
costs are extensive and substantial for follow-on innovations when the existing patents 
are overlapping.710 This is particularly relevant to pharmaceutical patents, as the 
industry is keen to pursue ‘patent thickets’ by seeking a wide portfolio of patents around 
a single invention.711 Given the scale of questionable patents in China, it is reasonable to 
assume that poor quality patents have contributed significantly to the patent thicket and 
other anti-competitive practices. The Eli Lilly case discussed in Chapter 6 gives further 
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support to the argument that poor quality patents have helped suppress innovation and 
generic competition in China.  
8.3 Patent administration 
 
In this section, this thesis examines how external influences and resource constraints 
affect the performance of the Chinese patent office (CPO) in patent administration. 
8.2.1 Political interests in patent expansion  
 
Unlike the most popular ‘statutory person’ model of other patent offices,712 the State 
Intellectual Property Office of the PRC (SIPO) is a governmental agency directly 
affiliated under the State Council of the PRC. Its predecessor was the Patent Office of 
the PRC.713 The SIPO was established as part of a governmental policy attempt to 
coordinate China’s IPR protection and enforcement bodies under one national authority, 
although this objective has yet to occur. Today, SIPO’s legal affairs cover the 
administration of patents and layout designs of integrated circuits, international 
applications, patent re-examination and invalidation, and administrative review. The 
Patent Affairs Administration Department (PAAD), a SIPO major affiliate and 
commonly referred to as the Chinese Patent Office (CPO), oversees the legal work 
relating to patents.714 Also, SIPO plays an explicit role in policy formulation.715 It has a 
special policy unit, the ‘Legal Affairs Department,’ with a major role in policy 
development. More unusually, it runs a business unit for technology commercialisation 
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services, the China Patented Technology Development Corporation, which began its 
operations in 1986.716 There are several problems with such an organisational structure. 
 
First, SIPO’s political affiliation may interrupt its integrity in patent administration. As 
a governmental agency, SIPO depends heavily on the central government for finance, 
welfare, personnel, and other operations. This dependence makes SIPO susceptible to 
political influence in its patent administration. In fact, the fundamental function of the 
SIPO is to serve the objectives of the national technological development agenda. Under 
the Outline of National Intellectual Property Strategy issued by the State Council 
recently, SIPO is assigned the mission to improve ‘China's capacity to create, utilize, 
protect and administer intellectual property, making China an innovative country and 
attaining the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects.’ 717 
Specifically,  the patent office is required to  ‘[m]ake advanced development plans 
according to the nation's strategic needs in some sectors such as biology, medicine, 
information,..., and to obtain a group of patents in these core areas of technology to 
support the development of China's new and high technology industries.’.718 Clearly, 
this strategy manifests not only the country’s aspiration to update China’s reputation 
from ‘made in China’ to ‘innovated in China’, but also the political interest in patent 
expansion. Under such influence, the work of the SIPO can be greatly affected by the 
notion that patents are good for economic and technological development, the more the 
better. This is likely to boost its enthusiasm for granting patents  
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The second concern is SIPO’s ownership of a profit-driven business unit that directly 
engages in patent commercialisation. It is understandable that as a State agency with a 
considerably smaller budget and lower salaries for its personnel in comparison with 
those of privately-owned enterprises, there is pressure on SIPO’s management to 
generate extra revenue to improve the organisation’s finances. Nonetheless, the profit 
motive of business involvement in patent affairs makes the SIPO a direct beneficiary of 
the expansion of patenting. Thus, the SIPO’ motivation of revenue generation may have 
added another driving force encouraging the proliferation of patents in China. 
8.2.2 Resource limitation  
 
The disparity between the growing numbers of patent applications and constant 
examination resources can contribute to the poor quality of patent examination.719 The 
CPO is one of the fastest growing patent offices in the world. Between 1995 and 2007, 
filings in China grew on average by 23.9% a year, which is far above the growth rate of 
filings at the EPO and the USPTO. The CPO became the world’s second largest patent 
receiving office in 2010.720 The surge of patenting filing has led to a large and growing 
backlog of unprocessed patent applications at the office, since there are insufficient 
numbers of examiners to deal with the incoming load of patent applications.721 
According to SIPO, the CPO was staffed with 2844 personnel by 2008, with 1913 
examiners for invention patents, 312 for UM and Design patents, 249 for preliminary 
examination and flow management, and the rest for other supporting tasks.722 Also, 
IAM (Intellectual Asset Management) has reported that the SIPO  now has 5000 
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examiners and the rate of new recruits is growing at around 250 per year.723 Thus, 
growth is underway but like other major world patent offices, the CPO continues to 
experience patent backlog problems.724 Against this environment, the CPO confronts 
constant demands to improve its productivity. The pressure to accelerate the processing 
of patent examinations may induce examiners to be less rigorous in their application of 
the patent examination standards. In turn, this could have affected the quality of patents. 
8.2.3 Convergence with the Trilateral Offices’ practices 
 
The CPO has so increased its cooperation with the Trilateral Offices, the USPTO, EPO 
and JPO combined (TO) that its administrative patent practices have effectively 
converged with those of the TO. Most significantly, by incorporating TO patent 
examination techniques, the CPO has enhanced its ability to grant greater numbers of 
patents. Since the 1980s, the TO members have established powerful joint cooperative 
arrangements among themselves. Over time, this trilateral cooperation has brought 
greater compatibility and alignment among their technical systems for exchanging data 
and for the search and examination of applications. 725 At the same time, the TO members 
have also actively sought to integrate developing country patent offices into a global system 
of patent administration through ‘technical assistance’ programmes.726 China has been 
absorbed within such global patent administration system through bilateral and 
multilateral co-operation, such as the EU-China IPR 2 and the Five Offices Cooperation, 
which includes the USPTO, EPO, JPO, SIPO and KIPO. 727 These international 
technical assistance programmes have spread widely and deeply in the area of patent 
                                                 
723
 Wild, J (2011), 'Quality is China's Biggest Patent Challenge ', IAM Magazine, at <http://www.iam-
magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=e81c5421-bccc-4eb5-9895-f347443cf73e> 
724
 UK IPO ‘Patent backlog’ http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-types/pro-patent/p-policy/p-policy-backlog.htm. 
725
 Drahos, Peter (2007), '“Trust me”: Patent offices in developing countries', (ANU working paper), p6. 
726
 Ibid.,p33.  
727
 Trilateral 'Four Office Statistics Report 2008', available at http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr.html. 
 294 
administration. The EU-China IPR co-operation is useful illustration. Phase 1 of the co-
operation programme operated between 1999 and 2004. The main tasks of this phase 
aimed to support administrative, legislative and judicial reforms.728 The second phase of 
the project (EU-China IPR 2), launched in 2007, focuses on patent enforcement. 
Through this second co-operation phase, the EU aims to improve the effectiveness of 
the IPR enforcement system in China through technical assistance with Chinese 
legislative, judicial, administrative and enforcement institutions.729 
 
The Trilateral Offices, through their technical assistance programmes, not only help the 
CPO improve its efficiency but also influence its decision-making processes. Thus, the 
CPO is becoming increasingly integrated into the emerging global system of patent 
administration. The system is currently structured and operated under the principle of 
productive efficiency.730 It can be expected that the CPO will become more ‘efficient’ 
and grant many more pharmaceutical patents. This emphasis on efficiency may well be 
to the detriment of quality of patents unless the there is a shift to a more balanced 
administrative policy. 
8.4 Excessive patent litigation  
 
The proliferation of poor quality patents has generated a large, even excessive amount 
of patent litigation in China. Presumably mirroring the trend in patenting, China has 
become the country having the most IP litigation in the world.731 In the US, the 
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historical record number of civil patent cases in one year was 3075 in 2004. 732 In China, 
the number of civil patent cases in 2007, the earliest year that data was available, 
already exceeded the US record and stood at 4041 (Table 8.2). In 2010, the number of 
Chinese patent cases has grown further by 43% when compared to 2007 to a total of 
5785 cases. It is well established that excessive patent litigation can deter innovation, 
considering the involved high legal costs, long term in court, the expensive damages or 
settlement sums, and the patent troll problems.733 
 
Table 8.2 Patent litigation statistics (China vs US) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
China 4041 4074 4422 5785 
US 2896 2892 2744 2892 
 
 Sources: 
1. Intellectual Property Protection in China (2007) 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zwgs/zscqbps/200805/t20080505_395442.html 
2. Intellectual Property Protection in China (2008) 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zwgs/zscqbps/200904/t20090427_457166.html 
3. Intellectual Property Protection by Chinese Courts (2009) 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zscq/znss/201004/t20100426_4544.html 
4. PWC Patent Litigation Studies 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010.  
In addition to the poor quality of patents, the courts’ pro-patent stance could also have 
contributed to the growth of patent litigation.734 This is particularly the case with the 
Chinese courts because of their strong political and economic dependency on the 
government. In China, the judiciary is not designed as a constitutionally independent 
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branch of the government. The courts’ decisions are influenced by three sources of 
external influence: (1) constitutionally, courts are subject to the supervision of the NPC 
(legislature); the NPC exercises supervisory power over all administrative, judicial and 
procuratorial organs of the state,735 (2) politically, courts are subject to the leadership of 
the Party, and (3) economically, courts also depend on local governments for their 
budget. 736 With such affiliations, Chinese courts are expected to support the 
government’s innovation agenda and thus are more likely to embrace the state’s pro-
patent bias.  
As explored in Chapter 6, China’s compliance with and implementation of its 
obligations in multilateral treaties relating to patents has required it to increase judicial 
powers of enforcing both civil and criminal claims of patent-holders. This creates a 
judicial predisposition in their favour and strong procedures for the protection of their 
interests. The case study on Eli Lilly in section 6.3.2, for example, illustrated how the 
Chinese Pre-Litigation Injunction procedure required the court to issue and execute its 
injunction rapidly to benefit the patent-holder, despite eventual invalidation of most of 
its claims and great damages to the defendant and its ability to market its product. In 
addition, as the analysis of Chinese litigation summarized in Table 8.2 below shows, 
patent-holder plaintiffs have won in an average of 86% of the cases filed between 2006 
and 2009. This high average plaintiff win rate is another indication that there may be an 
inherent judicial preference in the system. More interestingly, China IP Litigation 
Analysis, created by Rouse, a leading foreign IP firm in China,737 has reported that the 
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average duration of proceedings for IPRs cases in China is only about 7 months (Table 
8.3). Compared with the average of 2 to 3 years’ duration in many other countries, this 
may suggest another cause for concern. 
The increase in litigation may indicate that there is a growing confidence in the Chinese 
litigation system and an enhanced ability of right-holders to protect and enforce their 
rights there. This development could promote higher level of R&D investment and thus 
innovation growth; however, paradoxically, it is just as likely that poor quality patents 
would also be increasingly protected and enforced.  
Table 8.3 IP litigation analysis in China (2006-2009) 
Years 
IPR cases 
filed  
IPR cases 
decided  
 Average duration 
of proceedings 
Average plaintiff 
win  
2006   7 months 84% 
2007 17877 17395 7 months 86% 
2008 24406 23518 7 months 84% 
2009 30626 30509 6 months 91% 
Average   6.75 months        86% 
 
Sources:  
1.   China IP litigation analysis: available at 
http://www.ciela.cn/Content2.aspx?pageId=14&ppId=3&language=en 
2.   Intellectual Property Protection in China (2007) 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zwgs/zscqbps/200805/t20080505_395442.html 
3.   Intellectual Property Protection in China (2008) 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zwgs/zscqbps/200904/t20090427_457166.html 
4,   Intellectual Property Protection by Chinese Courts (2009) 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zscq/znss/201004/t20100426_4544.html 
 
8.5 Concluding remarks:  
By building upon the previous empirical studies, this chapter identified a pressing 
concern with the Chinese patent system: patents of poor quality have become too easy 
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to obtain and enforce in China. The studies have indicated that this problem appears to 
be a product of the interplay of China’s adoption of the dominant global pro-patent 
policy, resource constraints, and lack of experience in patent administration and 
litigation. As a consequence, every year the system produces an astonishing number of 
low quality patents which have no relation with innovation. Furthermore, these poor 
patents generate excessive, deleterious patent litigation in China. Both these trends can 
impair innovation and undermine the intended objective of the patent system.  
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Chapter 9 Conclusions 
 
This thesis has drawn on empirical evidence and expert insights to determine the actual 
policy and economic effects of China’s implementation of TRIPS’ stronger patent rules 
on innovative capabilities of its pharmaceutical industry. Its findings can be summarised 
as: (1) China has not succeeded in establishing a pro-development patent regime under 
the TRIPS legal framework, but instead, has embraced an economic-oriented pro-patent 
approach to its patent law. (2)The effects of China’s pro-patent policy on innovation 
have been multifaceted and mixed. Whereas, positive effects of patent strengthening 
were indentified empirically through innovation indicators, including patent 
applications and grants, R&D expenditure and ITT inflow, Local innovation remains 
imitation-oriented, little R&D is devoted to researching cures for major diseases, more 
MNC patents control leading and upstream technologies, and patent litigation has 
greatly increased. (3) China’ experience may imply that the pro-patent approach in 
TRIPS implementation is not as constructive for economic development as the 
promoters have claimed and as many Chinese policymakers have assumed. China’s 
experience also demonstrates the challenges and experimental nature of the process 
involved for developing countries to design an optimal patent regime under the TRIPS 
legal framework. The three sections below discuss them in turn. 
9.1 The evolution of Chinese patent policy for pharmaceuticals 
 
Chinese law concerning protection for pharmaceutical patents has harmonized rapidly 
since 1984 to achieve numerous TRIPS-plus standards. Under its modern patent system 
introduced in 1984, pharmaceuticals were excluded from patentability, the patent term 
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was fifteen years, and the working requirement was provided under the compulsory 
licensing provision; however, these provisions were soon eliminated by the 1992 
amendment. Subsequently, patent protection standards were further broadened and 
strengthened under the 2000 amendment to fully conform with its obligations under 
TRIPS and other measures negotiated under bilateral IPR agreements. Immediately 
following its accession to the WTO in September 2001, China incorporated additional 
TRIPS-plus provisions in its drug registration and administrative laws. These included a 
6-year data exclusivity, a 7.5-year administrative patent protection rule specifically 
designed for foreign pharmaceutical products, and a US-style patent linkage system. 
Paradoxically, the built-in TRIPS flexibilities, such as the international exhaustion 
regime, the regulatory exception/early working exception and provisions on anti-
competitive practises were omitted from China’s TRIPS implementation until recently. 
As a result, Chinese law governing pharmaceutical patents has conferred more weight to 
protecting interests of rights producers and greater importance to the economic 
dimensions of the patent system, while considerably neglecting to balance concerns for 
right users’ interests and wider socio-economic issues.  
 
This ‘pro-patent’ approach is also evident in the execution of enforcement measures. 
Firstly, following this policy approach Chinese judicial bodies have been inclined to 
interpret TRIPS enforcement measures in a simplistic and imbalanced manner. The 
Chinese patent law has introduced provisions enhancing private control rights but has 
largely left out complementary rules of obligation safeguarding interests of rights users 
and the public. Secondly, Chinese criminal enforcement rules cover not only trademark 
and copyright but also patents and trade secrets. This is a higher standard than TRIPS 
requires. Thirdly, the pre-litigation injunction enforcement measure was structured for 
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the benefit and convenience of rights-holders. The fact that the requirements for 
granting an injunction order are so loosely defined and readily met by the applicants 
creates a risk of imposing damages unfairly on competing patent seekers and delaying 
the entry of valuable innovative medicines to the market. Thus, although China has 
more than met its international patent protection and enforcement obligations, it has 
neglected important domestic ones in the process of achieving this, 
 
This thesis has found a number of rationales behind China’s embrace of its particular 
pro-patent pharmaceutical regime. On the international sphere, China’s dependence on 
the US market and technology and US political influence on China’s accession to the 
WTO made it vulnerable to US demands to increased TRIPS implementation. 
Domestically, China’s adoption of an economic-centric development policy also 
channelled it towards favouring a TRIPS-plus approach to IPRs. Under the economic-
centric development policy, development was measured by economic indicators, such as 
the amount of gross domestic output (GDP), trade, and FDI flow, whereas humanitarian 
considerations, such as access to education and health care, employment opportunities, 
economic security, and political freedom, were of little concern. Law and legal reforms 
were viewed as institutional tools for the attainment of the economic agendas. This 
development policy has encouraged China to adhere to the private rights-centred 
conception of a patent system and a pro-patent policy. 
 
Finally, given the findings that China has adopted a pro-patent rather than a pro-
development policy towards pharmaceuticals, it follows to consider whether this study 
provides any guidance regarding the feasibility of developing countries’ building a pro-
development policy in compliance with their TRIPS obligations. China’s experience 
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demonstrates the challenges and experimental nature of the process involved for 
developing countries to design an optimal patent regime under the TRIPS legal 
framework. This is particularly potent for countries with conflicting legal cultures 
regarding property law. As seen with China, increasing IPR protections beyond the 
TRIPS requirements makes this process even more difficult even for countries like 
China with relatively stronger economic and institutional capacities. This thesis also 
found that the pro-patent approach in TRIPS implementation are not as constructive for 
economic development as the promoters have claimed and as many Chinese 
policymakers have assumed. Nonetheless, there are some policy spaces within the 
TRIPS regime that may be useful in furthering a pro-development policy that China has 
not utilised effectively in its TRIPS interpretation and implementation.  
9.2 Effects of Chinese pro-patent policy on innovation change  
 
This research has found that the effects of China’s pro-patent policy on innovation in 
the Chinese pharmaceutical industry are multifaceted and diverse. The establishment of 
a patent system and its continual improvement have introduced the rule of law and 
private property concepts to intellectual activities in China. Despite being at an early 
stage, these developments are making the Chinese market an increasingly secure, 
predictable and rewarding place to undertake R&D and trade high-technology goods. In 
this sense, the patent law has played a positive role in increasing both domestic and 
foreign interest in innovation and investment in China. Still, not all the effects are 
positive. 
 
This thesis has examined the State of local pharmaceutical innovation under both 
quantitative and qualitative standards. The empirical analyses found strong evidence to 
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support the above propositions. The number of pharmaceutical patents filed to the 
Chinese patent office has grown at an average rate of 22 % between 1987 and 2007 
(Appendix .1), and the number of pharmaceutical patents granted have grown by as 
much as 24 % (Appendix 2). The increasing growth of domestic patenting began in 
1984 with the introduction of the patent system, whereas foreign patenting started to 
grow later in 1992 after China introduced a product patent regime for pharmaceuticals. 
This indicates at least a quantitative increase in innovation. 
 
The research has also found that patent incentives have contributed to a measurable 
growth in pharmaceutical R&D activities and investment in China. In terms of the 
inflow of FDI and ITT, the thesis examined the evolution of the composition of FDI 
inflow from the world’s top 12 pharmaceutical MNCs to China before and after the 
2000 patent reform. It found that in the 1980-90s when China had a weak patent system, 
all 12 MNCs had limited their operations to forms of distribution or manufacturing, but 
following the 2000 patent reform in line with TRIPS requirements, R&D-oriented FDI 
emerged from most of the sampled MNCs. Moreover, in recent years local players also 
successfully developed, patented and commercialized a number of innovative gene 
therapy drugs. 
 
On the other hand, these innovation and investment statistics cannot be interpreted 
narrowly and simplistically, and the roles of patents in China need to be understood 
qualitatively along with the following five complementary aspects. Firstly, the 
economic effects of patent policy have to be understood together with other 
indispensable economic and policy factors. As the survey in chapter 7 has shown, there 
are other important factors also attributable to the growth of innovation, FDI and ITT in 
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the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. These specifically include national fiscal and 
industrial policies, national funding initiatives, market advantages and human resources. 
  
Secondly, a significant portion of Chinese pharmaceutical patents may actually 
represent impediments to innovation. This is because China’s pro-patent policy has 
rendered numerous patents of low quality that are too easy to obtain and enforce. This 
has caused a proliferation of poor quality patents and excessive patent litigation. These 
trends not only hurt innovation but also distort the incentive rationales of the patent 
system. The case study in Chapter 6 illustrated how Eli Lilly’s poor quality patent had 
disrupted generic competition and local innovation. 
 
Thirdly, Chinese domestic innovation has not made as much progress in the 
pharmaceutical industry as its policymakers had expected. Chapter 7 has revealed that 
the Chinese pharmaceutical industry has retained its long-standing imitation-oriented 
nature. No NCEs have been produced locally since the patent incentive mechanism was 
introduced two decades ago. Chinese patents are overwhelming characterised by 
imitative and follow-on technology, while the patents held by foreign rights owners are 
largely associated with leading or upstream technologies. The presence of such foreign 
patents in China is rising and foreign rights holders are increasingly inclined to use their 
rights strategically in competition against local rivals. These trends impose high 
economic, technological and legal costs on Chinese follow-on innovation, thus make the 
catch-up more difficult. 
 
Fourthly, the geographical distribution of FDI and IT benefits are uneven. The survey 
has shown that the emerging R&D-oriented FDI projects are overwhelmingly 
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concentrated in Beijing and Shanghai or cities in close proximity to them (Table 7.4). 
Such geographical distribution of R&D-oriented FDI implies that the majority of 
domestic pharmaceutical companies are excluded from the benefits induced by the 
strengthening of patent protection, while they also have to bear higher operating costs 
resulting from such legal change. These disadvantages impose serious burdens on the 
business prospects of these companies. This could have implications on access to 
medicine and local employment, given that these companies are important providers of 
low cost medicines and local jobs.  
 
Lastly, the increasing R&D activities have not responded properly to the primary local 
health needs. The patent analysis in Survey 3 in section 7.2 above has revealed that the 
quotient/ratio of patent application filings associated with therapeutic treatments for the 
infectious diseases was the lowest with an average of 0.0006, while the relevant ratios 
related to the chronic disease and the sampled lifestyle therapies were 0.0045 and 
0.0050, respectively, approximately eight times greater than the former. These results 
support the view that the patent incentive may not be effective in improving the 
inadequate R&D efforts devoted to research into cures for the diseases essentially 
important to Chinese patients, particularly the poor. 
 
Put together, the examination of China’s experience has provided several important 
lessons for developing countries about the roles of stronger patents required by the 
TRIPS Agreement in inducing indigenous innovation First of all, as far as the economic 
effects are concerned, it is submitted that China’s experience cannot be applied 
generally to other developing countries, given China’s unique political and business 
conditions. Nonetheless, the Chinese experience may testify to the proposition that 
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TRIPS obligations make technological catch-up more difficult, at least in the context of 
the pharmaceutical industry, and a pro-patent approach to pharmaceuticals may be not 
well-suited to the growth of indigenous innovation, which largely relies on reverse-
engineering.  
9.3 Implications and directions for further research  
 
The primary goal of China’s national IPR strategic plan is to promote China as one of 
the world’s most important centres for technological innovation through the policy of 
stronger and increased numbers of patent filings by 2020.738 The pharmaceutical 
industry is one of 16 strategic sectors in which China desires to achieve this goal.739 But 
this research finds that so far, strengthening patent protection by TRIPS or TRIPS-plus 
standards has promoted the growth of patenting, but not advancements in the innovation 
level of the industry. Given the findings of this thesis, particularly the persistence of 
domestic imitative and follow-on innovation and increasing foreign litigation tactics and 
superiority in pharmaceutical patents in the Chinese and world markets, China’s 
expectation that a stronger patent regime can engender faster catch-up is likely to be 
frustrated. 
 
Despite its dissatisfaction with the role of patents in fostering local pharmaceutical 
innovation in China, the Chinese patent office and other nation’s patent offices can be 
reasonably expected to continue to grant increasing numbers of pharmaceutical patents 
to Chinese nationals, with little regard for the technical value they present. Given the 
diverse interests in the expansion of patent rights, this prospect may fulfil the intended 
                                                 
738
 Para II.2 (6) The state council (2008), 'Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy’. 
739
 Para IV,1(16), Ibid. 
 307 
policy goals of the law drafters, but it casts shadows on the campaign for better access 
to medicines both domestically and internationally.  
 
The empirical studies herein have also indicated that Chinese ignorance of the 
development implications of IPRs may be the greatest concern with the TRIPS 
Agreement in China. Early in its introduction to these new rights, China had abandoned 
the TRIPS flexibilities and agreed to TRIPS-plus standards on medicines, and it was not 
until the 2008 patent law amendment that the TRIPS flexibilities were accommodated 
into national law, while all TRIPS-plus provisions remain in force. As reviewed in 
Chapters 4 and 8, that decision was not well-informed. Generally, it is assumed that 
legislators should not make decisions without full knowledge of the appropriateness and 
various implications it will have on domestic law and the national interest. There should 
be particular care paid to the introduction of a legal concept fundamentally new to its 
legal culture, such as is the idea and issues of intellectual property. Chinese decision-
makers, despite their crash course on the subject compelled by China’s WTO 
membership, remain novices in their understanding and experience in this area and 
particularly regarding the roles of patents in economic and social development. This 
limits China’s ability to make informed policy decisions. 
 
 Just as problematic is the fact that personnel involved in IP law-making and 
management in China have been deeply influenced by the international legal framework. 
As discussed above, the global IPRs regime is systemically biased in favour of patent-
holder rights. The work of the patent office, drug administration, courts, and other 
administrative bodies has tended to adhere to the political dogma that ‘patents are good 
for innovation and economy’ and ‘the more and stronger the patents, the greater the 
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economic efficiency’. Meanwhile, considerations of public health and the wider socio-
economic issues have been neglected. With such scant IP experience and the influence 
of unbalanced information, China has great challenges in establishing an optimal patent 
system that is truly compatible with its internal economic and social interests while 
fulfilling its international obligations.  
 
Therefore, there is an urgent need to address the asymmetry of the existing IP-related 
foreign assistance, and to help China to develop its national patent system on the basis 
of balanced information. It is submitted that Chinese policymakers should consult 
international non-governmental organisations for IP and health (IP/health INGOs) in its 
patent policy formulation and implementation processes. These NGOs have 
accumulated experience and knowledge in assisting other developing countries in 
forming their pro-health IP policies and supporting their negotiations in multilateral 
agreements.740  
 
Yet, IP/health INGO engagement with China seems to be rather limited in these areas. 
In comparison with other large developing countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa, 
although China may have relatively stronger IPRs institutions, its experience and 
substantive knowledge on IPRs and development may be weaker. Given the influence 
of Chinese patent policy on access to medicine nationally and internationally, IP/health 
INGOs’ research on Chinese health-related patent issues could contribute 
supplementary policy suggestions from pro-health and pro-development perspectives 
useful to China and other countries. After thirty years of Chinese experience in 
international economic legal relations, the law-making process has become more 
                                                 
740
 Matthews, D. (2006 b) 'NGOs, Intellectual Property Rights and Multilateral Institutions' (ESRC). 
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transparent and accessible domestically or internationally, but the state and the CPC 
continue to exercise absolute authority in the development of China’s legislation. The 
low political tolerance for public participation and foreign intervention may impose 
great challenges for international NGOs’ engagement efforts in China.  
 
In addition to the initiatives aiming to balance information asymmetry in Chinese patent 
policy-making processes, there are other interesting topics waiting for more empirical 
studies. The most compelling question is whether or how China can make effective use 
of TRIPS flexibilities while it is bound by TRIPS-plus provisions. What are the possible 
legal barriers to this objective? What policy options can be made available to soften the 
restrictions imposed by TRIPS-plus provisions? Finally, if it could be shown, 
comparatively and empirically, that other TRIPS implementation approaches, adopted 
by countries in a similar position to China, achieved greater benefits in terms of 
innovation and health welfare, this would increase political awareness and the will to 
reform the current patent regime.  
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Appendix 1: The annual growth rate of A61 patents filed to the Chinese patent 
office (1987-2006) 
 
Years 
Aggregate 
Number 
Annual growth 
rate Inventions Utility models 
1987 1089  340 749 
1988 1799 65% 457 1342 
1989 1861 3% 495 1366 
1990 2268 22% 664 1604 
1991 2833 25% 750 2083 
1992 4081 44% 1049 3032 
1993 5789 42% 2090 3699 
1994 6227 8% 2326 3901 
1995 6177 -1% 2911 3266 
1996 6203 0% 2700 3503 
1997 7589 22% 4431 3158 
1998 5720 -25% 2353 3367 
1999 8757 53% 5115 3642 
2000 9296 6% 4827 4469 
2001 12509 35% 6705 5804 
2002 13196 5% 7216 5980 
2003 16583 26% 9953 6630 
2004 17448 5% 10059 7389 
2005 24875 43% 16730 8145 
2006 33401 34% 22713 10688 
 
Average  22%   
 
Notes:  
1. The sources of data are the Chinese patent statistic books from 1987 to 2006.  
2. The calculations are executed by the author with the assistance of Excel Sheet.  
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Appendix 2: The annual growth rate of A61 patents granted by the Chinese patent 
office (1987-2006) 
 
Years 
Aggregate 
number 
Annual growth 
rate Invention Utility models 
1987 377  13 364 
1988 639 69% 32 607 
1989 1002 57% 54 948 
1990 1146 14% 79 1067 
1991 1350 18% 118 1232 
1992 1719 27% 128 1591 
1993 3526 105% 246 3280 
1994 2891 -18% 218 2673 
1995 2517 -13% 173 2344 
1996 2084 -17% 138 1946 
1997 2250 8% 187 2063 
1998 2555 14% 256 2299 
1999 4865 90% 661 4204 
2000 5285 9% 1204 4081 
2001 4781 -10% 1387 3394 
2002 5367 12% 1454 3913 
2003 6838 27% 2605 4233 
2004 9094 33% 4426 4668 
2005 10179 12% 4967 5212 
2006 12279 21% 4995 7284 
 
Average  24%   
 
Notes 
1. The sources of data are the Chinese patent statistic books from 1987 to 2006.  
The calculations are executed by the author with the assistance of Excel Sheet. 
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